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I. INTRODUCrION
MICHAEL R. MOODIE, S.J.*
To function as a vital force in the life of a society, a system of
law must express those values considered fundamental to the soci-
ety's continued existence. Thomas Aquinas, when considering the
nature of law and the appropriate object of legislation, emphasized
the essential link between morality and law: whereas law expresses
a moral judgment, and some actions support or do not support the
good of society, not all morality is enacted into law. Rather, only
those values central to the life of the society and the welfare of its
citizens play a part.
A study of comparative law discloses the variety of fundamen-
tal values in diverse legal systems. The contrast between varying
legal values helps delineate the underlying values and themes in
one's own legal matrix-values and themes often difficult to per-
ceive because of the proximity of one's perspective. In an increas-
* J.C.D., Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, 1984; M. Div., Jesuit School of
Theology, Berkeley, 1979; B.A., Gonzaga University, 1973. Father Moodie is currently the
Director of Campus Ministry and an Adjunct Professor of Canon Law at Loyola Law
School in Los Angeles. He has also served as a judge in the tribunals of the Archdioceses
of San Francisco and Los Angeles.
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ingly interrelated world, an appreciation of competing values may
increase opportunities for mutual understanding, cooperation, and
respect.
This symposium offers perspectives from three religious law
traditions: Roman Catholicism, Islam, and Judaism. Each of the
three legal traditions offers a comprehensive, normative system
that translates doctrine into practice and religious values into con-
crete directives. While the place of theological law differs in the
respective religious bodies, each body asserts a binding authority
over its confessional members.
In preparing the symposium, the editors adopted a format of
responses to specific fact patterns that raise pertinent issues in fa-
milial life. These fact patterns were presented to legal writers from
the three traditions, who were then asked to respond to the situa-
tions within the context of their own religious law. It is interesting
to note that not only do the authors' conclusions differ on each
subject, but so do their underlying beliefs about the pertinent is-
sues raised by the fact patterns. Our laws express values that are
rooted in religious doctrine and belief; as the beliefs differ, so do
their concrete expressions in the law.
The editors wish to acknowledge and thank Gerald T. Mc-
Laughlin, Dean of Loyola Law School, for both suggesting the
topic of the symposium and assisting in its development. It is
through such comparative studies that jurists may more thoroughly
understand the manifold contributions of religious legal systems to
American law and the particular religious values that provide the
basis for American legal thought.
II. DuTy TO EDUCATE-FACr PATTERN
Part A
Fred and Ethel are a married couple living in rural Ruritania.
They are wealthy farmers, as were their parents before them. They
have a child named Johnny, who is lovingly raised by them.
Ruritania provides free education for every citizen; however,
education is not compulsory. Neither Fred nor Ethel were formally
educated, so they see no reason for Johnny to receive a formal edu-
cation. They consider no other future for Johnny other than farm-
ing. Therefore, they do not allow him to obtain a formal education,
even though Johnny appears bright and says that he wants to go to
school and learn.
1993]
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Later, when Johnny reaches adulthood, he has his intelligence
tested. He is discovered to be a near genius in natural ability. No
university, however, will take this unschooled young man. He is
now locked into a farming career, as his options have been nar-
rowed significantly by his lack of formal education. Johnny is so
unhappy with his situation that he wishes to sue his parents for a
breach of the duty to educate him. He comes to you to inquire
whether your laws can help him. His parents desire the same
advice.
Part B
David and Mary share the same religious faith and are actively
committed to it. As their children approach school age, however,
David and Mary become increasingly concerned about the moral
environment the children will find in school. They agree that no
social environment is value-free, and that the public school system
fosters an environment of moral relativism repugnant to them.
They consider this environment to constitute a secular religion that
contradicts their own faith.
David and Mary also believe they have the fundamental right
to choose the educational environment of their children, as they,
not the state, are primarily responsible for their children's welfare.
David and Mary conclude that their tax money spent on education
should be allocated to the school of their choice. For the state to
refuse to allocate funds to the school of their choice would be tan-
tamount to establishing a secular religion and thus denying individ-
uals the free exercise of their own. They plan to bring suit and
desire your advice.
A. Roman Catholic Response
JAMES CONN, S.J.*
Part A
As in Anglo-American law, the Roman Catholic moral and
canonical traditions require both a substantive and procedural
analysis of the instant case. Substantively, the question is whether
Johnny has a right to a formal education. If the answer is yes, we
* Father Conn is Vice President and a Professor of Canon Law at St. Mary's
Seminary and University, Baltimore, Maryland.
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must then analyze the procedures by which Johnny may vindicate
that right.
The relevant legislation on the issue of Johnny's right to be
educated is found in the most recent Code of Canon Law,' based
on the teaching of the popes and of the Second Vatican Council.
Specifically, there are sixteen canons that enumerate the obliga-
tions and rights of the Christian faithful. 2 For example, Canon 217
assures all members of the Church "the right to a Christian educa-
tion by which they will be properly instructed so as to develop the
maturity of a human person and at the same time come to know
and live the mystery of salvation." 3 In referring here and else-
where to "Christian education" or "Catholic education" of the
young, the Code does not intend to limit the object of the right to
religious instruction. Human maturity that comes from proper in-
struction in a variety of disciplines is seen as an antecedent condi-
tion to knowledge of the things of God.4 Canon 795, found in the
section of the Code that deals with the Church's teaching function,
further elucidates this principle when it says:
Since a true education must strive for the integral formation of
the human person, a formation which looks toward the person's
final end, and at the same time toward the common good of
societies, children and young people are to be so reared that
they can develop harmoniously their physical, moral and intel-
lectual talents, that they acquire a more perfect sense of respon-
sibility and a correct use of freedom, and that they be educated
for active participation in social life.5
While the Code does not consider formal schooling to be the
only appropriate means of education, it recognizes such institution-




4. The source for Canon 217 as cited in the Code is Paragraph 2 of the Second Vati-
can Council's Declaration on Christian Education. Paragraph 2 emphasizes the religious
character of Christian education. Paragraph 1, on which Paragraph 2 builds, deals with
education as a means of promoting brotherly association among peoples, as well as unity
and peace on earth. Education is to rely on advances in psychology and in the art and
science of teaching. The universal and inalienable right to education has been a consistent
teaching of the twentieth century popes, beginning with the Encyclical Letter of Pope Pius
XI, Divini llius Magistri (Dec. 31, 1929), reprinted in 2 JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J., SOCIAL
WELLSPRINOS (1942) [hereinafter Encyclical Letter].
5. 1983 CODE c.795.
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796, describes schools to be "[a]mong educational means the Chris-
tian faithful should greatly value."'6
Attendant to the right to education is the obligation of par-
ents, schools, and the Church and its pastors to educate. Canon
226, one of the central enumerated rights and obligations listed at
the beginning of the Code's treatment of "The People of God" in
Book II, states: "Because they have given life to their children,
parents have a most serious obligation and enjoy the right to edu-
cate them; therefore Christian parents are especially to care for the
Christian education of their children according to the teaching
handed on by the Church." 7
Indeed, the education of children falls within the Code's very
definition of marriage, as it states: "The matrimonial covenant, by
which a man and woman establish between themselves a partner-
ship of the whole of life, is by its nature ordered toward the good of
the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring ....
The role of schools is ancillary but significant. According to
Canon 796, schools "are of principal assistance to parents in fulfil-
ling their educational task." 9 Similarly, the clergy and the Church
at large have a responsibility to aid parents in educating children.
Canon 528, for example, obliges the parish priest to take special
care for the Catholic education of children and young adults.10
Once again, it should be noted that Catholic education is not re-
stricted to religious indoctrination. Rather, the whole person is to
be developed by an integrated educational philosophy ideally
rooted in Christian and Catholic principles. Elsewhere, Canon 794
affirms that the "duty and right of educating belongs in a unique
way to the Church which has been divinely entrusted with the mis-
sion to assist men and women so that they can arrive at the fullness
of the Christian life.""1 Bishops and clergy, therefore, "have the
duty to arrange all things so that all the faithful may enjoy a Catho-
lic education." 12
From the foregoing prescriptions of canon law, the following
seems evident: Johnny has a right to a Catholic education. Further,
6. Ld. c.796, § 1.
7. Id. c.226, § 2.
8. Id. c.1055, § 1.
9. Id. c.796, § 1.
10. Id c.528, § 1.
11. Id. c.794, § 1.
12. Id. § 2.
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that right is to be broadly understood as including education in the
areas of cultural literacy that contribute to human maturity and in-
tegration and provide a foundation for intellectual and spiritual
formation in the Christian tradition. Johnny's parents have an obli-
gation to provide him with an education that reasonably accommo-
dates his intellectual abilities. Formal education in schools is a
recognized means of fulfilling this obligation. Indeed, the clergy
and the Church itself shared Johnny's parents' responsibility and,
thus, contributed to their failure.
How, then, might Johnny vindicate this violated right? While
the procedural question is answerable in theory, it is, practically
speaking, a more complicated problem than it may first appear. In
the sixth chapter of his First Letter to the Corinthians, Saint Paul
wrote:
When one of you has a grievance against a brother, does he dare
go to law before the unrighteous instead of the saints? Do you
not know that the saints will judge the world? And if the world
is to be judged by you, are you incompetent to try trivial cases?
Do you not know that we are to judge angels? How much more,
matters pertaining to this life! If, then, you have such cases, why
do you lay them before those who are least esteemed by the
church? I say this to your shame. Can it be that there is no man
among you wise enough to decide between members of the
brotherhood, but brother goes to law against brother, and that
before unbelievers? 13
This injunction against Christians who settled disputes among
themselves by consulting secular authority gave rise to the adjudi-
cation of such conflicts by ecclesiastical authority, first by the
bishop himself and later by an ecclesiastical tribunal to which the
bishop had delegated his judicial power. Over the centuries, deci-
sions of ecclesiastical tribunals were recognized and enforced by
secular powers. Today, ecclesiastical courts are popularly viewed
as dealing exclusively with matters of Church discipline and, more
specifically, with the validity of marriage.
At least in theory, however, the law of the Church extends the
ecclesiastical tribunal's authority much farther. Canon 1400 states
that the object of an ecclesiastical trial is "to prosecute or to vindi-
cate rights of physical or juridic persons, or to declare juridic facts"
13. 1 Corinthians 6:1-5 (Revised Standard Version).
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and "to impose or declare the penalty for offenses. ' 14 Physical per-
sons are individuals, while juridic persons in canon law are
equivalent to corporations. Johnny, by virtue of his baptism, is a
person with rights and duties.15 Those rights can be vindicated
before a tribunal. The right to education, as we have seen, is guar-
anteed by the Code and, while it is not the sort of spiritual matter
over which the Church would claim exclusive jurisdiction, 16 it is at
least the object of the Church's jurisdiction, concurrent with that of
secular power. In Ruritania, for example, the Church would have
special cause for concern because the absence of a compulsory ed-
ucation statute suggests that children may not be considered as
having a civil right to education over the objection of their parents.
Johnny would have had no cause of action in a Ruritanian civil
court.
It is important to note that Church tribunals do not ordinarily
deal with disputes like the one between Johnny and his parents.
Because of the unusual character of the case, if Johnny were to
seek the service of a tribunal to vindicate his right, it is likely that
the judge would require Johnny to have an advocate, or canon law-
yer, present Johnny's case to the tribunal. Parties may freely
choose their advocates. While the law permits petitioners and re-
spondents to act pro se in ecclesiastical trials, the judge may re-
quire the services of an advocate. 17 It should be noted, however,
that while an advocate can be helpful, his role is not crucial be-
cause a canonical trial is not adversarial. The judge has broad dis-
cretion to act in the interests of justice, regardless of whether the
advocates make the requisite arguments or not. Johnny would be
well advised, as would his parents, to locate a canonist reasonably
well-versed on the issue. Both parties could find this a difficult
task, however, as most canon lawyers who deal with ecclesiastical
courts do so in the circumscribed field of matrimonial
jurisprudence.
Through his advocate, Johnny would then be obliged to submit
a complaint (libellus) which must, among other things, "indicate
the basis for the petitioner's right and at least in general the facts
and proofs which will be used to prove what has been alleged."' 8
14. 1983 CODE c.1400, § 1.
15. Id. c.96.
16. Id. c.1401.
17. Id. c.1481, § 1.
18. Id. c.1504, 20.
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When a judge has competence and a petitioner has standing, a
properly executed complaint can only be rejected "if from the libel-
lus itself it is certainly obvious that it lacks any basis whatsoever
and that it is impossible that any such basis would appear through a
process." 19 Strange as it may appear, therefore, Johnny's com-
plaint is valid on its face.
Although canonical justice is not an adversarial system, a can-
onist should be cautious about giving advice to contentious parties,
and should definitely avoid doing so once the process begins. Prior
to filing the complaint, however, I would advise Ethel and Fred
that their best argument would be that they provided for Johnny's
education through means other than formal schooling. After all,
Canon 793 allows parents the choice of "those means and institu-
tions through which they can provide more suitably for the Catho-
lic education of the children according to local circumstances." 20
While the facts do not suggest such a hypothesis, parents could rea-
sonably argue that they withheld their children from the public
school system because it was inimical to Catholic faith and morals.
Even if this were the case, however, Fred and Ethel were appar-
ently prosperous enough to send Johnny to a private school, Catho-
lic or otherwise, if one existed in their area. Based on the details of
the case as presented, there seems little by way of tenable argu-
ment for the behavior of Fred and Ethel.
It is not clear what sort of damages Johnny is seeking to re-
cover from his parents. Certainly, money damages would be ap-
propriate to provide for remedial education. Anything beyond
that, such as compensation for lost earning power in the profession
of his choice, would appear to fall outside the scope of the right to
education as guaranteed by canon law. Ecclesiastical tribunals
rarely award money damages, although the Code permits them to
do So.
2 1
A further matter to be considered is the binding force of a
judgment in Johnny's favor. Could civil authority order Fred and
19. Id c.1505, § 2,4.
20. Id c.793, § 1.
21. For example, Section 2 of Canon 1655, which provides for the manner in which
the appropriate bishop of the diocese executes a judge's sentence, reads as follows:
[A]s regards personal actions, when the respondent is condemned to furnish
something mobile, to pay money, or to give or to do something else, the judge in
the text of the sentence, or the executor with personal discretion and prudence is
to set a time limit for fulfilling the obligation ....
Id. c.1655, § 2.
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Ethel to pay Johnny the damages awarded by the ecclesiastical
court? It could perhaps be argued that their Church membership
and participation in the ecclesiastical trial created a quasi-contract
to which they agreed to be parties. Otherwise, the enforcement
would be left to the authority of the bishop executing the judg-
ment, who would have at his disposal the Church's penal remedies
to impose on the party failing to comply.
While many of the foregoing comments are theoretically valid,
they would likely strike diocesan judges as altogether impractical,
as such judges are faced with a heavy burden of marriage cases.
They would probably recommend, as does the law itself,22 that the
parties submit themselves to a form of mediation or arbitration.
Many dioceses have mechanisms in place that are intended to func-
tion as the Pauline injunction provides, namely, to have fellow be-
lievers not take one another to law but to submit themselves to the
judgment of someone within the community of faith.
Finally, both parties to the dispute should consider the even
more radical advice of Saint Paul: "To have lawsuits at all with one
another is defeat for you. Why not rather suffer a wrong? Why
not rather be defrauded? But you yourselves wrong and defraud,
and that even your own brethren."23
Part B
Some elements of the argument in favor of David and Mary
are well grounded in traditional Catholic teaching on both the right
of parents to choose schools for their children and the principle of
distributive justice. The principle of distributive justice holds that
the state should render appropriate financial assistance to parents
so that they can effectively exercise their right to choose a school
for their children; such financial support by the state of parental
educational choice is consistent with Catholic teaching. It is quite a
different matter, however, to assert that public schools constitute
the establishment of a secular religion, and that the refusal of fi-
nancial support to parents who choose other schools infringes upon
their free exercise of religion. The former is a proposition of social
ethics and moral theology; the latter is a question of constitutional
law.
22. See id cc.1716-1731.
23. 1 Corinthians 6:7-8 (Revised Standard Version).
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The assertion of David and Mary that parents, and not the
state, are primarily responsible for their children's welfare is in per-
fect harmony with the classic teaching on the subject by Pope Pius
XI. In Paragraph 31 of his 1929 Encyclical Letter, he writes:
The family therefore holds directly from the Creator the mission
and hence the right to educate the offspring, a right inalienable
because inseparably joined to a strict obligation, a right anterior
to any right whatever of civil society and of the state, and there-
fore inviolable on the part of any power on earth.24
In Paragraph 36 of the same letter, Pius XI cited the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters25 as confirming au-
thority for the view that natural law forbids the state from forcing
children to be instructed exclusively in public schools.26
Canon 1374 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law prohibited Cath-
olic children from attending non-Catholic, neutral, or mixed
schools.27 Public schools in the United States fell into the second
category of "neutral" schools, wherein religious instruction is op-
tional, omitted, or positively excluded. Only the local bishop, fol-
lowing instructions from the Holy See, could determine the
circumstances and the precautions against the perversion of faith
and morals that made such schools tolerable for Catholic children
to attend. Such circumstances included the total absence of Catho-
lic schools or their unsuitability for the education of children with
special needs; even then, public schools were permissible only if
proper safeguards protected faith and morals.28
While these legal restrictions reflected a negative presumption
about public schools and were not included in the 1983 Code, the
natural law principle remains that children are not to be exposed to
situations and institutions that will be dangerous to their faith and
morals. Catholic parents are, therefore, "obliged and enjoy the
right to educate their offspring. In addition, Catholic parents have
a duty and a right to select those means and institutions through
which they can provide more suitably for Catholic education under
24. Encyclical Letter, supra note 4, at 97.
25. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
26. Encyclical Letter, supra note 4, at 99.
27. 1917 CODE c.1374.
28. See T. LINCOLN BOUSCAREN, SJ. & ADAM C. ELLIS, S.J., CANON LAW: A TEXT
AND COMMENTARY 762-64 (2d ed. 1951). See also JAMES J. CONN, S.J., CATHOLIC UNI-
vERsrrIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITY 15-16 (1991).
1993]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
local circumstances." 29 More specifically, the law requires Catholic
parents "to entrust their children to those schools in which Catho-
lic education is provided." 30 In the United States, obviously, their
choice would be limited to private schools and, in all practicality, to
Catholic schools. Instead of forbidding attendance at public
schools, the canon focuses on the parents' obligation to provide
religious education. According to the Canon, "if they are unable to
[send their children to a school that provides Catholic education],
they are bound to provide for their suitable Catholic education
outside the schools." 31 Discretion is left to the parents themselves
in determining when they are "unable" to send their children to
Catholic schools. Issues to be considered could reasonably include
location, cost, and quality.
The view of David and Mary that the state should give finan-
cial support to their educational choice is upheld by the classic view
articulated by Pope Pius XI, who states in his 1929 Encyclical
Letter:
And let no one say that in a nation where there are different
religious beliefs, it is impossible to provide for public instruction
otherwise than by neutral or mixed schools. In such a case it
becomes the duty of the state, indeed it is the easier and more
reasonable method of procedure, to leave free scope to the initi-
ative of the Church and family, while giving them such assist-
ance as justice demands.32
The Second Vatican Council takes up this same theme in its
Declaration on Christian Education, where it states:
Parents, who have the first and inalienable duty and right to ed-
ucate their children, should enjoy true freedom in their choice of
schools. Consequently, public authority, which has the obliga-
tion to oversee and defend the liberties of citizens, ought to see
to it, out of a concern for distributive justice, that public subsi-
dies are allocated in such a way that, when selecting schools for
their children, parents are genuinely free to follow their
consciences.33
The 1983 Code offers a variation on the theme, not by impos-
ing an obligation on the state, but by affirming the right of parents
29. 1983 CODE c.793, § 1.
30. Id. c.798.
31. Id.
32. Encyclical Letter, supra note 4, at 114, para. 83.
33. WALTER M. ABBOTr, S.J., THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 644 (1966).
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"to make use of those aids to be furnished by civil society which
they need in order to obtain Catholic education for their chil-
dren. '3 4 The Code further urges the faithful to exercise their influ-
ence as citizens so that the government will provide parents with
resources to ensure educational choice and, thus, make suitable
provision for religious and moral education consistent with the
conscience of parents.
3 5
Neither the Council nor the 1983 Code condemn public educa-
tion. It would, therefore, be difficult for David and Mary to argue
that support of public education through their tax dollars is con-
trary to the moral teaching of the Catholic religion. Indeed, there
are reasonable grounds for arguing that they have a moral obliga-
tion as good citizens to contribute to the legitimate educational
objectives of the state. It would be difficult to argue on Establish-
ment Clause grounds that public education constitutes a civil reli-
gion, for religion is more than a moral code. Further, there is no
evidence to suggest that the schools to which David and Mary ob-
ject are fostering religion as it is commonly understood. As long as
David and Mary have the right to choose a private school for their
children, their Free Exercise rights have not been violated. The
Supreme Court has not yet held that the financial inability of citi-
zens to exercise a right constitutes an infringement of that right by
the government. Even if David and Mary were to argue that ex-
emption from taxes in support of public schools would render them
financially capable of choosing a religious school for their children,
the government's contention that it has a legitimate interest in tax-
ing all of its citizens to support public education would probably
prevail, especially given the current climate of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
David and Mary correctly assert their right to choose their
children's schools. They properly represent the consistent teaching
of the Catholic Church that the state should enable parents to sub-
sidize the school of their choice. Their constitutional arguments,
however, are weak. The government has not directly denied David
and Mary their Free Exercise right of choice by compelling all chil-
dren to attend public schools. Nor does the morally neutral or in-
imical teaching of public schools constitute an establishment of
34. 1983 CODE c.793, § 2.
35. See id. cc.797, 799.
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religion, as public schools prescind from religion in the ordinarily
accepted sense of the word as "divine belief' and "worship."
B. Islamic Response
AzIzAH Y. AL-HIBRI*
This problem involves at least four issues relevant to Islamic
law: (1) the Islamic position on education; (2) the obligation of par-
ents to educate their children; (3) the nature of relations within the
Muslim family; and (4) available remedies against one's parents.
Part A
1. The Islamic Position on Education
Prophet Muhammad, who carried the message of Islam, was
illiterate. The first divine word revealed to him was the imperative:
"Read."1 The rest of the Qur'an is replete with verses that empha-
size the importance of the pursuit of knowledge. For example, the
Qur'an exhorts Muslims to ask God to increase their knowledge. 2
It underscores the importance of knowledge: "God elevates by sev-
eral degrees the ranks of those of you who believe and those who
have knowledge."' 3 The Qur'an even asks rhetorically in one pas-
sage, "Say, are those two equal: those who know and those who do
not know?"'4
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; Member
of the Advisory Board of the American Muslim Council, Washington, D.C.; Advisor to the
Islamic Medical Association of North America; President, Muslim Women Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights.
The research for this Essay and the author's other Essays for this Symposium were
supported by a research grant from The T.C. Williams School of Law at the University of
Richmond and a travel grant from the University of Richmond. I would like to thank Dr.
Fathi Osman, Resident Scholar at the Islamic Center of Southern California, for his
valuable discussion with me on the subject of this Essay. I would also like to thank my
research assistant, Ms. Leila Sayeh, a Tunisian attorney, for her valuable research
assistance.
1. The first part of the surah says in full: "Read in the name of God the Creator.
God created the human being from a [mere] clinging clot. Read and God is the most
noble, who taught with the pen. He taught the human being what that being did not
know." QUR'AN XCVI:I-5 (A. Yusuf Ali trans., 1983). Although the author generally
relies on this translated version of the Qur'an, the translation was modified whenever the
author deemed it appropriate.
2. Id. at XX:114.
3. Id. at LVIII:11.
4. Id. at XXXIX:9.
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The Prophet himself emphasized the importance of knowledge
and education. Because his statements (the Hadith) are an impor-
tant source of Islamic jurisprudence, second only to the Qur'an,
they are a useful guide on this subject. The most famous state-
ments are the following: "Scholars are the heirs of prophets"; 5 "all
that is in heaven and earth asks God's forgiveness for a scholar";
6
"pursuit of knowledge is the duty of every Muslim"; 7 and "pursue
knowledge even if you have to go as far as China."8
Many Islamic jurists viewed education as either completely or
practically compulsory based on an ayah (Qur'anic verse) that
states: "IT]hose who conceal [from people] the clear Signs and
Guidance which we revealed, after we have made them clear to
people in the Book [the Qur'an], shall be cursed by God and others
who [are entitled to] curse." 9
Imam al-Shafi'i, an important ninth-century jurist, went so far
as to argue that if the inhabitants of one of the provinces of a Mus-
lim state unanimously agree to abandon learning, it is the duty of
the ruler to force them to pursue it.lo
In the case of Fred and Ethel, we have a different scenario: an
individual situation involving two parents refusing to educate their
child, Johnny. Al-Qabisi, a prominent tenth-century jurist, noted
that, if parents are financially unable to educate their children, the
5. 1 ABu ABD ALLAH AL-BUKHARI, SAHIN 25 (Istanbul n.d.) (ninth century).
6. 1 ABU ABDULLAH IBN MAJAH, SUNAN IBN MAJAH 81 (Muhammad Abd al-Baqi
ed., Cairo n.d.) (ninth century).
7. Id.
8. 1 MUHAMMAD NASIR AL-DIN AL-ALBANI, SILSILAT AL-AHADITH AL-DA'IFAH WA
AL-MAwDU'AH 413 (expanded 4th ed. Beirut 1977) (1959). This Hadith is viewed by major
scholars as weak, i.e., its attribution to the Prophet has not been satisfactorily established.
It is, nevertheless, important to include here, if only because of the popularity of this
Hadith among the Muslim masses. Indeed, it is the first Hadith they are likely to quote on
the subject. Thus, the impact of this Hadith, despite its weakness, on the consciousness of
Muslims throughout the Ages has been quite significant. This fact makes it specially de-
serving of mention in this paragraph, especially because it is consistent with the Qur'an and
the authenticated Hadith.
9. QUR'AN, supra note 1, at 11:159. Many modem scholars have discussed this topic
and concluded that education in Islam is compulsory. See, e.g., 1 AnD ALLAH 'ULWAN,
TARBIYAT AL-AWLAD F1 AL-ISLAM 257-58 (expanded 3d ed. Beirut 1981); MUHAMMAD
ATrnYAH AL-IBRASHI, AL-TARBIYAH AL-ISLAMIYAH WA-FALSAFATUHA 53-59 (3d ed.
Cairo 1975) (arguing that education of the public is practically compulsory in Islam);
MAnn AL-KILANI, TATAWWUR MAFHUM AL-NAZARIYAH AL-TARBAWIYAH AL-IS-
LAMrYAH 64, 93 (expanded 2d ed. Beirut 1985). For an overview of the Islamic position on
education and learning, see generally AHmAD BIN SHU'AYB AL-NASA'i, KrrAB AL-'ILM
(Va. 1993) (ninth century).
10. AL-KILANI, supra note 9, at 93 (quoting al-Bayhaqi on the matter).
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community must pay to educate them instead." This is not the sit-
uation here, as Fred and Ethel are financially able and the educa-
tion in Ruritania is also free. Therefore, we must look further into
the matter.
2. The Obligation of Parents To Educate Their Children
Many jurists interpreted the Qur'anic injunction: "0 ye who
believe! Save yourselves and your families from a fire .... ,,12 as an
injunction to educate their children.' 3 This interpretation was bol-
stered by other Qur'anic verses and the Prophet's own statements.
Primary among the latter is the following: "Each of you is a shep-
herd and each is responsible for your flock."' 4
The underlying reasoning is as follows: because parents are the
ones who are primarily responsible for the proper upbringing of
their children (they are the shepherds), then educating the children
properly would teach them the difference between right and wrong
and would thus protect them and their parents 15 from hell.
Ibn al-Qayyim, an influential fourteenth century jurist, ad-
dressed this issue in some detail. He quoted other jurists as saying
that, on Judgment Day, God will ask the parent about the child
before asking the child about the parent. He reasons that this is
because children have rights against their parents, just as parents
have rights against their children. AI-Qayyim concludes that par-
ents who neglect teaching their children that which is of benefit to
them and let the children go to waste will have committed a grave
wrong in the eyes of God.' 6
11. AHMAD AL-AHWANI, AL-TARBIYAH FI AL-ISLAM 103 (Cairo n.d.) (the author ap-
proximates the date of the Cairo version to be 1980, although the source itself contains no
date).
12. QUR'AN, supra note 1, at LXVI:6. The rest of the ayah describes the fire as being
fueled by men (who have committed wrongs) and stones. It also describes the angels that
are appointed over it.
13. See, e.g., ABD AL-FA-rTAH FUAD, FI AL-'USUL AL-FALSAFIYAH LIL-TARBIYAH
'IND MUFAKKIRI AL-ISLAM 112-13 (Alexandria 1983) (also quoting Ibn al-Qayyim's views
on the rights of children against their parents for a proper education). See also MUHAM-
MAD SUWAYD, MANHAJ AL-TARBIYAH AL-NABAWIYAH LIL-TIFL 25-27 (expanded 2d ed.
Kuwait 1988).
14. AL-BUKHARI, supra note 5, at 215.
15. The parents would go to hell for failing to educate their children, because they are
charged with the children's upbringing.
16. For a similar discussion of al-Qayyim's views on this subject, see SUWAYD, supra
note 13, at 27. See also FUAD, supra note 13, at 112-15.
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Still, generally, if parents refuse to educate their children, the
Muslim ruler must educate the parents regarding their Islamic duty
to educate their own children, and must inform them of the gravity
of the consequences of their actions in the eyes of God. She may
even impose upon them a suitable form of penalty or punishment
until they mend their ways. 17 Such penalty or punishment is per-
missible as long as it is consistent with the text and general spirit of
the Qur'an and the authenticated Hadith.
By opting for a noncomplusory system of education, it appears
that Ruritania has chosen not to impose such a temporal penalty or
punishment for actions by parents like Fred and Ethel. This view
leads to the conclusion that Johnny is limited to a remedy in the
afterlife. Such a conclusion is unwarranted, however, because
Ruritania has clearly made available its courts for suits by individu-
als like Johnny. The possible penalties and punishments for behav-
ior like that of Fred and Ethel are perhaps specified in Ruritania's
tort laws, among others. Furthermore, the fact that any punish-
ment or penalty against the parents must be decided by going
through the court system is very much in accord with the Islamic
principles of democracy and justice, although it puts the burden of
initiating the suit on Johnny.18 As we will see later, this burden
raises for Johnny other religiously significant issues that he must
consider before reaching a final decision about bringing suit against
his parents.
3. The Nature of Relations Within the Muslim Family
According to the Qur'an, God created humans from a single
nafs (soul) and made from this nafs a mate so that the mate can
dwell in tranquility with that nafs.'9 In another passage, the
Qur'an says: "And among His Signs is that He created for you,
from your own anfus [plural of nafs], mates so that you may dwell
in tranquility with them, and has put between you affection and
17. This kind of punishment that a Muslim ruler may impose is a form of Ta'zir (a
category that includes all those temporal punishments not specifically referred to in the
Qur'an and that do not fall into two other categories discussed by jurists: Hudud and
Qasas). Cf. AL-AHwAN1, supra note 11, at 103 (quoting al-Qabisi, who argues that the
ruler may pressure the parents but may not force them). The Shafi'i point of view, dis-
cussed earlier, is closer to Qur'anic and prophetic teachings on the central place of learning
in Islam. Therefore, it represents the better view.
18. For more on this point, see generally Azizah al-Hibri, Islamic Constitutionalism
and the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. REs. J. IN'L L. 1 (1992).
19. QuR'AN, supra note 1, at VII:189.
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mercy."20 Thus, the relationship within the family, which is primar-
ily defined by the relationship between the parents, is one of affec-
tion and mercy, not of conflict or hostility.
As stated earlier, each of the parents and children have rights,
duties, and obligations with respect to each other. Among the ba-
sic rights of children are the right to life, the right to legitimacy and
good name, the right to equal treatment regardless of gender, the
right to maintenance and health care, and the right to religious
training and a good education.21
Among the basic obligations of Muslim children towards their
parents are the obligation to love and honor them, especially in
their old age, and the obligation to obey them, except when they
stray from the straight path. The Qur'an enjoins the children to
consort with their parents in kindness, show humility, and ask God
to forgive them.22
When asked by a Muslim, "Who deserves my companionship
most?," the Prophet answered, "Your mother, your mother, your
mother, then your father."2 When a Muslim immigrated expressly
for the purpose of joining other Muslims in defending Islam, the
Prophet asked him, "Did you obtain your parents' permission?"
The immigrant indicated that he had not. The Prophet then told
him to go back and obtain the parents' permission. He added that
if the parents refused to grant it, then the man should be a dutiful
son and stay with them.24
Another less reliable Hadith states that the child who pleases
his parents will have both doors of Heaven open to him, whereas
the child who angers them will have both doors of Hell open to
him.25 This Hadith is not unusual, except that it goes on to state
that this is the case even if the parents were unjust. Al-Ghazali
20. Id at XXX:21.
21. ABDEL RAHiM OMRAN, FAMILY PLANNING IN THE LEGACY OF ISLAM 30-39
(1992). This is an excellent English-language work. The author's discussion is clear and
concise, and all quotes and cites from the Qur'an and Hadith have been authenticated by a
committee of distinguished scholars at a-Azhar.
22. QUR'AN, supra note 1, at IV:36, XVII:23-24, LXXI:28.
23. 7 AL-BUKHARI, supra note 5, at 69.
24. 9 Aau BAKR AL-BAYHAQI, AL-SUNAN AL-KUBRA (Beirut 1935) (eleventh
century).
25. 2 ABL HAMII AL-GHAZALI, 'IHYA' 'ULUl AL-DIN 216 (Cairo 1939) (twelfth
century).
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points out that this Hadith is weak in its attribution to the
Prophet.26 His comment is not insignificant for our purposes here.
Many Qur'anic verses, as well as passages in the Hadith, re-
quire children to exhibit a spirit of affection and humility towards
their parents, even in instances where the parents are clearly in the
wrong. But the Qur'an does permit dutiful children to disobey
their parents' wishes if the parents go astray. Therefore, the better
view on parental disobedience is that, even if the parents act un-
justly, the children must still treat them kindly, yet the children are
not obligated to accept or participate in the injustice.
In fact, the children are likely to have a positive duty to elimi-
nate the injustice created by their parents. First, several Qur'anic
verses make it the collective responsibility of all Muslims to enjoin
the right, prohibit the wrong, and advance the cause of justice.27
Second, by righting their parents' wrongs and asking God to for-
give the parents, dutiful children are mitigating the consequences
of their parents' unjust acts and improving their parents' chances
for forgiveness.
4. Available Remedies
In the instant case, Fred and Ethel clearly violated their reli-
gious obligation to educate Johnny. But the violation was not com-
mitted with malice; they simply made a terrible mistake in
judgment and did not know any better. Indeed, one wonders why
Fred and Ethel were not educated by their own parents. Under
these circumstances, the Muslim community in Ruritania should
have discussed the matter with Fred and Ethel and explained the
Islamic position on education, urging them to educate Johnny. In
the absence of such communal advice, they did their best.
Still, Johnny is in the position of a seriously wronged child and
does not have to accept this gross injustice. Therefore, he should
find an institution that will educate him, even at this late date.
With his exceptional natural abilities, Johnny may be able to catch
up with the others quickly. If free state education is no longer
available to him at this point, his parents are obligated to pay for a
private tutor or some other adequate remedial alternative. In fact,
I would advise them to do so if they want to meet God with a clear
conscience.
26. Id
27. Qui'AN, supra note 1, at H11:104, XVI:90-92.
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On the other hand, Johnny's idea of suing his parents runs
counter to the Muslim understanding of family relations. There is
no indication in the facts of any malice or willful violation by the
parents. Furthermore, it is not clear what Johnny would achieve by
suing. Any willingness by his parents to spend money to educate
him would represent a significant attempt to correct the prior unin-
tentional injustice.
If Johnny's parents refuse to right their wrong, the Muslim
community should educate them about their Islamic duty to edu-
cate their offspring and encourage them to fulfill it. If the parents
persist in their refusal, then Johnny can sue his parents because
their continued refusal to educate Johnny and to financially sup-
port his remedial education, in the face of a religious imperative to
do so, rises to such a level of willful injustice that Johnny is entitled
to sue. Yet, such a course of action should be undertaken with an
eye to fair settlement.
It is important to note that, if Johnny simply wants to punish
his parents for their serious past error, his action contradicts the
Islamic spirit of kindness and humility with respect to one's par-
ents, even when they are wrong. Further, if he is attempting to sue
in order to obtain damages for lost opportunities, then his actions
may again represent a conflict-oriented view of the family which is
foreign to Islam. This depends on the equities in the case deter-
mined in light of Johnny's continued potential to produce and
other relevant circumstances. In the absence of unusual circum-
stances, the better alternative would be for Johnny to trust in God
and immediately start the long road of educating himself. God will
reward him for his kindness to his parents, perhaps in this life, and
most certainly in the afterlife.
Part B
This question poses the issue of educating a Muslim in the
public school system of a non-Muslim state. As such, it involves
the developing Islamic jurisprudence Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat, which de-
rives special rules for Muslims living in non-Muslim countries, tak-
ing into account their special circumstances.
Whether David and Mary have a basis for their suit is really a
matter of American constitutional law. From the Islamic perspec-
tive, if an adequate basis does indeed exist, then they should cer-
tainly bring suit in order to fulfill their duty of ensuring that their
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children get the best possible education. In Islam, such an educa-
tion carefully balances temporal knowledge with spiritual and
moral education.
If the case appears to be constitutionally viable, then David
and Mary should contact other Muslims, People of the Book
(mainly Christians and Jews), as well as other Americans who may
share a similar position. I would recommend that they consider the
possibility of these other individuals joining them in the suit to give
the suit a broader base and a greater chance of success.
On the other hand, if the suit by David and Mary is not viable,
they should attempt to supplement their children's education
through additional instruction at home. If they conclude, however,
that this is useless in light of overwhelming negative influences and
pressures in the local public schools, and if they cannot discover
any alternative resolutions that protect their children's well-being,
David and Mary ought to contemplate moving to a more suitable
community in the United States. After all, the Qur'an clearly rec-
ognizes the efforts of those who immigrate for God's sake. 8 Such
a move, however, should be undertaken only as a last resort be-




"Rabbi Judah states: Anyone who does not teach his children a
profession, it is as if he has taught them robbery."1
Part A
As the above quote makes clear, Jewish law requires that one
teach one's children a profession.2 This duty is part of the specific
28. 1Id at IX:20.
* J.D., New York University;, Ordination, Yeshiva University. Rabbi Broyde is an
Assistant Professor in the Department of Religion at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia,
and also serves at Emory University Law School as an Adjunct Assistant Professor.
Writing about educational issues reinforces the author's feelings of profound gratitude
towards his parents, Rabbi Dr. Barret Broyde and Dr. Suse Broyde, for the education they
provided to him. It is difficult for a child to express the magnitude of debt owed to a
parent.
1. BABYLONIAN TALMuD, Kiddushin 29a, 30b.
2. Interestingly, it is unclear if the word "livelihood" is synonymous with the word
profession" in this context. A profession appears to mean more than a way to earn a
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obligation to educate one's own children.3 Generally, Jewish law
on the parental obligation to teach one's children has three differ-
ent, yet interrelated, components. The first is the obligation to ed-
ucate one's children in accordance with the tenants of the faith,
both in matters of theology and in matters of ritual practice. 4 The
second is the obligation to teach one's sons torah, the corpus of
classical Jewish law and ethics that all are obligated to study.5 The
third and final obligation is to train one's children in a trade or
livelihood. 6 The second and third obligations are mentioned in the
Talmud and Responsa in various forms and places, 7 and are the
focus of this Essay.8
The duty to teach a child torah (Jewish law and ethics) is a
clear biblical obligation upon the father that is recited every day in
living; it denotes specific skills. As implied by Rabbi Joshua Boaz, a parent does not fulfill
this obligation merely by providing a child with an ongoing source of income such as a trust
fund, or by providing the child with an income-producing business that the child derives
income from but cannot run. Rabbi Joshua Boaz, Sheltai Gibborim, in BABYLONtAN TAL-
MUD, Kiddushin 12a(1) (Rif pages). Instead, the law appears to obligate parents to provide
a skill for the child. On the other hand, providing children with the skills needed to be
farmers, rather than just providing the farm, would certainly fulfill this obligation. See
Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki (Rashi), in BABYLOmAN TALMUD, Kiddushin 30b (stating that
Rabbi Yehuda's ruling was predicated on the belief that, absent work to occupy the child's
time, the child might turn to robbery out of boredom). See also Rabbi Abraham Gumbi-
ner, Magen Avraham, in SmutcHAN ARUcH, Orach Cham 156 [hereinafter Magen
Avraham].
3. See generally 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA TALmuDICA, Chinuch 162 (1978).
4. For a general discussion of this mitzvah and its parameters, see id.
5. SHuLcHAN ARUCH, Yoreh Deah 245:1. For a very detailed discussion of the pa-
rameters of a woman's obligation to study Jewish law, see SHOSHANA PArNrnL ZOLTY,
AND ALL YOUR CHrLDREN SHALL BE LEARNED: WoMEN AND THE STUDY OF TORAH IN
JEWISH LAW AND HISTORY chs. 1, 2, 3, 9 (1993). This book is an extraordinary survey of
the topic and deserves reading by all interested.
6. Rabbi Asher ben Yecheil, Commentary of Rosh, in BABYLONANs TALMUD, Kid-
dushin 29a, 30b; see also Rabbi Nathan Weil, Karban Nethanial, in BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
Kiddushin 29a.
7. It is worth noting that the rule requiring that one teach one's child a trade is not
cited explicitly in either Maimonides' code or Shulchan Aruch. As demonstrated by Rabbi
Jacob Emden, this does not mean that these authorities reject such an obligation. See
RABBI JACOB EMDEN, RESPONSA SHELAT YAVETZ 2:68; RABBI OVADIA YOSEF,
RESPONSA YACHAVE DAAT 3:75.
8. Indeed, this answer assumes that the practical religious education of Johnny is
somehow taken care of independently from the issue of providing a trade for him. Accord-
ing to the Jewish tradition, it is clearly prohibited for Fred and Ethel to deprive Johnny of
educational opportunities within the field of Judaic studies or Jewish law, even if they
could so deprive him of a secular education and confine him to life on the farm. For a long
essay on this topic, see ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDICA, supra note 3, at 162-202.
Symposium on Religious Law
the prayer service. This is one of the basic obligations of a parent.9
Indeed, in situations where the parent is incapable or unwilling to
fulfill the obligation, others must do so at the father's expense1o
Thus, one must make one's children as literate and competent as
possible in the fields of Judaica.1' Yet, because one reaches adult-
hood at the age of twelve or thirteen in Jewish law,' 2 a father is
certainly not obligated to educate his son or daughter beyond legal
adulthood.' 3 Thus, the duty ends upon legal maturity.
The duty to train a child to earn a livelihood is not explicitly
found in any of the classical post-talmudic codes, although it is
clearly an obligation under Jewish law. This duty is also created by
a specific rabbinic commandment.' 4 It is unclear how precisely one
needs to teach a child such a livelihood, particularly when the need
to earn a living conflicts with the obligation or inclination to study
Jewish law or other aspects of Judaism.15 Yet, it is clear that an
obligation does exist.' 6 Thus, the pressing question is whether Jew-
ish law requires a father to provide for the intellectual training of a
child, in addition to training for technical matters of earning a live-
lihood or Torah study. Jewish legal tradition indicates that it does
not. Except for the child who wishes to pursue advanced studies in
Judaica, the father who is willing and able to provide a child with
career training through which he may earn a living, even in a disci-
pline that the son does not find intellectually attractive, has clearly
fulfilled the obligation. Thus, it appears that Fred and Ethel have
9. This is found in Deuteronomy 11:19, and is one of the three paragraphs recited
every day with the Shema and its related prayers.
10. SHuicRAN ARucH, Yoreh Deah 245:2,3,7. It is worth noting that, when a parent
is unavailable and a guardian has been appointed, the guardian is under an obligation to
educate the child. See R.Ani EzRA BATzRi, DnMAI MAmmoNuT 3"353 (2d ed. Machon
HaKatav 1990).
11. See generally Magen Avraham, supra note 2; see also supra notes 2-6; 1 ENCYCLO-
P DIA TAL~mduCA Av 5 nn.108-14 (2d ed. Yad Harav Herzog 1972).
12. TWelve for a girl and thirteen for a boy. SHULcHAN ARUCH, Orach Chaim 55:9,
Even Haezer 155:12. This age also requires signs of physical maturity. IM
13. There is, however, a series of decrees by the Israeli Chief rabbinate that requires a
parent to support the children into adulthood. These decrees are not discussed in this
Essay.
14. Indeed, as recounted in the Babylonian Talmud, this obligation supercedes one
particular aspect of the Sabbath laws. BABYLOmAN TALUuD, Ketubot 5a.
15. See YosE, supra note 7, at 3:75 (addressing the issue of whether one should send
a child to a trade school or an institution of higher study of Judaism). Rabbi Yosef con-
cludes that the obligation to teach a child about Judaism supersedes the obligation to teach
them to errand a living. I&
16. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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fulfilled the third part of the duty to educate their son, namely, to
provide for his livelihood on the farm with the necessary skills to
become a farmer.
It is unlikely, however, that Fred has fulfilled his mandate to
teach his son Judaica to the full extent mandated by Jewish law.
Was Johnny given instruction in Jewish law, the various codes, and
talmudic texts? Was he exposed to the breadth and depth of Jewish
learning? While it is true that one need not expose one's children
to all secular disciplines 17 as part of the religious mandate to edu-
cate one's children, within Judaica more exposure is better.
Under Jewish law, a community may force parents to educate
their children properly.18 What is clear from the Jewish perspec-
tive, however, is that the obligations a child has to a father, and a
father to his child, are not financially actionable retrospectively. 9
Instead, Jewish law retrospectively sees the parents' failure as a vi-
olation of a divine obligation, not remediable by the civil law.
Therefore, the son has no cause of action to sue his father for the
father's failure to educate him; similarly, the father may not sue his
son for his son's failure to honor him.2o
If a son were to take advantage of a secular cause of action
and sue for breach of duty to educate under the common law21 of
the secular courts, I would remind him that Jewish law prohibits, at
least for Jews, resorting to the secular legal system to resolve these
types of disputes. The Babylonian Talmud prohibits this kind of
lawsuit in secular court when it states:
17. This is not to say that the exposure to all things secular is prohibited or unwise,
but merely that it is not mandated by Jewish law. See generally RABBI NoRMAN LAmm,
TORAH UMADAH passim (1992).
18. See sources cited supra note 10.
19. In other words, no damages may be sought by a person against his parents for
their failure to educate him.
20. The sole actionable financial claim is for the ongoing obligation to support,
whether it be parents by children or children by parents. See generally GERALD BLD-
STEIN, HONOR THY FATHER AND MOTHER: FILIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN JEWISH LAW AND
ETHics chs. 3-4 (1975).
21. It is clear that, historically, there has been a common law duty to educate one's
children, as in Jewish law. The common law, however, occasionally would recognize in tort
a failure to educate. See Frank D. Aquila, Educational Malpractice: A Tort en Ventre, 39
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 323 (1991); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?":
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992) (particu-
larly material cited in note 280); John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice
Claims: A Representational Focus, 67 WASH. L. REv. 349 (1992). But see Kathryn J. Pars-
ley, Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Power To Hold Parents Criminally Liable for
the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44 VArND. L. Rev. 441 (1991).
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Rabbi Tarfon stated: In all situations where one finds Gentile
courts, even if their laws are the same as Jewish law, one may
not use them for judgment, because the Bible states; "these are
the laws that you shall place before them," that is to say, "before
the Jews" and not before Gentiles.22
Indeed, Rabbi Karo clearly states that "[i]t is prohibited to be
judged before Gentile judges or their courts, even if they apply
Jewish law and even if both litigants agree to be judged by them."
23
Thus, even if the child could show a valid cause of action
under the law of the state in which he or she resides, such an action
would be improper. First, the plaintiff violates the above prohibi-
tions by initiating a suit against the wishes of the other party who
would prefer a Jewish tribunal. Second, it is akin to thievery when
the plaintiff is awarded damages that Jewish law would not other-
wise award. 24
In sum, Johnny should not sue. As a matter of substantive
Jewish law, there is a clear duty to educate one's children, but there
is no remedy in tort for the breach of that duty. Further, even if
such a remedy existed, Johnny suffered no damages because his
parents provided him instruction in a trade. Additionally, any suit
would violate Jewish law because resorting to secular courts is
prohibited.
If he wishes, Johnny may leave his parents and seek the educa-
tion he desires. Jewish tradition avers that Rabbi Akiva did not
begin to pursue Judaic studies until he had reached the age of forty;
however, after diligent study that he began at an age much older
than Johnny is now, Rabbi Akiva became the preeminent scholar
of his generation.25 There is no need for Johnny to harbor a
grudge, as his parents did for him what they thought was in his best
interest.
In final words of advice to Johnny's parents, Jewish law re-
quires that Fred (and Ethel) educate their children. The obligation
is not limited merely to the duty to teach them technical aspects of
observing ritual law, but also to teach them all aspects of Jewish
22. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin 88b. For more on this issue, see generally Michael
J. Broyde, The Practice of Law According to Halacha, 20 J. HALACHA & CoNrrEMP. SOC'Y
5(1992).
23. SHuLCHAN ARucH, Choshen Mishpat 26:1.
24. See Rabbi Akiba Eiger, in SHuc.HrAN ARucH, Choshen Mishpat 26:1; RABBI
ISRAEL MEYER MIZRACs, RESPONSA PRI HAARErz, Choshen Mishpat 1:13.
25. See AxUBA BEN JOSEPH, THE JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 1:304-10 (1901).
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law and the intellectual love for learning and studying Torah, such
as Jewish law, Bible, and Mishnah. They did not fulfill that man-
date with Johnny, who now feels deprived. According to technical
rules under Jewish law, they are under no ongoing obligation to
provide for Johnny's further education. Yet, they must do better
by their remaining children; they should send them to a Jewish
school where the children will receive both a Jewish and a secular
education. Additionally, it would be the charitable thing to do to
support Johnny while he pursues his goals of a higher education.26
Part B
The issue presented in this case has nothing to do with sub-
stantive Jewish law. The Jewish education network educates nearly
400,000 children every year.27 There is an acute money shortage
within the Jewish education system that undoubtedly hampers its
effectiveness, and at every opportunity the Jewish community
seeks to expand the asset-base available to support Jewish educa-
tion. 8 Indeed, this cross-religious alliance to expand governmental
support for parochial schools is most likely the single most signifi-
cant forum of interfaith cooperation functioning in the United
States.29
Clearly, allowing parents to pay for the private Jewish educa-
tion of their children out of money that would otherwise be spent
on educating them in public schools would vastly increase the
number of Jewish children attending Jewish schools.30 An increase
in Jewish education would, over the course of a number of years,
vastly increase the pool of educated Jews, which would lead to an
increase in Jewish activity in every facet of American life. There is
26. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Yoreh Deah 251:3.
27. See Sergio Dellapergola and Uziel Schmelz, Demography and Jewish Education in
the Diaspora, in JEWISH EDUCATION WORLDWIDE: CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 43, 55
(Harold Himmelfarb & Sergio DellaPergola eds., 1989).
28. For example, one who compares the rate of attendance at Jewish day schools in
Canada and the United States notes that the Canadian rate is markedly higher, undoubt-
edly due to the reduced burdens of tuition. See generally Jerome Kutnick, Jewish Educa-
tion in Canada, in JEWISH EDUCATION WORLDWIDE, supra note 27, at 135.
29. For example, in Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1980), the Union of
Orthodox Jewish Congregations filed an amicus brief supporting the right of the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Milwaukee to use taxpayer-provided money for job training.
These alliances cross profound theological barriers. Id.
30. See, e.g., Ya'acov Rubel, Jewish Education in Argentina, in JEWISH EDUCATION
WORLDWIDE, supra note 27, at 185 (noting the precipitous decline in enrollment in Argen-
tina's Jewish schools as tuition increased).
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a clear statistical correlation between Jewish education and in-
volvement in every area of Jewish existence. 31
What David and Mary seek is a wonderful idea and a glorious
dream. Nonetheless, the constitutional claim that they are seeking
to litigate has no chance of succeeding in the milieu of American
jurisprudence, and has been rejected repeatedly by every court that
has examined it in the last twenty years.32 Thus, I would urge them
to abandon any idea of suing, even as I commend their outrage. 33
David and Mary have no chance to succeed through a lawsuit and
it will benefit no one except the lawyer they employ.
I would, however, suggest that David and Mary involve them-
selves politically in this cause.3 Much can be changed in local
school boards. They should involve themselves by running for of-
fice or joining a political action committee. If a time comes when a
lawsuit might succeed, they should then file one. Until that time,
they should do what the rest of the committed Jewish world has
done; send their children to a Jewish day-school, even at great per-
sonal sacrifice.
31. See, e.g., Geulah Solomon, Jewish Education in Australia, in JEWISH EDUCATION
WORL.DwIE, supra note 27, at 395, 431 (noting the correlation between early Jewish edu-
cation and adult involvement in communal Jewish issues).
32. See LAuRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAw 1214-26 (2d ed. 1988)
(reviewing the various cases). As described by Thbe, it is abundantly clear that this lawsuit
would have no chance of succeeding.
33. There is no tension between the right to sue permitted under Jewish law and the
prohibition to sue noted in Part A of this Essay. In this case, David and Mary would sue
the school district, whereas in the suit contemplated in Part A, Johnny would sue his par-
ents. Public causes of action, such as those actions created by secular governments under
the rubric, "The law of the land is the law," that aid the government in its task of gov-
erning, may often be litigated in secular court. One may unquestionably litigate against the
government or its agents or agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Environmental Protection Agency, or the Internal Revenue Service. Also permitted is any
litigation where the primary cause of action was created by the secular government and
involves public litigation in order to "make the world a better place" (tikkun ha'Olam).
See, e.g., SHULcHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 369:8; RABBI JOSHUA FALK, SEFER
MEIROr AYNAYIN (SEMA) 269:21. It is sometimes difficult to determine whether an ac-
tion is public or private according to Jewish law. See generally Steven Resnicoff, Bank-
ruptcy-A Viable Halachic Option?, 24 J. HALACHA & CoNTEW. Soc'y 5 (1992)
(discussing whether bankruptcy and discharge are public or private actions).
34. As noted by Laurence Tribe, it is clear that a school district can legally provide
large amounts of aid to parochial schools if it wishes to. See TRIBE, supra note 32, at 1214-
26 (discussing the various permissible and impermissible types of aid).
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III. ABORTION-FACT PATTERN
Matilda is married and pregnant with her second child. In her
third month of pregnancy, doctors diagnose Matilda with cancer of
the uterus. The doctors tell her that, unless the cancerous uterus is
removed within two months, she will almost certainly die. If they
remove her uterus within two months, however, she has a fifty per-
cent chance to recover and live. She understands that this proce-
dure will result in the death of the child in her womb. She also
understands that, if she does nothing and allows the cancer to pro-
ceed, she has a fifty percent chance of delivering a healthy new-
born by caesarean section. This latter course, however, will result
in Matilda's death.
She requests some time to think about her options. Approxi-
mately one month later, Matilda passes into a coma, having made
no decision. Both Matilda's husband and her parents approach the
doctors, making contradictory requests. The husband feels that the
pregnancy should be allowed to continue, while Matilda's parents
want the cancerous uterus removed. Both Matilda's husband and
mother claim to know what Matilda would have wanted if she had
been able to decide before she went into a coma. Due to recent
inconsistent rulings by the Supreme Court, the law of the state pro-
vides no clear guidance. The family in question and the hospital
are each affiliated with your religious tradition. The doctors ap-
proach you to ask if a particular course is either illegal or recom-
mended. What is your response? They also want to know whose
directives are to be followed, the husband's or the parents'.
A. Roman Catholic Response
PETER J. CATALDO, PH.D.*
The first part of this Essay explains principles of Catholic
moral teaching pertinent to Matilda's case. These principles are:
(1) the inviolability of human life; (2) the duty to conserve human
life; (3) informed consent; and (4) the "double effect." As will be
shown, there is no single moral principle in the Church's teaching
that specifically binds a party to one option over another in the
case. The second part of the Essay will apply these principles to
Matilda's situation.
* Peter Cataldo is the Director of Research at the Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral
Research and Education Center, Braintree, Massachusetts.
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1. Catholic Moral Principles
Catholic moral teaching in the area of the human life issues is
premised on the principle that innocent human life is inviolable.
The direct taking of an innocent human life, no matter what the
particular circumstances, can never be morally justified. An act
that is in itself against innocent human life is directly contrary to
God's creation of that life in His own image. Thus, every innocent
human life is inviolable because it has been created by God in His
own image. This truth has been reiterated in recent Church docu-
ments. For example, The Declaration on Procured Abortion states
that "what is immediately willed [by God] is life, and in the visible
universe every thing has been made for man, who is the image of
God and the world's crowning glory .... -" Additionally, Vatican
II declared that life "must be protected with the utmost care from
the moment of conception: abortion and infanticide are abomina-
ble crimes."'2 In 1987, Donum Vitae proclaimed the inviolability of
innocent human life:
Thus the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its
existence, that is to say from the moment the zygote has formed,
demands the unconditional respect that is morally due to the
human being in his bodily and spiritual totality. The human be-
ing is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment
of conception; and therefore from that same moment his rights
as a person must be recognized, among, which in the first place is
the inviolable right of every innocent human being to life.3
The duty to conserve human life naturally flows from the prin-
ciple that human life is inviolable. Because innocent human life
must never be taken directly, there is a duty to conserve one's own
life and the lives of others for which one has responsibility. In fact,
to an extent, one has conserved life by fulfilling the duty not to kill.
The Catholic Church recognizes that the duty to conserve life
is founded in Holy Scripture, as well as in the official magisterium
and theological tradition of the Church. Recent official teachings
have summarized and reaffirmed this duty: "The gift of life which
God the Creator and Father has entrusted to man calls him to ap-
preciate the inestimable value of what he has been given and to
1. The Declaration on Procured Abortion (Quaestio de abortu) (Nov. 18, 1974).
2. GAUDIUM ET SPEs, Pastoral Const., Vatican Council II n.51.
3. The Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of
Procreation (Donum Vitae) pt. 1, sec. 1 (Feb. 22, 1987).
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take responsibility for it .. . . 4; and, "Everyone has the duty to
care for his or her own health or to seek such care from others.
Those whose task it is to care for the sick must do so conscien-
tiously and administer the remedies that seem necessary or
useful." 5
Through its teaching and theological tradition, the Church has
always held that the duty to conserve human life is evident in natu-
ral law as well as in Scripture. Both Scripture and natural law show
that an inherent component of the duty to conserve human life is
its proportionate fulfillment. This means that the duty to conserve
human life must always be proportionate to the circumstances of
the life being conserved. For example, to fulfill the duty, the cir-
cumstances of the person's life may necessitate anything from a
nutritionally balanced diet to medical or surgical care, or the appli-
cation of ice chips and other palliative care measures.
The intrinsic quality of this feature of the duty is explained by
St. Thomas Aquinas:
It is natural for each individual to love his own life and things
pertaining thereto, but in due measure: that they are loved not
as if the end of life were rooted in them, but that they must be
used in view of the ultimate end of life. Hence failure to love
these things in due measure is contrary to the natural inclina-
tion, and consequently, a sin.6
In sum, proportionate fulfillment is part of the very intelligibility of
the natural inclination to conserve life. The duty, I would argue, is
in itself absolute. This follows from the absolute character of the
inviolability of life and the basis of the duty found in natural law.
The fulfillment of the duty, however, must not be confused with the
absolute nature of the duty as an obligation, which would wrongly
require every possible means at all times.
Given that the human person is created in the image of God
with faculties of reason and free will, there is an obligation to give
consent to acts in an informed way, and a corresponding duty to
facilitate that informed consent. "Man's dignity," Gaudium et Spes
teaches, "therefore requires him to act out of conscious and free
4. Id. at Introduction n.1.
5. The Declaration on Euthanasia pt. 4 (1980).
6. THOMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, question 126, art. 1, reprinted in
THE POPE JOHN CENTER, CONSERVING HUMAN LnFE (Daniel A. Cronin trans., Russell E.
Smith ed., 1989).
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choice, as moved and drawn in a personal way from within, and not
by blind impulses in himself or by mere external constraint."' 7 Be-
cause the objects of reason and free will are truth and good respec-
tively, we respect the dignity of man every time these capacities are
used according to their objects. These are the Church's fundamen-
tal reasons why informed consent must be given and secured for
medical care.
Finally, the principle of the "double effect" has had a long tra-
dition as a moral guide in particular cases. The principle serves as
a moral guide for preserving the integral goodness of a particular
act already judged to be intrinsically good, or for preventing a mor-
ally indifferent act from becoming bad. The integrity of a good act
consists of three elements: (1) the act is good in kind (or at least
morally indifferent); (2) the act is performed with the right inten-
tion; and (3) the circumstances surrounding the act are in due pro-
portion. Assuming the fulfillment of the first component, the
principle of the double effect guides the judgment process for the
fulfillment of the other two components.
Thus, the principle may be configured according to precondi-
tions and conditions. There are two preconditions for the valid use
of the principle: The proposed act is intrinsically good or morally
indifferent and has good effects; and the goodness or moral indif-
ference of the act is threatened by bad effects. The conditions for
retaining an act's integral goodness or for preventing a morally in-
different act from becoming bad are: (1) that the bad effect is not
directly intended; (2) that the bad effect is not the means by which
the good effect is achieved; and (3) that the good effect is propor-
tionate to the bad effect. Additionally, in connection with the last
condition, no other reasonable way may exist to obtain the good
effect except together with, but not by means of, the bad effect.
Keeping these principles in mind, I will now discuss them as ap-
plied to Matilda's case.
2. Catholic Moral Principles Applied to Matilda
It seems doubtful from the facts in this particular case that
Matilda was given all of the information she needed to make an
informed decision. Apparently, no one informed Matilda that she
may lapse into a coma before the two month period expired, or she
would have made her decision sooner. If a coma was likely with
7. GAUDIUM ET SPEs, Pastoral Const., Vatican Council H n.17.
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any delay, she presumably would not have taken the amount of
time that she did to deliberate. Moreover, there is no indication
that she was given any information or counselling about the ethical
aspects of her case.
Both options (either removing the uterus and losing the baby,
or refusing treatment for the cancer and saving the baby) would be
justified by, or at least would not violate, the three principles dis-
cussed above. The principle of the inviolability of human life
would not be violated because no innocent human life would be
directly killed. The duty to conserve life is fulfilled by means of
directly treating Matilda's pathology. The object of the action is
the treatment of her pathology and will have the probable good
effect of restoring Matilda's health. The good effect of Matilda's
health is proportionate to the foreseen, but unintended, bad effect
of the child's death, because the lives of both mother and child
would be conserved to the extent possible. The death of the child
is unavoidably concomitant with* the good effect, but is not the
means by which the good effect is achieved.
Though it would result in the certain death of Matilda, the op-
tion of refusing treatment would not violate the principle of the
inviolability of human life, as she would not be acting to end her
life either by commission or omission, but to save the life of the
child. Matilda fulfills the duty to conserve life insofar as she does
not directly take her own life, and because she conserves it in pro-
portion to the circumstances of conserving her child's life. Her act
of refusing the proposed treatment is not in itself morally bad, and
has the good effect of saving her child. This good effect is propor-
tionate to the foreseen, but unintended, bad effect of Matilda's
death, because the lives of both mother and child would be con-
served to the extent possible. Matilda's death would likely be con-
comitant with the good effect, but not at any time the means by
which the good effect is achieved.
The patient and her surrogates are bound by the same moral
principles in reaching judgments about the options. Hence, neither
the husband nor the parents can claim moral authority simply on
the grounds of their particular conclusions. As I have shown,
either option would be morally permissible. In the absence of any
facts on the relationships between Matilda and her husband or be-
tween Matilda and her parents, the moral presumption for surro-
gacy should go in favor of the husband based upon the nature of
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marriage. This presumption is made because "married love" is a
total love in which "husband and wife generously share every-
thing"8 in an indivisible unity, and because by "its very nature the
institution of marriage and married love is ordered to the procrea-
tion and education of the offspring." 9 Moreover, "the marriage of
those who have been baptized is," according to the teaching of
Humanae Vitae, "invested with the dignity of a sacramental sign of
grace, for it represents the union of Christ and his Church." 10 Ma-
tilda and her husband both need to inform their consciences prop-
erly with the teachings of the Catholic Church; then, informed with
the truth, they must choose and act in good conscience.
B. Islamic Response
WAEL B. HALLAQ*
It is a fundamental legal postulate in Islamic law that the right
of parents to conserve their lives, be it the father's or the mother's
life, may override their right to conserve the life of their child when
a choice between the two must be made.1 The source (a.l) simply
has priority over and against the derivative (far'); here, the mother
is the source, and the fetus is the derivative.
In the case at hand, Matilda was diagnosed with cancer of the
uterus during the third month of her pregnancy, and she passed
into a coma during the fourth month, before 120 days had lapsed.
During this period, Islamic law does not deem the fetus to be en-
dowed with a soul. Thus, it does not possess the legal capacity of a
person.2 Hence, the choice of saving the life of the mother over
that of the unensouled fetus is clear, despite the fact that the
mother has only a fifty percent chance of living if she removes the
cancer (simultaneously removing the fetus). The choice of saving
the mother at the expense of the fetus is further strengthened by
the fact that, if no operation to remove the cancer is performed,
the probability of delivering a healthy infant is only fifty percent.
This being the case, Islamic law provides no grounds on which
to grant the husband's request for the pregnancy to proceed. It is
8. Paul VI, Humanae Vitae n.9 (1968).
9. GAUDIUM ETr SPES, Pastoral Const., Vatican Council II n.48.
10. Paul VI, supra note 8, at n.8.
* Professor of Law, McGill University, Montreal.
1. 3 FAKHR AL-DIN B. MANSOR AL-AwzAJANDI, FATAWA QADIKHAN 439, 449
(1980).
2. See BAsIM MUSALLAM, SEX AND SOCIETY IN IsLAM 57-59 (1983).
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the directive of Matilda's parents, in favor of an operation, that
Islamic law supports and that must be followed.
C. Jewish Response
ELLIOT N. DoRFF**
Life is sacred within the Jewish tradition. Consequently,
although abortion is permitted in some circumstances and even re-
quired in others, it is not viewed as either a morally neutral matter
of individual desire, or an acceptable form of post facto birth con-
trol. Contrary to the opinions of many contemporary Jews, Juda-
ism restricts the legitimacy of abortion to a narrow range of cases.
It does not give blanket permission to abort.
Judaism does not see all abortion as murder because Rabbinic
sources developmentally understand the process of gestation. The
fertilized egg cell, and even the egg and sperm alone, are potential
life and, therefore, must not be destroyed without reason; they do
not, however, have the same legal status as a person already born.
According to the Talmud, the zygote is "simply water" within the
first forty days after conception.1 Another talmudic source distin-
guishes the first trimester from the remainder of gestation.2 These
temporal demarcations are not based on a theory of ensoulment at
a particular moment in the uterus; instead, the physical develop-
ment of the fetus determines them. These demarcations effectively
make abortion during the early periods more acceptable than dur-
ing the rest of pregnancy.3
The fetus does not attain the full rights and protections of a
human being until birth, specifically, when the forehead emerges.4
The mother, of course, has full human status. Consequently, if the
fetus threatens the life or health of the mother, then the mother
may (and in some cases must) abort it, as the Mishnah graphically
** Ph.D., Columbia University, New York, 1971. Rabbi Dorff is currently Provost
and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Judaism. He was ordained a Conservative
Rabbi by the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in 1970.
1. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yevamot 69b. See also RABBI IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS,
JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS 275 (1975) (noting that "forty days" in talmudic terms may mean
just under two months in our modem way of calculating gestation, due to improved meth-
ods of determining the date of conception).
2. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Niddah 17a.
3. See DAVID FELDMAN, MARITAL RELATIONS, BIRTH CONTROL, AND ABORTION IN
JEWISH LAW 265-66, ch. 15 (1968).
4. If it is a breech birth, full rights and protections are attained when most of the
body emerges. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Niddah 3:5.
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explains: "If a woman has life-threatening difficulty in childbirth,
one dismembers the embryo in her, limb by limb, because her life
takes precedence over its life. Once its head or its 'greater part'
has emerged, it may not be touched, for we do not set aside one life
for another." 5
While all Jewish sources permit and even require abortion in
order to preserve the life or organs of the mother,6 authorities dif-
fer widely on how much of a threat to a woman's health the fetus
must pose to justify an abortion. Many modem authorities permit
an abortion to preserve the mother's mental health, based on a
responsum by Rabbi Israel Meir Mizrahi in the late seventeenth
century.7 In modem times, this goal of "preservation" of mental
health has been construed narrowly by some and leniently by
others.8 In sum, to the extent that Jewish law makes special provi-
sion for an unusually young or old mother, an unmarried mother,
the victim of a rape, or the participant in an adulterous union, it
permits abortion to preserve the mother's mental health.9
There is no justification in the traditional sources for aborting
a fetus for reasons pertaining to the health of the fetus; only the
mother's health is a consideration. As a result, some people object
to performing an amniocentesis at all, even to determine whether
to abort a malformed fetus.10 Others reason in precisely the oppo-
site direction: they justify the abortion of a defective fetus on the
basis of preserving the mother's mental health. Yet, this is only
where it is clear that the mother is unable to cope with the prospect
of bearing or raising such a child."1
Many Conservative and Reform rabbis, not to mention a few
contemporary Orthodox rabbis, have handled the matter in a com-
pletely different way. They reason that traditional sources recog-
nize only threats to the mother's health as grounds for abortion
5. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Oholot 7:6. There are variant versions of this. See, e.g.,
JERUSALEM TALMUD, Shabbat 14:4 ("its greater part"), Tosefta Yevamot 9:9 ("its head");
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 72b ("its head"); JERUSALEM TALMUD, Sanhedrin 8
("its head or its greater part").
6. See JAKOBOVrrS, supra note 1, at 186-87, 378-79 n.173.
7. RABBI ISRAEL MEIR MIzRAmI, RESPONSA PRi HA'ARETz, 2 Yoreh Deah (1899).
8. See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 284-94; 12 MosHE HALEVi SPERO, JUDAISM AND
PSYCHOLOGY: HALAKHic PERsPEcrvEs 168-80 (1980).
9. Id; see also JAKOBOVITs, supra note 1, at 189-90.
10. J. DAVID BLEIcH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 112-15 (1977); 9 JEW-
ISH BloETnHics 161, 175 n.97 (Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979).
11. See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 284-94.
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because, until recently, it was impossible to know anything about
the genetic or medical make-up of the fetus before birth. These
rabbis believe that our new medical knowledge should establish the
fetus' health as an independent consideration.12
Although I personally agree with this latter approach, it still
has problems. Aside from the fact that it would represent an inno-
vation in well-established tradition, it raises the extremely difficult
issue of determining what constitutes a sufficient defect to warrant
abortion. The "clear" cases are those in which the fetus has mini-
mal brain tissue, as in anencephaly, or a degenerative disease, such
as Tay-Sachs or Lesch-Nyhan syndrome.
Other cases are not as clear, such as those involving Hunting-
ton's Chorea, where degeneration does not begin until age thirty-
five or forty. I believe abortion is not justified in such cases, as the
person will live an extended period of time without suffering from
any of the disease's debilitating effects. Additionally, there is rea-
sonable hope that such people may have children of their own.
Moreover, it is not unreasonable to expect that a cure may be de-
veloped in that time. But where do we draw the line? At twenty-
five years? Fifteen years? Ten years? Further, what should consti-
tute a "defect" to justify abortion in the first place, and how should
we treat varying degrees of the same defect? Should a slight de-
gree of mental retardation be enough? Blindness? Deafness? In
trying to answer any of these questions we quickly slide into the
danger of defining qualifications for a master race.
The difficulty of making these decisions does not mean that we
can, or should, shrink from them. Human life is full of difficult
decisions. Judaism believes that we need not accept whatever na-
ture gives us; rather, we have the right and the duty to intervene
medically as a partner of God. Advances in modem medical sci-
ence have created a whole new spectrum of decisions that must be
confronted responsibly, although we may prefer not to have to
make them.
In the area of abortion, we will undoubtedly find that it is
clearly justified or unjustified in some cases. In other cases, how-
ever, the matter is more ambiguous. In the more difficult cases, the
12. ELIEZER WALDENBERG, RESPONSA Tzrrz ELIEZER 9:51, 13:102; SAUL ISRAELI,
AMUD HAYEMiNI, Responsum no. 35 (cited in NO'AM, 16 (K.H.) 27, note); 2 LEIvi GROss-
NASS, RESPONSA LEV ARYEH 205; ALEx J. GOLDMAN, JUDAISM CONFRONTS CONTEMPO-
RARY IsSUES 52-62 (1978).
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traditional method of judging the issue on the basis of the mother's
mental reaction to the defect may be the wisest. For some mothers,
while raising a mentally retarded child is not pleasant, it is manage-
able. For others, it is beyond their psychological competence to
handle. As a result, only psychologically strong and stable
mothers would have the responsibility of raising such children, a
result that would be unfair. Moreover, if most families abort "de-
fective" children, one wonders about the degree to which society
will tolerate imperfections and provide for the people born af-
flicted. Thus, the very sensitivity of society to the sanctity of life is
at stake. Even so, we must develop guidelines for making these
decisions, at least in the relatively clear cases. We must also foster
sensitivity among medical and religious professionals in order to
help families facing these excruciating decisions where no guide-
lines are possible.
In practice, much of this discussion is moot. Jews engage in
abortion almost indiscriminately to the extent that, in recent years,
there have been more abortions than live births among Jews in
Israel. This is a particularly problematic phenomenon for the con-
temporary Jewish community because Jews are barely reproducing
in Israel and are reproducing even less in North America, where
the Jewish reproductive rate is approximately 1.6 or 1.7 children
per couple. Consequently, even those rabbis who liberally inter-
pret Jewish abortion law are calling for Jews to marry and have
children so that Judaism can continue for generations to come.
Therefore, the case before us is relatively simple from the
standpoint of Jewish law. The fetus, although valued as a potential
life, is not yet a full-fledged human being with all the rights and
protections of the law; this status comes only at the moment of
birth. The mother, however, is obviously a full-fledged human be-
ing. Therefore, even before Matilda went into a coma, she was re-
quired by Jewish law to have an abortion to save her life. Matilda
is not permitted to give birth to the child, as suicide is prohibited
and the doctors have no doubt that death will result if she goes
ahead with the pregnancy. Similarly, once Matilda falls into the
coma, anyone entrusted with her care-whether her husband or
her parents-must try to save her life, even though the action
causes the fetus to die. Neither the third parties' nor Matilda's
wishes matter in such a case. This is a clear example of how Jewish
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law is based on duties, in contrast to the emphasis in American law
on individual rights.
If, however, there is effectively no chance to save Matilda's
life, the doctors must try to save the life of the fetus by caesarean
section, whether or not the survivors want the baby born under
such circumstances. For the survivors, too, it is a matter of a duty
defined by Jewish law, and not an option open for autonomous
choice.
IV. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION-FACr PATTRN
In their six years of marriage, Diane and George have been
unsuccessful in starting a family. After a series of medical exami-
nations, the couple discover that Diane has blocked fallopian
tubes. Although ovulation takes place, the eggs are unable to
move to the uterus. The condition cannot be corrected by surgery.
Diane and George find that their sole means of having a child
of their own is to submit to in vitro fertilization. This is accom-
plished by George masturbating and ejaculating into a specimen
jar. Diane's ova will be surgically removed from her ovaries.
Later, the doctors will introduce the ova to the sperm in order to
produce several embryos. Five live embryos are produced, which is
more than necessary, in order to avoid the repetition of the proce-
dures required to obtain ova and sperm specimens. It usually takes
several attempts at implantation to impregnate the woman success-
fully. After successful implantation occurs, the remaining embryos
are usually destroyed. Before submitting to this process, Diane
and George come to you and seek your legal advice. What do you
advise?
You never hear from Diane and George again, until you find
out that they are currently battling each other in court. You learn
that the couple is now divorced and Diane has claimed custody of
the embryos. She wishes to have them implanted in her womb and
hopes to give birth to children out of wedtock. If successful, Diane
expects child support for these children from George. George,
therefore, has brought this suit to either win custody of the em-
bryos in order to have them destroyed or, failing that, to enjoin her
from implantation. Should either option fail, he wants the court to
find that he is not obligated in any way to provide support for the
children that may result from Diane's unilateral action of implanta-
tion. What do you advise?
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A. Roman Catholic Response
RUSSELL E. SMrrH, S.T.D.*
1. The Ethical Questions
The case of Diane and George involves the moral aspects of
infertile couples choosing from the many forms of fertility inter-
vention. This Essay develops six ethical issues: (1) the ethical pro-
priety of in vitro fertilization ("IVY") itself; (2) the concomitant
issue of masturbation to obtain the husband's semen; (3) the re-
trieval of multiple in vitro conceptions of embryos; (4) the associ-
ated issue of freezing/storing excess embryos; (5) the destruction of
unwanted embryos; and (6) the issues of custody, possession, pa-
rental obligation, survival, and destruction of frozen embryos in the
event of divorce. As to the last issue, this Essay analyzes the
destiny of the embryos and the obligations of the genetic parents.
2. The Church's Teaching
The Catholic Church's long-standing teaching on the moral is-
sues involved in this case has been rearticulated most recently in
two magisterial documents: The Declaration on Procured Abor-
tion1 and The Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin
and on the Dignity of Procreation,2 both from the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith. The content of the former is summarized
in its own words: "The tradition of the Church has always held that
human life must be protected and cherished from the beginning,
just as at the various stages of its development... [P]rocured abor-
tion, even during the first days, [is] objectively a grave sin. '3 This
echoes the teaching of the Church's supreme magisterium, the Sec-
ond Vatican Ecumenical Council, that "abortion and infanticide
are abominable crimes (nefanda crimina).
' '4
* Father Russell E. Smith, S.T.D. is the President of the Pope John XXIII Medical-
Moral Research and Education Center, Braintree, Massachusetts.
1. Quaestio de abortu (Nov. 18, 1974) [hereinafter The Declaration].
2. Donum Vitae (Feb. 22, 1987) [hereinafter The Instruction]. The extended intro-
duction in The Instruction sets forth the moral values, Christian anthropology, and funda-
mental criteria for moral evaluation. Three sections follow: the first deals with questions
regarding respect for human embryos; the second with intervention into human procrea-
tion; and the third with the relationship between moral and civil law.
3. The Declaration, supra note 1, at 6-7.
4. GAUDIUM Er Sins, Pastoral Const., Vatican Council II n.51.
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The Instruction provides a more expansive treatment of the
issues involved in this case. The two phrases of its long title are the
two principles by which certain questions of contemporary medical
technology should be evaluated.
The Instruction highlights two foundational values: (1) human
life itself; and (2) the means of transmitting human life. Concern-
ing the former, the Church teaches that while physical life "does
not itself contain the whole of a person's value, the supreme good
being eternal life with God, it does constitute in a certain way the
'fundamental' value, precisely because upon this physical life all
the other values of the person are based and developed."5 There-
fore, "[tihe human being must be respected as a person from the
very first instant of his existence." 6 Hence, the Church teaches that
we are to respect human life as personal and inviolable. This is
most evident in the abortion debate.
Concerning the second value regarding the transmission of
human life, the Church teaches that the covenant of heterosexual
marriage is the only appropriate forum for sexual expression. It
also holds that the loving union of the spouses and the "begetting
of offspring" 7 are the two essential purposes of marriage, expressed
most dramatically in the conjugal act.8
Two general moral implications follow from this. First, the
foundational value of human life derives from the fact that there is
no way to make a credible distinction between a human being and
a human person; critics have severely criticized any attempt to do
so. Second, the foundational value of the transmission of human
life also carries a moral implication, namely, that one cannot delib-
erately separate the two meanings of the conjugal act without em-
bracing (at least implicitly) in a utilitarian manner a philosophical
dualism that renders the physical nature subordinate to the spiri-
tual nature. This is the rational basis for the Catholic doctrine for-
bidding contraception.
The moral implications that apply in the area of suppressing
fertility apply also in the area of achieving fertility. Paradoxically,
5. See generally The Instruction, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra p. 50 (discussing the difference between procreation and
reproduction).
8. "Matrimoniale foedus, quo vir et mulier inter se totius vitae consortium constituun4
indole sua naturali ad bonum coniugum atque ad prolis generationem et educationem
ordinatum... ." 1983 CODE c.1055, § 1.
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the same mentality that champions contraception and abortion also
supports fertility technology, as the same technological ideology
presents both sets of possibilities. This ideology depersonalizes
some patient populations, such as fetuses and the permanently un-
conscious, and then proceeds to depersonalize integral features of a
patient's humanity. It is a depersonalization that claims dominion
not just over pathology, but also over the "new medical commodi-
ties" of life and death. This ideology implies that we have a right to
someone's death by abortion or physician-assisted suicide, as well
as a right to someone else's life. The ideology is presupposed, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, by the technological imperative that states
that we should do all that we are technologically capable of doing.
The Instruction teaches that "science and technology are valu-
able resources for [humanity] when placed at [its] service and when
they promote [humanity's] integral development of the benefit of
all, but they cannot of themselves show the meaning of existence
and human progress." 9 This points to the necessity of the moral
question. The Instruction states that "[i]t would on the one hand
be illusory to claim that scientific research and its applications are
morally neutral; on the other hand one cannot derive criteria for
guidance from technical efficiency alone." 10 Science without moral
reflection, therefore, is catastrophic.
These two perennial values and their moral implications, ver-
sus the dualism implied by technological culture, form the matrix in
which the painful situation of infertility is examined. The basic
conclusion of The Instruction is best summarized as follows:
Whereas assisted insemination can be morally licit because it is es-
sentially a therapeutic intervention, an act of technology cannot re-
place the conjugal act.
The Instruction then states the following regarding the arena
of fertility intervention:
First, concerning fetal life and its dignity:
(1) Fetal human life is inviolable. The pursuit of offspring
cannot include an intention to terminate their life, such as if
there is a defect or disease. Procured abortion terminates inno-
cent, personal human life. Concretely, diagnosis of disease
should not be tantamount to a death sentence. There should be
no discarding of embryos once conceived.
9. The Instruction, supra note 2, at Introduction.
10. Id.
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(2) The dignity of fetal human life precludes freezing the
embryo as well as non-therapeutic experimentation.
(3) The Church teaches that the unborn child has a right
to be procreated, born and raised in a family composed of his/
her parents. It is in the family that the child can discover his/her
own identity and achieve his/her own proper human
development.
(4) Fertility intervention, which replaces the conjugal act
rather than therapeutically assisting it, offends the dignity of the
offspring by treating a human person as a "product" of technol-
ogy, rather than as an "offspring" of one's parent's conjugal
act."
There is a world of difference between "reproducing" and
"procreating." Making human persons a product of technological
industry presumes that human life is a commodity about which "cli-
ents" may be selective. It emerges from a worldview in which life
itself can be manufactured, marketed, and distributed with concern
for the buyer, not the object. The Church teaches that, while the
personal dignity and inherent worth of an individual are not cheap-
ened or compromised by the way they are conceived, nevertheless,
a petri dish is not a worthy site of creation.
Four issues exist concerning the worthy transmission of life
(the second perennial value). First, procreation should take place
only within marriage. This precludes all practices of heterologous
fertilization, including all techniques that "obtain a human concep-
tion artificially by the use of gametes coming from at least one do-
nor other than the spouses who are joined in marriage."'1 2 These
procedures include artificial insemination by a donor ("A.I.D."),
heterologous in vitro fertilization, and surrogate motherhood.
Second, the unitive and procreative aspects of the conjugal act
are inseparable. Just as one cannot suppress the procreative aspect
of the conjugal act by contraception, one also cannot suppress the
unitive meaning of the marital goods in pursuit of the procreative
by artificial fertility interventions. Consequently, all forms of ho-
mologous artificial fertilization 13 are precluded. For example, arti-
ficial insemination by the husband ("A.I.H.") and homologous in
vitro fertilization are prohibited. Additionally, masturbation severs
11. Id. § 2.
12. Id.
13. In other words, creating conception by using the gametes of spouses.
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the two integral meanings of the conjugal act by depriving it of its
unitive dimension.
14
Third, The Instruction analyzes the question of suffering
caused by infertility in marriage. The Church teaches that "the suf-
fering of spouses who cannot have children or who are afraid of
bringing a handicapped child into the world is a suffering that eve-
ryone must understand and properly evaluate."'1 5 The desire for a
child is integral to the vocation to parenthood, which is inherent in
conjugal love. Suffering is particularly acute, therefore, for those
couples whose infertility appears to be incurable. Yet, in spite of
what we have said so far, it is still true that the end does not justify
the means. Given the milieu of technological culture and its tempt-
ing axiom that we should proceed to do all that we can technologi-
cally do, the suffering of infertility may drive couples into the easy
choice of an option at odds with the landscape of larger values, and
may actually cause the moral depreciation of the child they so des-
perately desire.
On this score, The Instruction states:
[M]arriage does not confer upon the spouses the right to have a
child .... A true and proper right to a child would be contrary
to the child's dignity and nature. The child is not an object to
which one has a right, nor can [s/he] be considered as an object
of ownership; rather, a child is a gift (the supreme gift) and the
most gratuitous gift of marriage, and is a living testimony of the
mutual giving of ... parents. 16
In other words, no one has a right to another person.
Without denying the suffering of those couples who are infer-
tile, the Church warns against the commodification of that which
defies objectification and subordination to industry, namely, the
human person. Research that is directed by proper moral protocol
is again encouraged and its results praised.
Finally, the relationship between moral and civil law deserves
a brief discussion. The Instruction maintains that the task of civil
law is to ensure the common good of people through the recogni-
tion and defense of fundamental rights and through the promotion
of peace and public morality. Those responsible for public policy
should force society to recognize and respect inalienable rights of
14. The Instruction, supra note 2, § 2(B)(6).
15. Id. § 2(B)(8).
16. Id.
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persons, especially those rights that pertain to human nature and
the creative act from which persons take their origin. 1
7
In summary, the Church's teaching derives from two perennial
values: (1) the dignity of human life itself; and (2) the dignity of the
worthy transmission of human life. These two principles, usually
applied in the area of abortion and contraception (the latter of
which involves the suppression of fertility and the pursuit of the
unitive over the procreative aspect of sexuality), are consistently
applied in the area of fertility intervention technology. This in-
volves the achieving of fertility, and often pursues the procreative
aspect over the unitive.
3. Diane and George
In light of the above analysis, the answers to the couple's ques-
tions become clear. I would advise the couple to avoid IVF for
both ethical and medical reasons. In addition to sundering the
meaning of the conjugal act itself, IVF is not very successful medi-
cally. It is both ethically and medically incorrect to claim that IVF
is their only chance to have a child; Diane and George should ex-
plore other procedures, such as the modified Gamete Intrafal-
lopian Transfer ("G.I.F.T."), and their consultant should present
adoption as a most generous option. The humiliation of masturba-
tion would also be avoided as well as the depersonalizing proce-
dures of multiple conception and the storage of embryonic human
life. Furthermore, the "death sentence" of abortion would be
avoided, which ironically undergirds the theory of some forms of
fertility technology. Counseling should also attempt to overcome
the understandable, but ultimately self-defeating, notion of a
"right" to have a child. This notion rests on a generally unspoken
assumption of depersonalizing the child by employing the market-
ing language of commodity. Such an attitude, coupled with the
business interests of fertility technologies, can easily manipulate
vulnerable and suffering infertile couples.
Frozen embryos conceived through IVF are the human victims
of injustice. Even if they are not illegitimate, their conception has
occurred in a depersonalized fashion, and they are undeserving of
their present state of hibernation. The Court should consider them
as human beings and not as property. In custody battles, custody
should be awarded to the spouse who intends to permit gestation
17. Id. § 3.
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of the embryos. In the event of the regrettable situation that
neither of the genetic parents desire the gestation of the embryos,
the parents should make the embryos available for adoption by a
stable family; the adopting family should include the gestational
mother and her legitimate husband. The law should allow children
to be nurtured and raised by the adopting family without interven-
tion from either genetic parent.
B. Islamic Response
WAEL B. HALLAQ
In Islamic law, marriage is an institution within the bounds of
which lawful sexual intercourse takes place, chiefly for the purpose
of procreation.1 All other reasons for marriage, such as restraining
sexual desire and sexual activity to a licit framework, are secon-
dary. Accordingly, Islamic law encourages Diane and George to
submit to in vitro fertilization, as long as this remains their last re-
course for having children.
Yet, the very practice of producing four extra embryos
through in vitro fertilization raises a question of legality regarding
this fertilization procedure. If the remaining embryos are de-
stroyed once pregnancy is successful, this would amount to abor-
tion. Abortion is generally deemed illegal in Islamic law except
under one condition, namely, when pregnancy threatens the health
of the mother.2 In the case of Diane, no threat is perceived and, if
five embryos are to be produced, the assumption must be that all of
them will eventually be implanted in the womb of the mother. In-
stead, Diane should produce and implant in her womb one embryo
at a time, in order to avoid such a complex situation with the resul-
tant destruction of the embryos. If pregnancy fails to take place,
the entire procedure should be repeated, again with only one em-
bryo produced at a time. If Diane and George agree to produce
1. SAYYM ISMA'tL SULAYMAN, AL-MAR'A BAYNA AL-SHARI'A WAL-QANON 138
(1984); HIsHAm QABLAN, ADAB AL-ZAWAJ 41-42 (1983); MuHAmmAD 'ABD AL-HAMID,
AL-AHwAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA 11-12 (1984).
2. All Islamic legal schools (madhdhib) agree that abortion is prohibited, as it con-
travenes God's will. Yet, they hold that the fetus is not ensouled during the first 120 days
of its formation and, thus, it is not considered to be a person. Therefore, although Islamic
law prohibits killing a fetus during this period, the act does not require penalty, as it would
if the fetus were killed after the lapse of the first 120 days. See BASiM MUSALLAM, SEX
AND SoCm'ry iN IsLAM 57-59 (1983) (and sources cited therein); QABLAN, supra note 1, at
166.
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five embryos, therefore, they must attempt to implant all of. the
embryos successively into Diane's womb, in order to avoid com-
mitting the illegal act of abortion.
Diane and George have deliberately opted to take the latter
course, namely, to have more embryos produced than immediately
needed. Because the couple already has a claim before the court,
the pressing issue becomes whether the court may grant their di-
vorce in light of the existing embryos.
For an irrevocable divorce to take effect, the waiting period
('idda) must lapse. The purpose of the waiting period is to estab-
lish that no pregnancy is in progress; 3 if pregnancy is in progress,
the court will determine paternity and obligate the father to pay
child-support.
The question remains whether, under these particular circum-
stances, the waiting period will ever lapse as long as the embryos
still exist. Because the embryos represent the beginnings of
pregnancies in Diane's situation, Diane will be in a constant wait-
ing period while they exist. Divorce, therefore, will become final
only after every embryo has been successfully or unsuccessfully im-
planted into Diane's womb. Specifically, if the last implantation is
successful, the divorce will become final upon delivery of the baby;
if unsuccessful, it will become final upon the completion of her
third menstruation cycle.
If the embryos' existence precludes Diane's legal divorce, she
has a right to have the embryos implanted in her womb. She is not
free to limit the number of embryos to only two, but must submit
to the successive implantation of all remaining embryos. No mat-
ter how many implantations are successful, George is obliged to
provide support for each child born as a result. Moreover, these
children are legitimate in the eyes of Islamic law and, therefore,
have, inter alia, the unabridged right to their stipulated shares of
inheritance. 4
Finally, it must be noted that, in demanding that the embryos
be implanted in her womb, Diane was not, strictly speaking, acting
unilaterally; the initial decision to produce five embryos and, thus,
five potentially successful pregnancies had the consent of her
husband.
3. 2 SYED AMEER ALl, MAHOMMEDEN LAW 499-500 (5th ed. 1985).
4. 1 AL-FATAWA AL-HINDIYYA 560 (al-Shaykh Niz.m ed., 1980).
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C. Jewish Response
ELLIOT N. Doi-F
Because Judaism places such a high regard on children, it is
not surprising that rabbinic authorities have permitted creative
ways of conception for couples who cannot otherwise conceive.
Nevertheless, there are objections to some of the procedures.
When the semen of a man is united artificially with his wife's
ovum, there are no objections whatsoever.1 This artificial insemi-
nation may be accomplished either by placing the man's semen at
the opening of the woman's cervix or by inserting his sperm into
the woman's uterus directly. When these methods do not work, as
in this case, their sperm and ovum are united in a test tube and the
fertilized egg cell is then inserted into the woman's uterus. Be-
cause of Judaism's appreciation of medicine as an aid to God, the
religion does not abhor such methods merely because they are arti-
ficial. Instead, the only issue is the means by which the husband's
sperm is obtained. Some rabbis prefer couples to use the method
of collecting the sperm from the vaginal cavity after intercourse
rather than through masturbation to insure that there is no "de-
struction of the seed in vain."'2 Others, however, permit masturba-
tion on the ground that the man's ejaculation to produce semen for
artificial insemination of his wife is not "in vain."3
The matter becomes more complicated when the donor is not
the husband or the bearing mother is not the wife. In these situa-
tions, some rabbis object to artifical insemination on grounds of
adultery. For many, however, adultery takes place only when the
penis of the man enters the vaginal cavity of the woman, which
does not occur when insemination takes place artificially. With ar-
tificial insemination, not only is the physical contact missing, but
the intent to have an illicit relationship is also absent.
If the donor is anonymous, there is also the possibility of unin-
tentional incest in the next generation, such as the product of the
artificial insemination marrying his or her natural half-brother or
1. RABBI IMMANUEL JAKOBOVrrs, JEWISH MEDICAL ETHics 264 (1975); J. DAVID
BLEiIcH, JUDAIsM AND HEALING: HALAKlic PERsPECrIVES 82-84 (1981).
2. See BLEiCH, supra note 1, at 84 n.3 (listing sources on this issue).
3. d
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half-sister. This issue dissolves if the donor is known or, at least, if
it is known that the donor is not Jewish.
4
Some have voiced concern about the morality of using some-
one else's body or semen in this way, and others worry that artifi-
cial insemination will increase the prospects of widespread
licentiousness. Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits, 5 author of the first
English book on Jewish medical ethics, voices these moral
concerns:
If Jewish law nevertheless opposes A.I.D. [artificial insemina-
tion by a donor] without reservation as utterly evil, it is mainly
for moral reasons, not because of the intrinsic illegality of the
act itself. The principal motives for the revulsion against the
practice is the fear of the abuses to which its legalization would
lead, however great the benefits may be in individual cases. By
reducing human generation to stud-farming methods, A.I.D.
severs the link between the procreation of children and mar-
riage, indispensable to the maintenance of the family as the
most basic and sacred unit of human society. It would enable
women to satisfy their craving for children without the necessity
to have homes or husbands. It would pave the way to a disas-
trous increase of promiscuity, as a wife, guilty of adultery, could
always claim that a pregnancy which her husband did not cause
was brought about by A.I.D., when in fact she had adulterous
relations with another man. Altogether, the generation of chil-
dren would become arbitrary and mechanical, robbed of those
mystic and intimately human qualities which make man a part-
ner with God in the creative propagation of the race.6
Some ancillary concerns also exist, but most are addressed rel-
atively easily. While Jewish law has recognized and applauded
adoption, it has not replaced the child's natural parentage under
the law. For example, if an orphan is the child of a descendant of
Aaron and is, therefore, a priest (Kohen), but his adoptive father is
a Jew with no hereditary connection to the priests and Levites in
the ancient Temple (a Yisrael), the child retains his natural father's
status at birth. If the natural father's status is not known, however,
the child is treated as a Yisrael by default. Because Jewish law de-
4. Incest is not a concern in this latter situation because, even though such a couple
may be physically related, Jewish law does not consider them to be legally related, which
they must be for Jewish law to consider the relationship incestuous.
5. Immediate past Chief [Orthodox] Rabbi of the British Commonwealth.
6. JAxOBOVrrs, supra note 1, at 244-50, 272-73; see also Bti.cH, supra note 1, at 81-
84; ALEX J. GOLDMAN, JUDAISM CONFRONTS CONTEMPORARY IssuEs 74-86 (1978).
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termines a person's Jewish identity based on the religion of the
bearing mother, the fact that a donor father's identity is unknown
does not present a problem. If necessary, a child can be converted
to Judaism as an infant.
Under Jewish law, the provider of the semen is the father.
Consequently, even if the adoptive father assumes all of the re-
sponsibilities of parenthood, consenting to have his wife impreg-
nated by another man's seed does not fulfill the mitzvah of
procreation. As a result, Rabbi J. David Bleich, an American Or-
thodox rabbi specializing in medical ethics, reduces artificial insem-
ination by a donor to a matter of personal desire, which must be
weighed against the legal problems of adultery, wasting of seed,
and incest in the next generation.7 Although Rabbi Bleich usually
takes the harshest position possible, even he grudgingly permits ar-
tificial insemination under certain restrictions.
Most rabbis, however, take a more liberal position toward arti-
ficial insemination, even if the insemination is accomplished
through a donor. These rabbis point out that people who want to
be licentious will find many ways to do so, without resorting to
artificial insemination. Moreover, in our own day, the diminishing
number of Jews is a critical problem, calling our very existence as a
people into question. As a community, we must encourage young
married couples to have children however they can. Couples will
not normally resort to artificial insemination unless they have gone
through the frustration and anguish of failure to conceive through
sexual union. Communal support for artificial insemination, there-
fore, is crucial for both humane and Jewish reasons. Along these
lines, one rabbi has suggested that, where the husband is the donor,
he should be credited with fulfilling the mitzvah of procreation, be-
cause the mitzvah is to produce two viable children for which both
intercourse and artificial insemination are preparations.8 This sev-
ers the command to procreate from the emotional bonding that
commonly accompanies sexual intercourse. Instead, the command
is fulfilled by the couple's intent to produce children and their suc-
cess in doing so.
Other problems will undoubtedly arise as reproductive medi-
cal procedures become more sophisticated. Yet, as medical knowl-
7. BLEicI, supra note 1, at 80.
8. Rabbi Morris Shapiro, Paper Prepared for the Committee on Jewish Law and
Standards of the Rabbinical Assembly (Conservative) 3 (1978).
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edge about how to help infertile couples advances, some of the new
procedures may become unnecessary and the moral problems they
raise would then become moot. While rabbis have sanctioned the
new, artificial methods of conception in varying degrees, they
clearly prefer methods that will help the couple have children
through their own sexual intercourse-as the couples undoubtedly
prefer as well. When medical intervention is solely to aid a natural
process, the emotional values of coitus and reproduction can be
preserved.
When a couple cannot have children, adoption is an available
option. Adoption probably existed during Biblical times, although
the evidence is equivocal and is not specified in any legal source of
the Bible. In later Jewish law, adoption is not a defined institution
as such, but Rabbinic law provides for the approximate equivalent.
The Rabbinic court, "the father of all orphans," 9 appoints guardi-
ans for orphans and children in need, and the guardians have the
same responsibilities as natural parents. They must care for the
child's upbringing, education, and physical accommodations, and
must administer the child's property. If the guardian dies, his es-
tate continues to be responsible for the child's care. In fact, guardi-
anship responsibilities in Jewish law are so strong that they were
recently invoked in a New York case to extend the obligations of
the adoptive father beyond the demands of civil law.10
Contrary to modem adoption procedures, however, under
Jewish law the natural parents have continuing obligations to the
child; the personal status of the child in matters of Jewish identity,
ritual, and marriage depends upon the status of the natural par-
ents.1 One Rabbinic source, however, states that the people who
raise the child, and not the natural father and mother, are called
the parents;12 perhaps Jewish law will develop in that direction.
The contemporary need to increase Jewish ranks certainly makes it
imperative for Jews to encourage infertile Jewish couples to adopt
children and raise them as Jews. Additionally, it is in everybody's
interest to cement the ties between children and adoptive parents
as much as possible. A legal recognition of the adoptive parents as
9. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Kamma 37a, Gitlin 37a.
10. Wener v. Wener, 59 Misc. 2d 959, 301 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1969); cf. Wener v. Wener, 35
A.D.2d 50, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1970).
11. See ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 2:298-303, 3:218-22, 12:1478-80 (1972).
12. ExoDus RABBAH 46:5; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 19b.
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the child's parents in every sense would help to accomplish these
objectives.
Thus, in our case, Diane and George are not only permitted,
but are encouraged to try in vitro fertilization if they cannot possi-
bly conceive a child through sexual intercourse. If surgery per-
formed on either Diane or George would make them fertile, they
would be permitted to have the surgery as long as the procedure
would not pose an undue risk to their life or health. They would
never be required to undergo such surgery, for the obligation to
procreate is secondary to the duty to preserve one's life and health.
Because of the danger involved in any surgery, Diane would not be
permitted to produce eggs for implantation in a surrogate mother
simply because, for example, Diane wants to avoid pregnancy for
reasons of career or convenience. Most couples who contemplate
having in vitro fertilization, however, do so for the reasons that
Diane and George did-namely, that, through normal sexual inter-
course, they have failed to conceive. In such cases, in vitro fertili-
zation is both permitted and encouraged.
The preferred embryos to be used in transplantation are those
that medically have the greatest chance of surviving to birth. If all
embryos have equivalent chances, then those to be used may be
chosen at random. The remaining embryos should be either frozen
for future use or destroyed.
In the later action brought by Diane, rabbinic law views the
embryos as George's property because the embryos were not part
of the property brought into the marriage by Diane. Because the
embryos have not been born, however, they are not considered
human beings; rather, they are property. Moreover, rabbinic opin-
ion in recent years has tended to look askance at single women
being impregnated artificially, for it prevents the resulting child
from having the benefit of both a mother and father in his or her
upbringing. When the lack of a parent happens naturally through
divorce or death, the then-single parents and their children have to
deal with the problems that arise as best they can, and the commu-
nity should be as supportive as possible; but we should not know-
ingly create such situations when we have the possibility to avoid
them.13 Therefore, for property considerations, and to avoid an in-
13. R~AB DAvID GoLNKIN, Artificial Insemination for a Single Woman, in
RESPONSA OF THE VA'AD HALACHA OF THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY OF ISRAEL 83-92
(1988).
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herently undesirable situation for the child, the dictates of Jewish
law require the judge to award the embryos to George.
If, for some reason, the judge awarded the embryos to Diane
and she produced children from them, then George would, indeed,
be responsible for child support. This is true until and unless the
children are adopted by any new husband of Diane. Therefore,
George would have yet another property interest in preventing Di-
ane from having children with their joint embryos.
V. PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS-FACT PATTERN
John and Deborah are young professionals in their early thir-
ties. They come from different religious backgrounds. In their
professional careers, both have acquired significant financial assets.
After dating for several years, the couple decides to marry.
Although they are sure that their love will last forever, John and
Deborah are also aware that divorce does occur, and are concerned
about the religious upbringing of their children as well as the con-
siderable financial investments each has made. In consultation
with an attorney, the couple is preparing to sign an agreement that
would settle property disputes in the event of divorce. The agree-
ment also indicates that they desire to have two children, the first
to be raised in the religion of the father and the second in the reli-
gion of the mother.
One week before the document is ready to be signed, John
begins to have serious doubts about the propriety of such an ac-
tion. He is now appalled at the notion of planning for divorce
while planning for marriage. He has come to question Deborah's
commitment to the marriage and whether the prenuptial agree-
ment itself precludes a legally valid marriage. He comes to you for
advice.
A. Roman Catholic Response
MICHAEL R. MOODIE, S.J.
From the perspective of Roman Catholic canon law,' John and
Deborah's prenuptial agreement raises the question of conditioned
1. Canon law is not of exclusively Roman Catholic usage. The Eastern Orthodox
churches, as well as some sectors of the Anglican Church, refer to their laws as "canon
law." The term canon comes from the early centuries of Christianity. The Greek word
KcaoAu, meaning a "rule" or "measure," was used to refer to the laws passed by Church
Councils; distinguish this from the Nojiot, or "imperial laws."
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consent; do the conditions placed upon the marriage result in its
invalidity? The question itself arises from a particular legal and
doctrinal context that requires some explanation before a canoni-
cal answer to John's query can be given.
Early in its history, the Catholic Church adopted the Roman
law principle of marital contract: that marriage comes into being
solely and exclusively through the mutual consent of the parties.
This principle remains a foundational element of canon law.2 To
this Roman law concept, however, Catholic doctrine added an im-
portant qualifying element-the irrevocability of marital consent.
Consent, once given, could not be rescinded. In Catholic law and
doctrine, therefore, marriage is indissoluble and divorce
impossible.3
Because the marital bond created by the mutual consent of the
parties could not be broken, the only possible remedy in cases of de
facto broken marriages was to prove'that the original consent was
substantially defective; that is, that true and binding consent had
never been given. Without true consent, the marriage contract
would be invalid ab initio, leaving the parties free to marry. Conse-
quently, legal attention focused on the conditions necessary to give
valid consent.
The Roman law of contracts recognized that parties could
place conditions on an agreement. Because marriage is a contract,
the parties could conceivably place conditions on their consent.
Opposing that legal principle, however, was the Christian notion
that marriage is a divinely-established institution and, therefore,
2. Thus, Pope Nicholas (d. 867) decreed: "Sufficiat solus secundum leges consensus
eorum, de quorum quarumque coniunctionibus agitur." Decree of Gratian, C.27 q.2 c.2, in
1 CoRPus IJURIS CANONICI 1063 (Aemelius Friedberg ed., 1959). This principle found ex-
pression in the 1917 Code of Canon Law: "Matrimonium facit partium consensus inter per-
sonas iure habiles legitime manifestatus, qui nulla humana potestate supplen valet [Consent
legitimately manifested between persons legally qualified creates the marriage of those
parties]." 1917 CODE c.1081, § 1; see also 1983 CODE c.1057, § 1 (repeating the Latin ver-
sion of Canon 1081 verbatim).
3. The basis for the doctrine of indissolubility is found in the Christian scriptures.
Luke 16:18 states: "Everyone who divorces his wife and marries another is guilty of adul-
tery, and the man who marries a woman divorced by her husband commits adultery." JE-
RUSALEM BIBLE, Luke 16:18. Similarly, Corinthians adds: "For the married I have
something to say, and this is not from me but from the Lord: a wife must not leave her
husband-or if she does leave him, she must either remain unmarried or else make it up
with her husband-nor must a husband send his wife away." Id 1 Corinthians 7:10-11.
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not completely subject to positive law. 4 The resolution of actual
cases helped to clarify the law.
In 1187, the Bishop of Exeter forwarded a case to Pope Alex-
ander III. A nobleman in the bishop's jurisdiction had betrothed a
woman; at that time, betrothal was a solemn, sworn act binding a
party to marriage and giving the other party the legal right to insist
upon marriage. After the betrothal, however, the nobleman exper-
ienced a call to the monastic life. The question presented was
whether the marriage should proceed. On the one hand, the sworn
betrothal legally obligated the nobleman to marry. On the other
hand, the nobleman had a divine vocation to monastic life. This
posed a complicated problem for twelfth century Christendom.
Pope Alexander III replied with the decretal Commissum. 5
He decreed that because of the nobleman's sworn oath, the noble-
man should proceed with the marriage, but only on the condition
that the marriage not be consummated. Then, his obligation to
marry fulfilled, the nobleman could separate from his spouse and
enter monastic life.6 The profession of monastic vows would dis-
solve the unconsummated marriage, leaving the woman free to
contract a new marriage.
The legal precedent set by Commissum clearly indicated that a
contracting party could place binding conditions upon marital con-
sent and still validly contract marriage. Legal scholars, however,
questioned the content of Commissum. Granted that some condi-
tions might be placed on marital consent, the actual condition in
question was against sexual intercourse, an essential element of
marriage according to natural law.7 How could one consent to
4. See Lynda A. Robitaille, Conditioned Consent Natural Law and Human Positive
Law, 26 STUDIA CANONICA 76 (1992) (discussing in greater detail the qualifications that a
natural law approach places on the marriage contract).
5. 2 Conpus IUIs CANONICI, supra note 2, at 667, bk. 4, tit. 1, ch. 16.
6. The Catholic Church accepted the Roman law principle that consent created mar-
riage with a qualification adopted from Germanic law: Consent created marriage, but mar-
riage only became absolutely indissoluble when marital rights were concretely exchanged,
Le., when sexual intercourse occurred. After consent, a marriage was considered ratum
(ratified). When sexual intercourse took place, the marriage became ratum et consum-
matum (ratified and consummated) and, consequently, indissoluble. The nobleman's mar-
riage would be ratum sed non consummatum (ratified but not consummated), and,
therefore, could be dissolved by the act of professing a perpetual vow of chastity.
7. Thus, the 1917 Code of Canon Law defined marital consent as: "Consensus ma-
trimonialis est actus voluntatis quo utraque pars tradit et acceptat ius in corpus, perpetuum et
exclusivum, in ordine ad actus per se aptos ad prolis generationem [An act of the will by
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marriage and not consent to sexual intercourse, an essential ele-
ment of that same thing?
The conclusion reached in Commissum could not last. In
1232, Pope Gregory IX clarified the law on conditions in the decree
Si conditiones, effectively overturning the precedent set by Pope
Alexander III:
If conditions are placed against the substance of marriage; for
example, if one party should say to the other: "I contract with
you, if you avoid the generation of children," or: "until I might
find someone more honorable and talented," or: "if you give
yourself to adultery for profit," then the marriage contract, no
matter how favorable it may be, lacks all effect; granted that
other conditions may be placed on marriage, if they are immoral
or impossible, they should be considered as not having been
made because of the favor [marriage enjoys]."
The decree recognized three categories of conditions: (1) condi-
tions against the substance of marriage; (2) conditions not contrary
to the substance of marriage but immoral or impossible; and (3)
conditions that are both moral and possible.
The first category of conditions would render a marriage inva-
lid. In the second category of immoral or impossible conditions,
the conditions were to be considered as never having been made,
and would not affect the validity of the marriage. The third cate-
gory would condition the contract, and the validity of the marriage
would depend upon the fulfillment of the condition.
Si conditiones became the precedent governing all subsequent
jurisprudence on conditioned consent. When canon law was codi-
fied in 1917, Canon 1092 transformed the decree into a statute:
Can. 1092 - A condition once placed and not revoked:
10 If it is a condition regarding the future that is necessarily
impossible or immoral, but not contrary to the substance of mar-
riage, it must be held as not having been placed;
which each party hands over and accepts a permanent and exclusive right of the body for
those acts which are per se apt for the generation of children]." 1917 CODF c.1081, § 2.
8. The untranslated version of the decree reads:
Si conditiones contra substantiam coniugii inserantur, puta, si alter dicat alter"
'contraho tecua, si generationem prolis evites,' ve. 'donec inveniam aliam honore
vel facultatibus digniorem,' au" 'si pro quaestu adulterandam te tradas,' ma-
trimonialis contractus, quantumcumque sit favorabilis, caret effect" licet aliae con-
ditiones appositae in matrimonio, si turpes aut impossibiles fuerint, debeant propter
eius favorem pro non adiectis haberi.
Decretal of Gregory IX, IV 5.7, in 2 CoRPus Iuais CAioNcil, supra note 2, at 684.
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20 If it is a condition regarding the future that is contrary to
the substance of marriage, it renders the marriage invalid;
30 If it is a licit condition regarding the future, it suspends
the validity of the marriage;
40 If it is a condition regarding the past or the present, the
marriage will be valid or not insofar as that which is conditioned
exists or not.9
The legal situation of conditioned consent finally seemed settled,
after almost seven hundred years of consistent jurisprudence.
When Pope John XXIII called for a revision of canon law,
conditioned consent once again came under discussion. The Sec-
ond Vatican Council o taught that marriage is "an intimate partner-
ship of life and love" that is constituted as "a mutual giving of two
persons."1 The essence of marriage is a mutual self-donation of
two persons, and any conditioning of that self-gift seems contradic-
tory.12 The commission responsible for the revision of marriage
law voted to abrogate the existing law and make all conditions re-
garding the future invalidating.' 3 The new norm became law on
November 27, 1983.14
John and Deborah's prenuptial agreement places two condi-
tions upon the marriage; namely, a disposition regarding property
in the event of a civil divorce, and an agreement regarding the
9. The untranslated version of Canon 1092 reads as follows:
Conditio semel apposita et non revocata:
1* Si sit de futuro necessaria vel impossibilis vel turpis, sed non contra ma-
trimonii substantiam, pro non adiecta habeatur,
20 Si de futuro contra matrimonii substantiam, illud reddit invalidum;
3' Si de futuro licita, valorem matrimonii suspendit,
40 Si de praeterito vel de praesent4 matrimonium erit validum vel non, prout id
quod conditioni subest, exsistit vel non.
1917 CODE c.1092.
10. The Second Vatican Council was held from 1963 to 1965.
11. GAUDIUM ET SPES, Pastoral Const., Vatican Council II n.48.
12. Ladislas Orsy, SJ., very succinctly points out the problem: "When the act of con-
sent is conditioned, the covenanting party intends, with the very same act, to commit him-
self and to suspend the effect of the commitment." LADISLAs ORSY, SJ., MARRIAGE IN
CANON LAw 146 (1986).
13. See 3 Communicationes 77 (1971).
14. Canon 1102 states: "§ 1. Marriage cannot be validly contracted under condition
regarding the future. § 2. Marriage entered into under condition regarding the past or the
present is valid nor not insofar as that which is conditioned exists or not." 1917 CODE
c.1102.
The untranslated version of the same Canon reads: "§ 1. Matrimonium sub condicione
de futuro valide contrahi nequit. § 2. Matrimonium sub condicione de praeterito vel de
praesenti initum est validum vel non, prout id quod condicioni subest exsistit vel non." Id.
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number of children and their religious education. Although pres-
ent Catholic discipline discourages individuals from placing condi-
tions of any sort on their marriage, the technical and legal
consequences of the two conditions differ.
Prenuptial financial agreements are an ancient practice. Dis-
positions regarding land, dowry, and ownership of assets were an
integral part of Germanic tribal laws that governed much of feudal
society, and ecclesiastical courts recognized these dispositions as
binding. Moreover, the law did not consider prenuptial financial
agreements as conditions regarding the future, but as sincere
promises regarding the present. A licit condition regarding the fu-
ture suspended the validity of the marriage until the conditions
were fulfilled. Financial agreements, however, were simply open-
ended; that is, the event of some occurrence, such as death, aban-
donment, abduction, or disappearance in time of war would not
dissolve the agreement. The purpose of the agreement was to pro-
tect the families and, particularly, the woman from some unex-
pected event not explicitly intended by the consenting parties.15
Contemporary life has changed from that of feudal Europe,
and so has the Catholic Church's attitude toward prenuptial finan-
cial arrangements. The agreement would still be generally consid-
ered a condition regarding the present and, therefore, not
invalidating. The Church, however, in response to American soci-
ety's favorable attitude to divorce, would question the sincerity of
the parties' commitment to the marriage. Planning for divorce
before the marriage hardly seems a sign of total commitment. De-
spite this hesitancy toward financial conditions, such an agreement
would not invalidate the consent.
The condition regarding children, however, would invalidate
the marriage. Canonical legal tradition is clear in asserting that the
very nature of marriage is directed to the generation and education
of children.16 Conditions upon the generation and education of
children would be against the substance of marriage and would,
therefore, invalidate the marriage. John and Deborah have agreed
not to raise one of the children in the faith. The education of chil-
15. On the other hand, if one party intended to divorce after a certain period of time,
that would constitute a condition against an essential marital element, namely, perma-
nence, and would render the marriage invalid.
16. "Matrimoniale foedus, quo vir et mulier inter se totius vitae consortium constituunt,
indole sua naturali ad bonum coniugum atque ad prolis generationem et educationem
ordinatum .... " 1983 CODE c.1055, § 1.
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dren, and specifically the handing down of the faith, is considered
to be a divine imperative. The Catholic tradition would consider a
condition not to educate a child in the faith as contrary to divine
law and, therefore, invalidating.
In sum, canon law does not accept the prenuptial agreement
between John and Deborah. While the Church will tolerate the
financial disposition, albeit with reservations, it will not tolerate the
disposition regarding the children. Rather, the latter disposition
directly violates the law prohibiting future conditions. Therefore,




The two areas of focus here are prenuptial agreements and
agreements regarding the religious upbringing of children. Re-
garding the first, John and Deborah have no need for a prenuptial
agreement to protect their separate financial investments. Regard-
ing the second, the agreement is void and unenforceable on the
merits.
Before starting the analysis, it should be noted that this Essay
makes several assumptions. Under the given scenario, John must
be the Muslim partner, because Muslim jurists unanimously agree
that a Muslim woman cannot enter into a valid marriage contract
with a non-Muslim.1 Although the Qur'an contains no clear bar to
a marriage where the prospective husband is one of the "People of
the Book,"2 some jurists have interpreted certain ayahs (verses) as
imposing such a bar.3 The underlying reasoning behind this posi-
* I would like to thank Professor Peter Swisher, the T.C. Williams School of Law,
and Dr. Fathi Osman, Resident Scholar at the Islamic Center of Southern California, for
their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Essay.
1. See, e.g., 4 ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-JAZIRI, KrrAB AL-FIQH 'ALA AL-MADHAHIB AL-
ARBA'AH 75-77 (Beirut 1969) (1928); 7 WIHRAH AL-ZUHAYLI, AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI WA
ADILLATUH 152-55 (Damascus 1984).
2. "People of the Book" is a term that refers to Christians and Jews, each of whom
believes in a holy "Book" revealed by God, the God of all Abrahamic religions. Some
scholars have used this term to refer to certain other religions as well.
3. See, e.g., AL-JAZIRI, supra note 1, at 75; al-Zuhayli, supra note 1, at 152. See also
MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRAH, AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYAH 102 (3d ed. Cairo 1957). More
recently, Muslim leaders and scholars such as Hassan al-Turabi and the late Mahmoud Abu
Saud have stated on different occasions that they have not found a clear bar in the Qur'an
to such marriages, but that the bar is derived from a certain jurisprudential understanding.
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tion is complex; most obviously, it involves the predominantly pa-
triarchal nature of the institution of marriage, and the negative
effect of this institution on the Muslim woman in a non-Muslim
community. Muslim scholars feared that the traditional prohibi-
tion on interfaith marriages imposed by other religions (including
Christianity and Judaism) upon their followers, when combined
with the patriarchal nature of the marraige institution in a marriage
where the husband is a non-Muslim, would result in the effective
denial of the Muslim wife's right to the free exercise of her religion.
To protect the Muslim woman from being denied such a basic
human right, they barred her from marrying a non-Muslim
altogether.4
Therefore, Deborah is the non-Muslim partner in this case,
and her marriage to John must be based on a Muslim marriage
contract for it to be recognized under Islamic law. If Deborah is
either an atheist or a pagan, she cannot enter into a valid Islamic
marriage contract with John. On the other hand, if she is either a
Christian or a Jew, i.e., one of the "People of the Book," she can
validly enter into the contract while still fully adhering to her own
religion.5 Her rights will be similar to those of her Muslim sister,
with some important exceptions. 6 Furthermore, Deborah's right to
the free exercise of her religion will be guaranteed under Islamic
law, because Muslims share her belief in God and the prophets of
her religion. 7
1. Prenuptial Agreements Under Islamic Law
Under Islamic law, prenuptial agreements are superfluous be-
cause the marriage contract itself usually contains provisions speci-
fying all legitimate conditions agreed upon by the parties, including
a provision that describes the mahr (dowry) of the woman." Con-
4. AL-ZuimYLi, supra note 1, at 152; ABu ZAHRAH, supra note 3, at 100.
5. AL-ZuHAYli, supra note 1, at 153; AL-JAzIRI, supra note 1, at 76.
6. See infra notes 14, 17 and accompanying text (while the non-Muslim woman is
entitled to the full payment of her mahr, there is a question as to whether she and her
husband may inherit from each other). See also Anu ZAHRAH, supra note 3, at 105.
7. See, e.g., AL-JAz=m, supra note 1, at 76; AL-ZuHAYu, supra note 1, at 153.
8. See AL-ZuHAYu, supra note 1, at 250-315, for a detailed discussion of mahr. See
also AL-JAzvi, supra note 1, at 94-107. Child support is determined under another part of
Islamic law, and is not part of the mahr. ABu ZAHRAH, supra note 3, at 174; AL-ZUHAYLI,
supra note 1, at 277. While it is usually preferable to indicate the mahr in the marriage
contract, its mention may be omitted without invalidating the contract. In fact, the con-
tract is valid even if the parties agree not to have mahr at all. Even so, the husband will
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trary to general belief, the mahr is the personal property of the
wife and may not be used by either her parents or her husband.9
Some view the mahr as the wife's consideration for entering into
the marriage contract. Consideration is required because, for ex-
ample, the wife usually undertakes a new life and new responsibili-
ties such as childbearing, or loses the opportunity of an
uninterrupted career.10
Mahr is usually divided into two parts, with only the first part
due immediately upon marriage; the second part is due later, often
upon divorce or the husband's death. Social custom, not religion,
requires this division and defines the proportion of the first part to
the second. Some women use the first part of the mahr to facilitate
their preparations for the marriage. Others may use it as capital to
start their own businesses after marriage. Therefore, such women
tend to want a large first installment. In contrast, well-to-do wo-
men tend to specify a first installment of negligible, yet symbolic,
value. Still, in either case, women-like to have a substantial second
installment of the mahr because they view it as security for later
years.11 Furthermore, under no condition is the husband entitled
to a share of his wife's money, regardless of whether she brought
such money into the marriage or earned it after the marriage.
12
still be obligated to pay an appropriate mahr. See ABu ZAHRAH, supra note 3, at 169. A
modem Islamic state may decide to require that every marriage contract contain a mahr
provision to protect further the prospective wife. Such a law would supplement divine law
with legislation that responds to the needs of society at that time; such supplementation is
totally acceptable. For more on this subject, see Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Islamic Constitutional-
ism and the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-9 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Sunin MANmmiNAm, FAI-SAFAT AL-TAsHRI' Fi AL- ISLAM 495-96 (3d ed.
Beirut 1961). See also AL-ZuHAYUt, supra note 1, at 251, 283; 5 AnD AL-HALim MUHAm-
MAD ABu SHUQoAH, TAHRIR AL-MAR'AH F1 'ASR AL-RIsALAH 57 (Kuwait n.d.) (the au-
thor approximates the date of the Kuwaiti version to be 1992, although the source itself
contains no date).
10. See, e.g., AL-ZuHAYu, supra note 1, at 251; cf. Anu ZAHRH, supra note 3, at 169-
70 (arguing that mahr is not consideration, but a gift to the wife and a token of affection).
11. When Khalifah (Caliph) Omar spoke in a mosque in support of placing an upper
limit on mahr, an old woman, recognizing the importance of mahr to a woman's financial
security, rose in opposition. She cited the Qur'an as the source of a woman's right to freely
specify the amount of her dowry with no upper limits. The Khalifah then withdrew his
proposal and admitted his error. AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1, at 255-56; ABu HAMM AL-
GHAZALI, 'IHYA' 'ULuM AL-DiN' 50 (Cairo 1939) (eleventh century). This story is often
recounted by jurists as an example of true democracy in early Islam because the old wo-
man was able to publicly contradict the Khalifah and succeed.
12. ABu ZAHtAH, supra note 3, at 231, 245-46; AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1, at 253;
MAHMASSANI, supra note 9, at 495; MUHAMMAD Husm IBRAHIM SAuM, Huouo AL-
ZAWJAH FI AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI 221 (Cairo 1983).
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The most that a husband in financial need can do is hope that his
wife will freely choose to help him. Nevertheless, she is under no
legal obligation to do so.
Where the marriage contract contains a mahr provision, the
provision must state the exact amount of money or sufficiently de-
scribe the property promised to the wife as first and second install-
ments.13 Promising as a second installment "half of all of the
husband's possessions at the time such installment is due" would
not satisfy the requirement because it is impossible to know at the
time of marriage the exact value of such a promise.
To the extent that any amount or property of the mahr re-
mains unpaid or undelivered, it becomes a debt of the husband
upon the death of either spouse.14 That debt is different from the
wife's determinate share in her husband's estate, which is distrib-
uted only after all debts, including the remainder of the wife's
mahr, are satisfied.
In this case, John has no right to be appalled at the notion of
planning for divorce while planning for marriage. Indeed, Islamic
law requires such planning in a marriage contract in order to pro-
tect both spouses from later problems and uncertainties. Under
the Islamic approach, John also has no reason to worry about his
financial investments. Deborah is not entitled to them, except to
the extent promised by John in the marriage contract, and to the
extent that Islamic law requires John to support her during their
marriage. John is required to support Deborah in accordance with
his means and her station. His refusal or failure to do so will affect
negatively his rights within the family and Deborah's obligations
toward him. Deborah also will become entitled to a variety of
other remedies, including divorce. She has no reason to worry
about her own financial investments because John is not entitled to
any of her money, whatever its source, during her life. This conclu-
sion is true despite the fact that Deborah is not a Muslim, because
she properly entered into a valid and binding Islamic contract with
John.15
13. See, e.g., AL-ZuHAvu, supra note 1, at 263; see also 4 AL-JAZRI, supra note 1, at
103.
14. See, e.g., ABu ZAHRAH, supra note 3, at 174; see also 1 ABD AL-AZIM SHARAF AL-
DIN, AHKAM AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYAH F1 AL-SHARI'AH AL-IsLAMIYAH 406-07 (Cairo
1987); MAHMASSANI, supra note 9, at 495.
15. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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If either John or Deborah is concerned about the amount the
other may ultimately inherit, they should look to Islamic inheri-
tance and estate planning laws. Although parties usually deal with
such matters after marriage, through a will, John and Deborah may
want to do so prior to marriage by signing collateral agreements. 16
It is also possible that they use the second installment of the mahr
as an additional vehicle for achieving the goals of their inheritance
agreement. The extent to which they can do that, however, is be-
yond the scope of this Essay.
17
Because both John and Deborah live in the United States,
they are subject to the family laws of the applicable state. If they
plan to have a civil marriage, their Islamic contract must precede
the civil contract in order to have the force of a prenuptial agree-
ment. Tuming is, therefore, quite important in this case.
2. Religious Upbringing of the Children
The proposed agreement between John and Deborah regard-
ing the religious upbringing of the children is void and unenforce-
able for several reasons. First, Islamic law charges Muslim parents
with, among other things, the duty to provide their children with a
proper Islamic upbringing.18 This is not a duty that they can avoid.
From its inception, Islam permitted inter-faith marriages in an ef-
fort to build bridges with the two other Abrahamic faiths.19 Never-
theless, such bridge-building remains subject to Islamic law and is
never in contravention of it. In the instant case, if John attempts to
opt out of this requirement, he will be shirking a basic Islamic duty.
Therefore, Muslim courts could not possibly legitimize, let alone
honor, John's breach of such duty.
Once children come of age, the responsibility regarding their
religious beliefs shifts from their parents to them. Thus, if the chil-
16. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
17. Some jurists have argued that Muslim and non:Muslim spouses may not inherit
from each other. See, e.g., 6 InN QUDAMAH, AL-MUGHNI 294-95 (Riyadh 1981) (thirteenth
century). In such jurisdictions, John and Deborah need to make their arrangements early
on. Any debt, however, owed by the husband to the wife must be paid. See sources cited
supra note 14.
18. For a detailed discussion, see 1 ABD ALLA4 NAsiH 'ULwA, TARBIYAT AL-
AWLAD F AL-ISLAM 148-61 (3d ed. Beirut 1981).
19. See ABu ZAHRAH, supra note 3, at 100; see also AL-ZuHAyI, supra note 1, at 153;
AL-JAZIRI, supra note 1, at 76.
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dren later choose to adopt different religions, they are personally
responsible to God for their own choices.2°
Further, the very notion of "splitting the children" goes
against the Islamic concept of the child's right against her parents,
not to mention the best interests of the child and of the family in
general. What is at stake here is not a piece of property that may
lend itself to mechanical division. Rather, the issue calls into ques-
tion a set of beliefs and commitments, first to God and then to
one's family and community. If John subscribes to Islamic religious
beliefs and takes them seriously, he then has the obligation towards
God and his children to raise the children in the best way he knows
how; namely, in accordance with his Islamic beliefs.
In Islam, the family is viewed as the basic source of harmony
and moral guidance.21 Raising two siblings in the same household
in two different religions, determined as to each child by essentially
flipping a coin, does not provide either child with sufficient moral
guidance. Instead, it is likely to create confusion, pressure, and
perhaps tension among siblings who may not understand, for ex-
ample, why Amy can freely consume pork while her brother, Sam,
may not do so; or why Amy is taught that marriage to her first
cousin is tantamount to incest, while the father's family encourages
Sam to marry his first cousin.
Additionally, the Muslim child will grow up in a society where
his religious group is in the minority. His experiences at school, for
example, will demand a great deal more resilience and patience
than those of the average child. His sibling, on the other hand, will
have a less demanding experience because she is more likely to fit-
in with the rest of the predominantly Judeo-Christian society, at
least in matters of religion. Further, both siblings will have diffi-
culty explaining the "split" to their friends, and will not escape it
without emotional and spiritual costs. Consequently, this mechani-
cal experience in false tolerance turns out to be a "cop out" by
parents who did not have the foresight to think through their pro-
posal in light of the best interests of their children.
Overall, the situation will cause the children to view religion as
yet another group of preferences, somewhat akin to cultural pref-
erences, devoid of transcendental truths and having only inter-sub-
20. See al-Hibri, supra note 8, at 5 n.15.
21. 'ULwAN, supra note 18, at 31; Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Marriage Laws in Muslim
Countries, 4 INr'L REv. Comp. PuB. PoL 242 (1992).
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jective value. This view is likely to result from the children's
inability to appreciate philosophical differences among the three
Abrahamic religions. Therefore, despite their parents' best inten-
tions, such children may flounder spiritually in, or even totally re-
ject, the very milieu from which they were supposed to have
derived their early guidance and support.
It is for these reasons that parents must provide their children
with solid guidance until they are old enough to properly under-
stand questions in life and make their own choices. American fam-
ily law lent its support to this point of view when many states
decided not to honor agreements among parents relating to "split-
ting" the children along religious lines. Instead, these states chose
to entrust the primary caretaker with the religious upbringing of
the children, regardless of any prior agreements between the two
parents.22 It would be advisable for John and Deborah to discuss
these potential problems thoroughly prior to marriage.
C. Jewish Response
MICHAEL J. BROYDE
There are two aspects of John and Deborah's prenuptial
agreement that require analysis. First, the agreement purports to
allow John and Deborah to raise their two children in separate
faiths. Second, the agreement dictates the financial circumstances
of a future divorce. Although the latter is not definitionally prob-
lematic in the Jewish tradition, the agreement is completely void
with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
1. Intermarriage in the Jewish Tradition
Before discussing the prenuptial agreement itself, it is impor-
tant to note that the hypothetical raises a serious problem under
Jewish law; namely, interfaith marriages are completely prohibited
according to the Jewish tradition. The statement of Rabbi J. David
Bleich as to the nature of the violation is clear, unambiguous, and
to the point. He states:
Among Jews no practice is more widely abhorred than is inter-
marriage. Commitment to take as a marriage partner only a fel-
low member of the Jewish community is not only a matter of
religious obligation but the bedrock of Jewish ethnic identity.
22. See, e.g., PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., VIRGINIA FAMILY LAW §§ 3-7 (1992 Supp.).
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A popular folk saying observes that wherever there are two
Jews, there are three opinions. It seems that in the area of Hala-
cha the number of opinions often increases geometrically, ac-
cording to the number of authorities writing about or discussing
any given topic. In the area of intermarriage, however, this is
not the case; there is little, if any, disagreement, and there are
very, very few hairs to split.1
Accordingly, because Jewish law does not recognize interfaith
marriage as legally binding, it would allow and encourage both par-
ties to terminate the relationship at any time.
2
2. Religious Upbringing of Children in the Jewish Tradition
Although intermarriage is forbidden under Jewish law, it is
still a practical reality that intermarriages do occur. Thus, Jewish
law still governs problems arising within intermarriages, such as the
prenuptial agreement proposed between John and Deborah.
As to the agreement's provisions concerning the religious affil-
iation of their children, the agreement would be void in the eyes of
Jewish law because Jewish law seeks to have all children raised in
the faith of the mother. In fact, Jewish law recognizes the faith of
the mother as being the faith of her children.3 Indeed, it does not
recognize paternity as legally established in the case of intermar-
riage; this is true whether the father is Jewish and the mother is
not, or vice versa.4 No paternal relationship is legally established.
Thus, according to Jewish law, the child of a Jewish-Gentile mar-
1. Rabbi J. David Bleich, The Prohibition Against Intermarriage, 1 J. HALACHA &
CoNTEMP. Soc'Y 5 (1980). Rabbi Bleich is a Professor of Law at Benjamin Cardozo
School of Law, Rosh Yeshiva, Yeshiva University. He is one of the premier writers and
influencers of Jewish law in America. [Admittedly, some do theorize about the precise
nature of the prohibition on intermarriage. Yet, on a practical level, intermarriage is
clearly forbidden.].
2. Like incestuous marriages and adulterous marriages, these "marriages" are void
and of no legal significance. SHULcHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 16:1-2.
3. Id at 8:4.
4. There are situations in Jewish law where, even in the course of a sexual relation-
ship, no paternity is established. According to Jewish law, the child of a relationship be-
tween a Jew and a Gentile always assumes the legal status of its mother. The child bears
no legal relationship to its father. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yevamot 22a-b; Jacob ben
Asher, Tur, in SHULJCHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 16. This is equally true in cases of artificial
insemination. Id.
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riage always assumes the legal status and religion of its mother and
bears no legal relationship to its father.
5
3. Acceptability of Financial Planning Under a
Prenuptial Agreement
The question of the validity of the financial aspects of the
agreement under Jewish law in the case of an intermarriage is
nearly a question of first impression to this author. The most likely
answer is that the agreement is valid in this respect, as Jewish law
recognizes the right to contractually regulate financial activity
through mutual agreement; this is true even if the agreement is
contrary to Jewish financial law and concerns a prohibited transac-
tion-in this case, an intermarriage. 6 Nevertheless, this issue re-
quires further analysis that is beyond the scope of this Essay.
4. Conclusion
In short, John and Deborah should not sign the prenuptial
agreement and, more significantly, should not enter into a mar-
riage. A commitment to religious values entails a commitment to
same-faith marriages. An intermarriage is equivalent to an aban-
donment of the Jewish faith.
VI. CONTRACEPION-FACr PAlTERN
Helen and Herbert have been married for three years. They
are childless. Helen and Herbert have no economic concerns, as
they are beneficiaries of a rather generous trust. Helen has de-
cided that she does not wish to bear children and sees a doctor to
obtain a birth control device. Helen believes that natural methods
are too uncertain, and she is concerned about the side effects of
birth control pills. She chooses to have one of the new "safer" In-
trauterine Devices ("IUDs") inserted into her uterus. In the event
that the IUD fails, however, Helen is. open to the option of
abortion.
5. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yevamot 22a-b; RABBI JACOB BEN ASHER, TUR, Even
Haezer 16; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 8:4.
6. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 208. This result is agreed to by my col-
league, Rabbi Howard Jachter of Congregation Beth Judah, Brooklyn, N.Y., an expert on
prenuptial agreements. For a similar case with a similar result, see Rabbi Chaim Shlomo
Shan, Summoning the Plaintiff to Secular Court, in TECHUMIN 12:257-58 (1990).
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Helen makes these decisions unilaterally, without consulting
Herbert. After Herbert discovers Helen's feelings on children, he
becomes very upset. Herbert married Helen expecting to raise a
medium-sized family, and feels that he cannot enjoy a future with-
out the family he always envisioned. Helen knew Herbert's feel-
ings before, but never contradicted him. Although she never said
how she felt, she now claims that Herbert never asked. Their disa-
greement nearly leads to the dissolution of their marriage. In or-
der to avoid this catastrophe, they have agreed that you should
counsel them.
A. Roman Catholic Response
WILLIAM E. MAY*
My first assumption is that Helen and Herbert are Catholics,
or that at least one of them is Catholic, and that they married with
the approval of the Church. My second assumption is that, in com-
ing to me for moral advice, they desire to discover the truth.
Therefore, I will not advise them to "follow their consciences," be-
cause they surely know that they should do this. What they need is
to have their consciences properly informed so that they can make
true moral judgments.
The first question is whether or not, at the time of the wed-
ding, Helen already had a firm belief against having children; it is
important to know whether she deliberately excluded the possibil-
ity of children from the marriage. If so, I would be obliged to in-
form Helen and Herbert that they are not truly married because
they did not consent to "marriage" as understood by the Church.
The Church defines marriage as an "intimate partnership of life
and love . .. ordered to the procreation and education of chil-
dren."1 Indeed, the Church teaches that "for matrimonial consent
to exist, it is necessary that the contracting parties be at least not
ignorant of the fact that marriage is a permanent partnership be-
tween a man and a woman, ordered to the procreation of children.'"2
Consequently, "if.... either or both of the parties should by a posi-
* William E. May is the Michael J. McGivney Professor of Moral Theology at the
John Paul II Institute for Study on Marriage and Family, Washington, D.C.
1. GAUDIUM Er SeEs, Pastoral Const., Vatican Council II n.48; cf. i n.50 ("Mar-
riage and married love are by nature ordered to the procreation and education of
children.").
2. 1983 CODE c.1096, § 1 (Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland et al.
trans.) (emphasis added).
1993]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
tive act of the will exclude marriage itself or any essential element
of marriage, or any essential property, such party contracts
invalidly."3
If, at the time of the wedding, Helen had, "by a positive act of
the will," excluded acceptance of children within the marriage,
then the marriage is invalid. I would then advise them to refrain
from engaging in sexual relations until the marriage is validated;
such sexual relations could not be considered marital, but rather
instances of fornication, and I would advise them not to fornicate.
I would urge Helen, however, to consider validating their marriage
by changing her mind and expressing a willingness to accept chil-
dren within the marriage. Herbert, who I presume gave valid mari-
tal consent, would still have to renew his consent to the marriage.
4
If Helen remains determined to exclude children from their mar-
riage, however, I would reluctantly advise Herbert to have the
Church formally invalidate the marriage to enable him to marry
someone else.
If my inquiry showed that Helen had given valid marital con-
sent on their wedding day (i.e., she did not decide against having
children until after the marriage), I would speak to the couple
about the goodness of children; children are a blessing, or good, of
marriage. Indeed, as Vatican Council II instructs us, "Children are
the supreme gift of marriage and greatly contribute to the good of
the parents themselves."'5 It is good for married men and women
to have children. In fact, as Vatican Council II again reminds us,
"Married couples should regard it as their proper mission to trans-
mit human life and to educate their children; they should realize
that they are thereby cooperating with the love of God the
Creator. "6
It is possible, however, that they mutually came to the under-
standing that it would be better not to have children because of a
serious health problem caused by a genetic disease, such as Lesch-
Nyhan Syndrome. In this situation, Herbert and Helen would have
a just reason not to procreate. I might suggest, however, that they
adopt a child.
3. Id. c.1101, § 2.
4. Id. c.1159; cf c.1055, para. 1 (essentially stating that marriage is a reality open to
the gift of children).
5. GAUDIUM ET SPES, Pastoral Const., Vatican Council II n.50.
6. Id.
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Another area that deserves discussion is Helen's willingness to
use abortion and contraception. First, as to abortion, Helen appar-
ently believes that abortion is morally justifiable. Yet, deliberately
procured abortion is the killing of an innocent human being. In all
likelihood, Helen does not regard the entity conceived or im-
planted in the womb to be a human being; at a minimum, she does
not view it as a human being endowed with the same rights as those
human beings who have survived life in the womb. It is likely that
Herbert does not agree with her on this matter, and I would elicit
his help in persuading her that neither scientific evidence nor phil-
osophical arguments support her position. Assuming Helen is a
Catholic, I would appeal to her Catholic upbringing and remind
her of the Church's traditional treatment of abortion and the hu-
manity of the unborn. If she in any way believes that the Bible is
the Word of God, I would ask her to read such passages as Psalm
139, where the Psalmist says: "For thou didst form my inmost parts,
thou didst knit me together in my mother's womb ... when I was
being made in secret.., thy eyes beheld my unformed substance."'7
I would also ask her to read Luke 1:44, where Elizabeth, pregnant
with her son John, exclaims when Mary visits her, "[W]hen the
voice of your greeting came to my ears, the babe in my womb
leaped for joy."8
Because Herbert apparently is opposed to abortion, I would
point out to Helen that it is horribly unfair and unjust for her to
involve him in abortion. Any child she might conceive is also his
son or daughter, and he has an obligation to respect and protect
the life of his child. Helen cannot honestly say that she loves Her-
bert if she is willing to bring about the death of his children and
cause him such grief.
In discussing abortion, I would explain that Helen's IUD is not
a contraceptive, but instead acts as an early abortifacient; 9 it does
not prevent the fertilization of her ova, but affects the lining of her
uterus so that the child conceived cannot implant there. In fact,
7. OLD TESTAMENT, Psalms 139:13, 15 (Revised Standard Version 1952).
8. NEW TESTAMENT, Luke 1:44 (Revised Standard Version 1948).
9. "IUDs seem to interfere ... with the implantation of the fertilized egg in the
lining of the uterine cavity. The IUD does not prevent ovulation." PHYSICIANS DESK
REFERENCE 1646 (36th ed. 1988).
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the pills currently in use in the United States frequently act as
abortifacients and not as a means of preventing conception.10
It is important to compare the use of contraceptives when
there are serious reasons for doing so, with the practice of periodic
abstinence or natural family planning. Regarding periodic absti-
nence, it is as effective in enabling spouses to avoid a pregnancy as
artificial contraceptives, although it is not as effective as steriliza-
tion.11 Yet, it obviously does not have the serious disadvantages of
a sterilizing operation. Additionally, periodic abstinence has no
medical risks, is inexpensive and can be effectively taught by sim-
ple practical instruction. Married couples can also use periodic ab-
stinence when conceiving children, as it places responsibility on
both husband and wife to communicate their feelings, desires, and
ideals, thus enhancing the marital union.12
Helen and Herbert should meet with a married couple or
couples who use natural family planning or fertility awareness in
order to meet their spousal and parental obligations. They would
learn that the divorce rate is much lower for couples who, for reli-
gious or moral reasons, refuse to practice contraception.1 3 Married
couples are more likely to remain married when they seek to har-
monize their marital love with the serious responsibility of respect-
ing the good of human life in its transmission.
After explaining these matters, I would provide Herbert and
Helen with some philosophical and theological arguments to show
that it is always wrong to contracept, i.e., one may never choose to
adopt a proposal to impede the beginning of new human life that
one reasonably believes will begin when one chooses to engage in
an act of genital union. An explanation of the basic reasons why
10. "Oral contraceptives frequently function as abortifacients. They do not always
prevent fertilization of the ovum; rather they prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum in
the uterine wall." BEVERLY WILDUNG HARRISON, OUR RIGHT To CHOOSE: TOWARD A
NEW ETmic OF ABORTION 303 n.68 (1983). Harrison is one of the most outspoken femi-
nists of our day, standing firmly in favor of both contraception and abortion. Yet, she
freely acknowledges the abortifacient character of the pills now used in the United States.
She continues this passage by saying, "The IUD also functions to prevent not conception
but implantation." At
11. Cf. JOHN F. KiPPLEY, THE ErncrnVNMss OF NATURAL FAMILY PLANNING pas-
sim (1986).
12. Cf. BENEDICr ASHLEY, O.P. & KEVIN O'RouRKE, O.P., HEALTH CARE ETmICS
THEoLOGICAL ANALYSIS* (2d ed. 1989); JOHN AND SHEILA KIPPLEY, THE ART OF NATU-
RAL FAMILY PLANNING (2d ed. 1989).
13. Cf. ROBERT T. MrcHAEL, "WHY DID THE DIVORCE RATE DOUBLE WrrHIN A
DECADE"?-REEARCH IN POPULATION 361-99 (1988).
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one ought not to contracept is beyond the scope of this Essay.14
Yet, in my discussion with Herbert and Helen, I would enter into
this matter in detail--of course, assuming that they would be will-
ing to do so. I would seek to show Herbert and Helen that the
slogan of those who advocate contraception and abortion, "No un-
wanted child ought ever to be born," is utterly superficial and
demeaning to human beings. Rather, the truth is that no human
being, including unborn children, ought to be unwanted. Our chal-
lenge is to create a society in which all human beings of whatever
age, race, condition, or sex are loved as God loves them and are,
thus, wanted.
These philosophical arguments may not persuade Helen and
Herbert of the truth, and they are free to make their own choices.
But they should realize that they can make a bad moral choice. If
they wish to be truly happy Catholics, they must seek to conform
their choices to the truth.
B. Islamic Response
WAEL B. HALQAQ
Islamic law contains three governing principles in the case of
contraception. First, the chief reason for marriage is procreation.
Therefore, a married couple that is capable of having children and
that has the means to raise them, as Helen and Herbert indeed do,
would be interfering with God's ways if they resort to
contraception.
Second, contraception is lawful only in a situation in which
pregnancy may prove detrimental to the health of the mother.'
This is clearly not Helen's case.
Third, in such matters as relate to family life, the husband's
wishes override those of the wife; the wife may, and should, diso-
bey those wishes of the husband that pertain to and violate the
wife's religious duties.2
Even if Helen resorted to contraception with the consent of
Herbert, this would only mean that both of them were violating the
14. See Germain Grisez et al., Every Marital Act Ought To Be Open to New Life:
Toward a Clearer Understanding, 52 THOiMs'r 365, 365-426 (1988) (discussing the matter in
detail).
1. BASIM MUSALt., SEx AND Socm-ry iN IsLAM 57-59 (1983).
2. 2 MuHAmmAD MrrWALLI SHA'RAWI, AL-FATAWA 186, 249 (al-Sayyid aI-Jamirl
ed., 1983).
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first two principles of Islamic law. If Helen chose to act unilater-
ally, however, contradicting Herbert's wishes, her acts would also
violate Herbert's legal rights. Yet, they may amicably resolve the
problem if Helen ceases to use contraceptives and joins her hus-
band in the wish to have children. Otherwise, if she continues to
use contraceptives, she will have violated Herbert's right by dis-
obeying his wishes (nushaz). In this case, Herbert may seek to le-
gally enjoin Helen from using contraceptives. If she still persists,
he is entitled to divorce her and, because she has violated his




Marriage and children are the epitome of blessing in Jewish
law. As our Rabbis taught, "A man without a wife lives without
blessing, without life, without joy, without health, and without
peace."1 A later mystic source carries this one step further: "The
divine presence can rest only upon a married man because an un-
married man is but half a man and the divine presence does not
rest upon that which is imperfect."2 So important is it to take a
wife that one "may sell a scroll of the Torah for the purpose of
having enough money to marry."3
Once married, propagation of children is both a command-
ment and a blessing. Specifically, the biblical commandment, "Be
fruitful and multiply"4 is fulfilled, according to the rabbis, when
one has two children,5 although couples are supposed to have as
many children as they can. Conversely, "A man without children is
as if he were dead."' 6 In our contemporary society with large num-
bers of unmarried Jews, that statement seems harsh. It does, how-
3. 1 AL-SHAYKH AL-NIZAM, AL-FATAWA AL-HINDIYYA 545 (1980); 'ABD AL-
HAMID, AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA 349 (1984).
1. MIDRASH PSALMS, Psalms 59:2.
2. ZOHAR HADASH 4.50b.
3. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Megillah 27a.
4. Genesis 1:28.
5. MISHNAH, Yevamot 6:6. The rabbis actually consider the biblical commandment
to be fulfilled only when one creates as God did (Genesis 1:27), namely, when one pro-
duces a male and a female. Moreover, for exegetical and economic reasons, the rabbis
understood the obligation to rest upon the male, not the female, even though men obvi-
ously cannot have children without women.
6. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Nedarim 64b.
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ever, articulate our ancestors' views on marriage and procreation
until well into this century.
With this in mind, one can understand that traditional Judaism
looked askance at interruptions in the process of conception and
birth. Normally, one was supposed to marry and have children.
Masturbation, birth control, sterilization, and abortion were both
physically and ideologically counterproductive.
Regarding masturbation, Jews shared other societies' abhor-
rence of the act. Interestingly, while they did not debate the prohi-
bition of masturbation, legal writers had difficulty locating a
biblical basis for it. For this reason, even the great authority Mai-
monides claimed that the court could not punish masturbation be-
cause no commandment explicitly forbade it.7 In part, the
prohibition undoubtedly stemmed from assumptions about the
medical consequences of ejaculation. According to Maimonides:
Semen constitutes the strength of the body, its life, and the light
of the eyes. Its emission to excess causes physical decay, debil-
ity, and diminished vitality. Thus Solomon, in his wisdom, says:
"Do not give your strength to women" (Proverbs 31:3). Who-
ever indulges in sexual dissipation becomes prematurely aged;
his strength fails; his eyes become dim, a foul odor proceeds
from his mouth and armpits; the hair of his head, eyebrows, and
eyelashes drop out; the hair of his beard, armpits, and legs grow
abnormally; his teeth fall out; and besides these, he becomes
subject to numerous other diseases. Medical authorities have
stated that for each one who dies of other maladies, a thousand
are the victims of sexual excess.8
Jewish sources discussing ejaculation specifically in the context
of masturbation do not base the prohibition on medical reasons.
Rather, the prohibition is based on concerns about self-pollution
and the murder of unborn generations. Of the two concerns, the
former is far more pronounced, 9 but the mystic tradition in Judaism
gave particular emphasis to the latter thesis. This tradition held
that such a man was guilty not only of murder, but murder of his
own children; therefore, he was a criminal more reprehensible than
7. Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 7:4.
8. MISHNEH TORAH, LAWS OF ETHics 4:19.
9. See DAVID FELDMAN, MARITAL RELATIONS, BIRTH CONTROL, AND ABORTION IN
JEWISH LAW 120 (1968); see generally id., pt. 3.
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any other.10 Moreover, the mystics claimed that even involuntary
emissions of semen created demons."
Folk literature proliferated such notions of demons created by
improper ejaculation. Thus, the narrator in I.B. Singer's book says:
"I was not born. My father... sinned as did Onan, and from his
seed I was created-half spirit, half demon .... ,"12 These notions
give graphic expression to the belief that exposed semen somehow
contaminates the environment and taints its holiness. In contrast,
ejaculation in non-adulterous, heterosexual relations is prized even
in non-procreative situations, for no "murder" is said to take place
and the forces of evil are not enhanced.1 3
Despite the above (including the command to have two chil-
dren, the ideal of having more, and the general prohibition against
"wasting the seed"), the Jewish tradition permits, and even re-
quires, contraception under certain circumstances. In general, the
command to propagate is directed towards the male and not the
female, both for exegetical and economic reasons. Therefore, in
addition to the prohibition against masturbation, male forms of
contraception are generally not permitted. Nevertheless, female
methods are sometimes allowed. The specific conditions under
which female contraception is permitted or required depend upon
one's interpretation of the following Rabbinic ruling:
Rabbi Bebai recited before Rabbi Nahman: There are three
classes of women who employ an absorbent for purposes of con-
traception: a minor, a pregnant woman, and a nursing
mother.... [a] minor lest she become pregnant and die, a preg-
nant woman lest abortion result, and a nursing mother lest she
become pregnant and prematurely wean the child so that it dies.
And what is a minor? From the age of eleven years and a day
until the age of twelve years and a day. One who is under or
over this age carries on her marital intercourse in the usual man-
ner-so says Rabbi Meir. But the other Sages say: The one as
well as the other carries on her marital intercourse in the usual
manner, and mercy be vouchsafed from Heaven, for [as Scrip-
ture says in Psalms 116:6], "The Lord preserves the simple.' 4
10. ZOHAR, Vay'hi 219b.
11. Id. Genesis 19b, 54b.
12. IsAAc BASHEVIS SINGER, From the Diary of One Not Born, in GIMPEL THE FOOL
169, 169 (Saul Bellows et al. trans., 1980) (1953).
13. ZOIAR, Emor 90a.
14. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yevamot 12b.
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The law follows the majority opinion, namely, that of the
Sages. There is some question, however, as to what the Sages actu-
ally mean. As the translation indicates, the Hebrew text uses the
present-tense indicative verb "employ" in the first clause. If that
verb is taken to mean that there are three classes of women who
may use a contraceptive device, it implies that other women may
not, even according to Rabbi Meir. With that understanding, the
Sages' opinion does not permit the three classes of women to use
contraception, regardless of whether their health or the health of
their babies is at stake. Rashi, the most famous commentator on
the Talmud, takes this position.'5 Later commentators adopting
Rashi's interpretation 16 were, nevertheless, generally convinced
that the Sages permitted contraception when someone's life or
health depended upon it. Consequently, they allowed contracep-
tion when medical reasons required it, but not otherwise.
Alternatively, if the operative verb in the above quotation is
interpreted to mean that there are three classes of women who
should or must use an absorbent, this implies that other women
may use contraceptive devices for other purposes as well. Those
other purposes may be strictly or leniently defined. Rabbenu Tam,
one of Rashi's grandsons, is followed by many in his adoption of
this approach. 7 While Rabbi Luria would permit all women to use
contraceptive devices, even for nontherapeutic purposes, others of
this school would restrict their use in one way or another.
Because propagation is a commandment, we must assume that
even the more liberal school would limit the use of contraceptives
to those couples who have already fulfilled the commandment by
having two children-except, of course, if the medical condition of
the woman or fetus requires contraception.' 8 In contemporary
times, when couples frequently postpone marriage until after they
have completed their extended education and initiated their ca-
reers, modern movements have varied widely in their response to
the ability and desirability of family planning. Some allow contra-
15. Rashi, m'shamshot b'mokh, in BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yevamot 12b.
16. E.g., Rabbi Meir Posner of eighteenth century Danzig; Rabbi Akiva Eger of nine-
teenth century Posen in Prussia; and Rabbi Moses Sofer of nineteenth century Pressburg.
17. Including Rabbi Asher ben Yehial (the "Rosh") of late thirteenth century and
early fourteenth century Germany and Spain; Rabbi Solomon Luria of sixteenth century
Poland; and Rabbi Isaac Halevi Herzog, first Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of the State of
Israel.
18. See FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 224-25.
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ception even before having children; the vast majority of Jews prac-
tice this. Yet, because of the losses of Jewish population, the high
rate of intermarriage, and the extremely low birth rate among
Jews, Jewish religious leaders have increasingly stressed the need
for Jews to propagate. Therefore, these factors have tempered an
otherwise liberal approach to contraception on the part of many
non-Orthodox rabbis and most Jews.
The same concerns govern the issue of sterilization but, addi-
tionally, Jewish law prohibits Jews from mutilating their bodies, as
the body is the property of God. Although sterilization procedures
are rather new, there are a few rabbinic rulings available on the
issues of vasectomies and tubal ligations. Both traditional and lib-
eral commentators forbid male sterilization, based on the rabbinic
interpretation and extension of two principles: First, Deuteronomy
23:2 states, "No one whose testes are crushed... shall be admitted
into the congregation of the Lord"; 19 and, second, Leviticus 22:24
states, "That which is mauled or crushed or torn or cut you shall
not offer unto the Lord; nor shall you do this in your land." 20 The
commentators more easily permit female sterilization, both be-
cause a woman does not come under these prohibitions and be-
cause she is not obligated to procreate. All commentators agree,
however, that even male sterilization is permitted, and perhaps re-
quired, when the man's life or health makes it necessary.21
In the case presented, Jewish law very clearly favors Herbert's
position. Neither Helen nor Herbert seem to have a medical con-
dition that requires them to use contraceptive methods to save
their health or lives. Further, they have not yet had any children,
so Helen cannot justify using contraceptives on the basis of having
already fulfilled the obligation to procreate. Some liberal, contem-
porary rabbis would permit the couple to use contraceptives while
finishing their education, but certainly not to the point that it
would be difficult for them to conceive and bear healthy children.
19. For the extended rabbinic interpretation, see MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH,
Laws of Forbidden Intercourse 16:2, :6; SHULcHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 5:2.
20. For the extended rabbinic interpretation, see BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat
110b.
21. See J. DAVID BLEICH, JUDAISM AND HEALING 65 (1981); COMPENDIUM ON MEDI-
CAL ETHICS 46-47 (David M. Feldman & Fred Rosner eds., 1984) (on the traditional per-
spective); SOLOMON FREEHOF, REFORM RESPONSA 206-08 (1960) (on the liberal
perspective).
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Moreover, Helen's duplicitous behavior in this case only adds to
the justice and moral correctness of Herbert's case.
VII. MARITAL FRAUD-FACT PATTERN
Alex and Phyllis have dated for four years. They have begun
to think seriously about marriage. Throughout the years of dating,
Phyllis has often expressed her desire to have a large family; her
love of children is well-known. Alex has always agreed with her
and apparently loves children as well.
Alex, however, is aware that, because of a childhood illness,
he is sterile. He realizes that Phyllis' desire for a large family is so
strong that she would probably not marry him if she knew he could
not father children. He decides not to tell her, thinking that, once
they are married, she will accept not having children or will be
amenable to adoption.
After two years of marriage, Phyllis becomes concerned be-
cause she is not yet pregnant. After a thorough medical exam, the
doctor tells her that nothing is physically wrong. She later insists
that Alex make an appointment for a similar checkup, and Alex
finally admits the truth. Phyllis is devastated by his deception. She
returns to her parents' home and consults an attorney. Because
both Alex and Phyllis are of your confession of faith, they request
that you provide an amicus curiae brief for the court to consider.
A. Roman Catholic Response
MICHAEL R. MOODIE, S.J.
Apart from specific and rare exceptions, Catholic Church doc-
trine does not admit the possibility of divorce.' Consent to marry,
once given, cannot be revoked; the resulting marriage is legally in-
dissoluble. Because of this doctrine of indissolubility, the attention
of canonists has historically focused upon the conditions necessary
to give the binding consent necessary to enter marriage.
1. A word of clarification regarding Catholic doctrine is needed here. The Catholic
Church teaches that marriage between two baptized Christians, whether Catholic, Protes-
tant, Orthodox, etc., is a sacrament. A sacramental marriage, once consummated, can
never be dissolved. Divorce, consequently, is impossible. The Catholic Church also
teaches, however, that marriages between non-baptized persons, although intrinsically per-
manent, can be dissolved "in favor of the faith." Only the Church can dissolve these mar-
riages, that is, grant a divorce. The Catholic Church does not recognize any other type of
divorce, whether religious or civil, as dissolving an existing marriage bond.
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In any practical judgment, a due proportion must exist be-
tween a person's knowledge and freedom and the responsibilities
assumed. The more serious the moral obligations, the greater the
required knowledge and freedom because no one is bound to what
is morally impossible.2 Given the consequences of consent-abso-
lute perpetuity-the consent given by a party must be proportion-
ately free and knowledgeable. When reasonable freedom and
knowledge are lacking, consent is vitiated and the marriage invalid.
Phyllis' and Alex's situation is one of deceit prior to consent.
Canon law did not historically accept deceit as a source or title of
nullity. The classical Roman law of contracts, incorporated into ca-
non law, considered deceit irrelevant in questions of validity. Con-
tracts in Roman law were generally held valid because of the words
and actions placed at the time of contract, whether or not deceit
was present.3 Although the ius gentium of the Praetors eventually
accepted deceit as affecting the validity of some forms of contracts,
canon law did not adopt this principle. Instead, canonists argued
that, because marriage is a more perfect state of life, even a person
deceived into marriage would, in effect, receive a benefit.4 There-
fore, even when given under deception, consent would bind the
parties involved.
Although classical canon law rejected in theory the principle
that deceit could vitiate marital consent, actual marital situations
demanded more nuanced responses. In a culture where marriages
were usually arranged, difficult situations arose; for example, it
seemed incorrect to recognize a marriage in which the wife's family
had arranged for their daughter to marry the first heir of a noble
family, only to discover after the ceremony that the daughter mar-
ried the family's second son. To give consent to the wrong person
was no minor matter when questions of inheritance and succession
were at stake; deceit was most certainly present. Yet, because the
Church did not recognize deceit as invalidating, ecclesiastical
courts could not declare the marriage invalid on that basis. Rather,
these courts judged that the deceived party's error vitiated consent.
Therefore, if a person thought that she was marrying one party
2. Canon law accepts this as a fundamental legal principle, as it states: "Nermo potest
ad impossibile obligari." Decretals of Boniface VIII, Liber Sextus, Rule of Law 6, in De
Regulis Iuris, 2 CORPUS IURIS CANONICI 1122 (Aemelius Friedberg ed., 1959).
3. See Kevin W. Vann, Dolus: Canon 1098 of the Revised Code of Canon Law, 47
JURIST 373 (1987).
4. See id. at 374.
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when, in fact, she was marrying another, the person contracted in-
validly. Because the intended object of consent (the eldest son in
the above example) was different than the actual object (the sec-
ond son), no real consent could be said to exist.
The ecclesiastical courts' rejection of deceit and their alterna-
tive acceptance of error as affecting the validity of marital consent
began centuries of legal application of the notion of error as a
source of nullity. From the obvious case of the above error in the
identification of a person, canonical jurisprudence hesitantly con-
cluded that error regarding a quality or characteristic of a person
could also vitiate consent, as long as that quality or characteristic
was directly intended and was the principal intention of consent.
Judges reasoned that a particular quality of a person could be so
fundamentally a part of consent that the later discovery of the ab-
sence of that characteristic would be equivalent to mistaking the
actual, physical person.
When canon law was codified in 1917, this evolving jurispru-
dence of error became part of the statutory law.5 Under the provi-
sions of the 1917 Code, Phyllis could petition her case only in terms
of error. To prove nullity on the basis of error was difficult and
rare. Although judges developed complex arguments to bring fac-
tual situations of deceit under the umbrella of error, the statutory
law itself was unsatisfactory. Because the statutory law did not rec-
ognize the influence of deceit, courts were constrained to argue in
terms of error even though they realized that the real issue was the
other party's deception.
At the beginning of his pontificate, Pope John XXIII man-
dated a complete revision of canon law. The revision process be-
gan in 1967. During the period of revision, the committee
responsible for marital law proposed that a new canon be added
specifying the invalidating effects of deceit upon marital consent.6
The revised Code, promulgated on January 25, 1983, incorporated
the following: "One who enters marriage misled by deceit, perpe-
5. Canon 1083 states:
§ 1. Error regarding the person renders a marriage invalid. § 2. Error regarding a
quality of the person, even if it gives cause to the contract, only invalidates
marriage:
1' if the error of quality redounds into error of person;
20 if a free person contracts marriage with a person whom he/she considers to
be free, but is in fact a slave in the proper sense of the term.
1917 CODE c.1083, §§ 1-2.
6. 3 Communicationes 76-77 (1971).
1993]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
trated in order to obtain consent, regarding some quality of the
other party which by its very nature can seriously disturb the part-
nership of conjugal life, invalidly contracts. ' 7
Assuming that the marriage of Alex and Phyllis took place af-
ter November 27, 1983, the date that the new law took effect, their
case would fall under the prescripts of the above canon.8 As even a
cursory reading of Canon 1098 reveals, not every type of deceit
invalidates marriage. To invalidate a marriage, deceit must (1) be
perpetrated in order to obtain consent, (2) regard a quality of the
other party, and (3) be objectively serious enough to disrupt conju-
gal life.9 Adequate proof of deceit would require the deceived
party to prove unawareness of the truth and that discovery of the
deceit precipitated the end of the marriage.10
Under canon law, Phyllis could petition to invalidate the mar-
riage on the grounds of deceit. The mere fact that Alex is sterile
would not invalidate the marriage.11 If both parties had known of
the sterility, or if Alex had been ignorant of the sterility, the valid-
ity of consent would not have been affected.
In sum, therefore, the invalidation is caused by the deceit it-
self, not the quality giving rise to the deceit. Although Alex's ste-
rility in itself is not invalidating, it is a quality which, by its nature,
7. "Qui matrimonium init deceptus dolo, ad obtinendum consensum patrato, circa ali-
quam alterius partis qualitatem, quae suapte natura consortium vitae coniugalis graviter per-
turbare potest, invalide contrahit." 1983 CODE c.1098.
8. According to Canon 9, laws are not retroactive. The legislation regarding deceit
would, therefore, not apply to marriages that took place prior to November 27, 1983. If
Phyllis and Alex had married before November 27, the case would have to be heard under
the title of error-a much more difficult allegation to prove. Admittedly, though, this limi-
tation of the law is a disputed point. Some canonists argue that being mislead by deceit is
not purely positive law but pertains to the natural law. A judge is thus entitled to apply the
law to any marriage. An adequate discussion of the reasoning on both sides of the issue,
however, is beyond the scope of the present analysis. 1983 CODE c.9.
9. The quality must be more than merely irritating to suffice. It must of its nature be
serious. This is pointed out by Justice Burke in a recent case: "[A] quality is not relevant
under the canon unless it involves an objectively grave defect which of itself tends to seri-
ously disturb the 'consortium' of conjugal life. Minor defects, even if one of the parties
finds them annoying, cannot be said of their nature to carry the potential for the serious
disturbance of married life." Coram Burke, Oct. 25, 1990, No. 14, in 26 STUDIA CANONICA
238 (1992) (emphasis in original).
10. See THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 781 (James A. Co-
riden et al. eds., 1985).
11. Canon 1084, Section 3 states, "Sterility does not prohibit nor invalidate marriage,
with due regard for [Clanon 1098." 1983 CODE c.1084, § 3. Canon 1098, as already men-
tioned, defines the invalidating effects of deceit. 1983 CODE c.1098.
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can disrupt conjugal life.12 Thus, the conditions for the application
of the Canon are fulfilled. Because Phyllis' discovery of the decep-
tion precipitated the end of the marriage, an ecclesiastical court
could reasonably conclude that the marriage was invalid due to de-
ceit. On the other hand, should Phyllis decide to forgive the deceit
and remain with Alex, her action would "validate" her consent. In
this case, because she still chooses marriage with Alex after knowl-
edge of the deceit, Phyllis is showing that Canon 1098 does not
apply in her case, and she no longer has a cause of action to invali-




Islamic law requires the satisfaction of certain initial condi-
tions before a marriage contract is recognized as valid. Among
these conditions are the willingness of the two parties to enter the
marriage union voluntarily, and the absence of any bar to mar-
riage. If these initial conditions are not satisfied, the marriage is
generally held to be either void or voidable.1
Bars to marriage range from familial factors, such as the exist-
ence of certain blood or milk relations between the contracting
parties, to physical and medical factors, such as the existence of
certain types of bodily defects, diseases or illnesses in either or
both of the parties. An example of a milk relation barring mar-
riage is one where the mother of the prospective spouse is found to
have nursed the other prospective spouse in his or her childhood.
This relationship would make the spouses "siblings-in-milk." Be-
sides creating a permanent bar to their marriage, their status as
"siblings" also entitles both of them to the full range of rights to
12. See supra note 9.
* For their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this essay, I would like to thank
Professor Peter Swisher of the T.C. Williams School of Law, Dr. Fathi Osman, Resident
Scholar at the Islamic Center of Southern California, and Dr. Hassan Hathout, Islamic
scholar and member of the Islamic Center of Southern California.
1. The best treatises on this subject include: 4 ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-JAZIRI, KrrAB
AL-FioH 'ALA AL-MADHAHIB AL-ARBA'AH (Beirut 1969) (1928); 7 WIHBAH AL-ZUHAYLI,
AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI WA ADIEurTuH (Damascus 1984); 2 FADL IBN AL-HASAN AL-
TABARSI, AL-MU'TALAF MIN AL-MUKHTALAF BAYN A'IMMAT AL-SALAF (Qumm 1990)
(twelfth century).
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which blood siblings are entitled, excluding certain rights such as
inheritance rights.
2
Scholars disagree on the scope of diseases and illnesses that
constitute a bar to marriage. They agree, however, on two basic
defects that make intercourse incomplete or impossible: (1) impo-
tence, which includes, for example, the presence of an unusually
small penis; and (2) the absence of a penis altogether. With few
exceptions, scholars agree also on an additional defect: the lack of
testicles.3 Such defects detract from the sexual enjoyment of the
wife, a basic right of the woman in an Islamic marriage. These de-
fects also contradict the basic goals of marriage, which include sex-
ual enjoyment and procreation.
Islamic literature also briefly addresses the issue of sterility.
The discussion of the issue is brief due to a previous absence of
adequate medical technology for determining sterility with cer-
tainty. Still, in light of the Islamic principles and methodologies of
ijtihad,4 it is possible to extrapolate a ruling on this matter based on
all available information, including the treatment of analogous
matters by Muslim scholars of various schools of ijtihad.
Therefore, it is important at this point to ask Phyllis and Alex
about the school of Islamic thought to which they adhere or prefer,
whether it be Shafi'i, Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, or Ja'fari, and then
provide an analysis based on that school's rationale. Most likely,
neither Alex nor Phyllis have thought much about this issue,
although Muslims in certain geographical areas tend to identify
themselves as adherents to one school of thought or another. In
the United States, however, it is most likely that the attorney for
each party will pick the school most sympathetic to his or her client.
2. Arguments Permitting Annulment-Different Islamic Schools
of Thought
A major goal of Islamic marriage is procreation. 5 A Muslim
wife has the right to have children. This right is fundamental and is
2. See, e.g., AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1, at 129-41 (providing a detailed discussion of
these issues).
3. For a thorough discussion of these matters, see AL-JAZIRI, supra note 1, passim
(especially pp. 180-98).
4. For more on this theory and the place of ijtihad in Islam, see Azizah Y. al-Hibri,
Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1
(1992).
5. See, e.g., AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1, at 107,517; 1 ABD AL-'AzIM SHARAF AL-DIN,
AHKAM AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYAH F1 AL-SHARI'AH AL-ISLAMIYAH 167 (3d ed. Egypt 1987).
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generally recognized in other areas of Islamic law as well. For ex-
ample, most scholars would argue that, while Muslims may practice
coitus interruptus and other forms of birth control, such practices
may not be adopted by the husband without the consent of the
wife; this is because such practices deny her both the right to have
a child and the right to undiminished sexual enjoyment.6
As noted earlier, the three male defects recognized by jurists
as voiding a marriage do not expressly include sterility. Instead,
discussion of sterility has been traditionally replaced with an analy-
sis of such lower-threshold issues as the inability to ejaculate, a
topic usually treated as part of the discussion on eunuchs. These
lower-threshold issues were a reflection of the dominant concerns
at the time. Significantly, these issues also recognized the central-
ity of sexual intimacy and procreation in ordinary family life.
Directly on point, however, is the story of Khalifah (Caliph)
Omar Ibn al-Khattab. Khalifah Omar was asked by a man who
believed himself to be sterile whether the man was obligated to
reveal that defect to his prospective bride. Khalifah Omar advised
the man to inform his prospective bride of his condition so that she
could make an informed choice about marrying him.7 This story
provides a very important precedent in the literature on such mat-
ters. Ibn al-Qayyim, a fourteenth century Muslim scholar, used
this story to argue that a party may choose to end a marriage when-
ever the other party has any defect whatsoever that is repugnant to
the first party, which defect was not revealed to the first party prior
to marriage.8 Malikis, on the other hand, recognize the wife's right
to annul her marriage from a eunuch if he cannot ejaculate, even if
he can still have an erection.9 Clearly, therefore, ejaculation is an
important function of sexual enjoyment and procreation, according
to Malikis. Indeed, both are widely recognized as basic goals in
marriage.
Hanbalis, however, are clearer on this point. Where the man
was a eunuch prior to marriage, and the wife has no notice of his
defect, Hanbalis argue that the wife has the right to annul the mar-
6. See Aziz Y. AL-HIBRI, Family Planning and Islamic Jurisprudence, in RELI-
GIOUS AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIIVES ON POPULATION ISSUES 2-11 (1993). See also AL-
TABARSI, supra note 1, at 154; ABD AL-RAHIM OMRAN, FAMILY PLANNING IN THE LEG-
ACY OF ISLAM 152-67 (1992).
7. AL-ZuHAYu, supra note 1, at 519; SHARAF AL-DN, supra note 5, at 167.
8. AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1, at 519.
9. AL-JAZIRi, supra note 1, at 183.
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riage, regardless of whether the husband is capable of ejaculation
or not.10 The reason given is that such a defect detracts from the
wife's sexual enjoyment. Thus, mere intercourse is not sufficient in
the Hanbali view to preserve the marriage. Full enjoyment by the
wife is a required aspect of intercourse. Indeed, Hanbalis argue
that any defect that prevents the full and perfect realization of the
goals of marriage should be accepted as a legitimate basis for an-
nulment. Based on this Hanbali ijtihad, we may extrapolate that
the wife's intercourse with a sterile husband may, depending on the
woman, detract from the woman's full enjoyment of intercourse
and, thus, provide a basis for annulment. Therefore, a wife's inabil-
ity to end such a marriage would contradict one of the basic goals
of marriage in Islamic law.
Shafi'is go even further in asserting the Muslim woman's right
to sexual enjoyment. Shafi'is give her the right to annul the mar-
riage in the case where the husband has no penis, even if she was
the one who severed it.1"
One reason for stressing the wife's right to sexual enjoyment is
that it protects her from adultery. Various schools have held that,
if the marriage did not provide her with a satisfactory sexual rela-
tionship, she may become vulnerable to the advances of others.
Therefore, it is the husband's responsibility to see to it that his wife
is sexually satisfied.12
In the instant case, Phyllis highly values procreation and has
stated that fact repeatedly. Alex, however, is incapable of fulfilling
her legitimate desire for children. Furthermore, he did not inform
her of his defect prior to the marriage. 13 In light of the preponder-
ance of evidence supporting the wife's right to annul in such cir-
cumstances, and in light of the very clear and important precedent
of Khalifah Omar, Phyllis must be given the right to annul the
marriage.
10. Id. at 196.
11. 1d at 194.
12. See, e.g., AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1, at 106-07.
13. Dr. Hassan Hathout offers another argument for annulment. According to Dr.
Hathout, the lack of notice was fraudulent. Therefore, because the Islamic marriage con-
tract is subject to contract law like any other contract, establishing fraud here provides
legitimate grounds for "rescission." There is some support for this view in AL-JAZIRI,
supra note 1, at 198; AL-TABARSI, supra note 1, at 149.
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3. Arguments Against Annulment
While all Muslims believe in a woman's right to sexual enjoy-
ment, it is not clear that sterility detracts significantly from it. As
for procreation, there is no such thing as a sterile person, because
God, not modem technology, determines sterility. To explain, the
Qur'an clearly tells the story of Abraham and Sarah. Sarah was
not only considered sterile, but she was also elderly. Nevertheless,
God informed Abraham that he would give them children, and He
did.14 For God, nothing is too difficult or impossible, regardless of
what our technology tells us. Further, Islamic literature has estab-
lished that a bride may live with an impotent husband (anin) for a
full year without losing the right to request an annulment.15 The
wait was not viewed as a waiver because jurists wanted to give the
groom a fair chance to recover from his condition.
In the case of sterility, the situation is somewhat analogous. A
husband may succeed in impregnating his wife in their later years.
This is especially true in today's world of ever-developing technol-
ogy. For that reason, a husband's fair chance to vindicate himself
should not be limited to one year. Finally, if God wanted the wife
to have children, she would, regardless of the husband's purported
condition.
Hanafis, in particular, adamantly limit the defects permitting
annulment to the three listed at the beginning of this essay. They
base this position on the view that marriage is no less sacred than
other familial bonds.16 Hence, if either one of the spouses has a
defect other than the three listed, the unafflicted spouse must help
the other spouse by providing all the necessary support that would
be provided for any other member of the family.
If this seems unusually harsh, Hanafis note that a prospective
spouse is responsible for thoroughly investigating the other pro-
spective spouse prior to marriage. That he or she did not ade-
quately do so is not a good reason to permit annulment. In the
present case, Phyllis had adequate opportunity to discover Alex's
infertility. Now that she has married him, she should help him, not
leave him. 17 In fact, Phyllis had a better chance in our modem
14. QUR'AN XI:69-74 (A. Yusuf All trans., 1983); see also id. XIX:1-15 (recounting the
story of Zakariyah and his old wife).
15. See, e.g., AL-JAZIRI, supra note 1, at 186, 191, 195-96.
16. See id. at 180.
17. Md
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technological society of ascertaining Alex's fertility than women
had in earlier societies. For example, she could have insisted on
having him medically tested prior to marriage. In a modem Is-
lamic state, the state may require such a test, including disclosure of
the results to the prospective spouse, as a prerequisite for mar-
riage. Such specific laws that supplement laws provided in the
Qur'an are acceptable in Islamic law as a proper part of Shari'ah in
that state. They may differ from those adopted in other Islamic
states due to the states' different customs and/or needs.
As a condition of the marriage, Phyllis also had the right to
specify in the marriage contract that Alex must be free from any
defects. Phyllis did not include such a condition in her contract
with Alex and, thus, waived her rights regarding this matter. She
cannot, therefore, later use Alex's defect as a basis for annulment.
This position is not new. Hanafis, for example, recognize the
legitimacy of including specific conditions in the marriage contract.
Where a condition is violated, the affected party has the right to an
annulment.18 It is also worth noting that Hanafis do not recognize
the woman's right to annulment where the husband is a eunuch
capable of an erection, even if he is not capable of ejaculation.19
This shows that some scholars do not view procreation as an essen-
tial part of the marriage or its goals. Indeed, some of them believe
that penetration, even without ejaculation, is sufficient to sustain
the legality of the marriage.20
If a wife does not want to continue in such a marriage, she
may choose divorce, which is permitted in Islamic law.21 The wife
may then marry another, this time with a more detailed marriage
contract that fully specifies her conditions for marriage.
4. Conclusion
While both arguments are compelling, the arguments in favor
of annulment more accurately reflect the Islamic position. Here,
the case is clearly one of marriage fraud. Divorce is much more
difficult than annulment, though the wife may be in a better finan-
18. For a more detailed discussion of the validity of conditions in the marriage con-
tract, see Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Marriage Laws in Muslim Countries, 4 INT'L REV. CoMP.
PuB. POL. 227-44 (1992).
19. See AL-JAZIRI, supra note 1, at 192. See also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying
text.
20. See AL-TABARSI, supra note 1, at 153.
21. Certain scholars have relied on this fact to deny annulment. See id at 149.
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cial position under the latter. The argument that God can do the
impossible provides a slippery slope that most scholars would not
approve of; for example, the argument could later be used to deny
other well-established Islamic rights like those of inheritance. The
argument, thus, would be that "if God wanted to give someone
money, God would have done so anyway." In short, Islamic courts
are charged with the responsibility of applying Islamic law carefully
and vigorously and are not entitled to vaguely speculate regarding




This hypothetical raises two interrelated issues under Jewish
law: First, whether Phyllis may divorce Alex in light of the discov-
ery; and, second, whether Phyllis may choose to remain married to
Alex even though he cannot procreate.
According to normative Jewish law, every man is obligated to
procreate and have, at a minimum, one boy and one girl.1 Under
normative Jewish law, however, a woman is not obligated to follow
the commandment to procreate. 2 Thus, Jewish law would deem it
proper if Phyllis were happy to continue in a marriage without hav-
ing children with her husband.3
1. SHuLCHAN ARUcH, Even Haezer 1:5. To have more than the minimum is to fulfill
a rabbinic commandment. Id. at 5-8.
2. SHUciicAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 1:13. Different rationales are presented for the
reason that Jewish law excluded women from the obligation to procreate. Lord Jacobivitz
suggests that it is because a woman's instinct is already so strong that there is no need to
add a legal obligation. Julius Preuss suggests that this was done to prevent "a kind of well
motivated promiscuity." DAVID FELDmAN, MARITAL RELATIONS, BIRTH CONTROL AND
ABORTION IN JEWISH LAw 54 (1975) (citing JuLius PREuss, BIBLIscH-TALMUDIScHE
MEDIZIN 479 (n.d.)). The Talmud linguistically derives it from the woman's exception from
combat. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yevamot 65b. Rabbi Moshe Sofer appears to relate the
exception to the risks of childbirth. RABBI MosHm SOFER, CHATAM SOFER, Even Haezer
20.
It has been suggested that there is a rabbinic obligation to procreate applicable to
women. Rabbi Noach Chaim Tzui, Atzay Arazim, in Su1cRAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 5:9;
RABBI YrrzCHAH SHEmELKEs, RESPONSA BElT YrrzcHAK, Even Haezer 91. This is very
difficult to accept in light of the clear statements to the contrary cited above. See
SHULcHAN ARucH, Even Haezer 1:4 (proposing a possible way to resolve this tension).
See also FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 55.
3. The same could not be said if the case were reversed. Because Jewish law obli-
gates a man to have children, a man is discouraged from staying in a relationship where
children cannot be produced, assuming he had no children from a prior relationship. The
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
On the other hand, Jewish law also recognizes the right of a
woman to have a child if she wishes; indeed, it accepts that she may
seek to end a marriage if the man is incapable or unwilling to have
children with her.4 Jewish law also recognizes that a woman has a
right to an ongoing sexual relationship with her husband.5 Should
the husband be incapable of an ongoing sexual relationship, the
wife may end the relationship on those grounds.
6
Phyllis, therefore, has the ultimate choice of whether to re-
main married to Alex or divorce him. If she chooses to remain in
the marriage, she may choose not to have children, to adopt chil-
dren, or, according to many authorities, to be artificially insemi-
nated. Regardless of which route Phyllis chooses, she must be
aware of the consequences of her choice under Jewish law, and the
differences in American law on the same issues.
1. The Alternative of Adoption for Phyllis and Alex7
Jewish law does not have an institution called adoption.
Although adoption must have been well known in talmudic times
because of its widespread use in Roman law,8 the codifiers of Jew-
ish law denied that the law recognized an institution of adoption.
Rather, they created an institution that they called "a person who
raises another's child." 9 Unlike either Roman law or current U.S.
ancient custom, however, is not to scrutinize these matters closely, even when people are
marrying in situations where no children will be produced. See Rabbi Moshe Isserless, in
SHULcHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 1:3, 154:10.
4. SHULCHAN ARuCH, Even Haezer 154:6. As noted by Rabbi Samuel Pardu, this
assumes that she has no children from a previous relationship. Rabbi Samuel Pardu, Beit
Shemuel, in id. at 154:10-11.
5. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Orach Chaim 240:1 (discussing the precise parameters of
this obligation).
6. SHucHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 154:6-7.
7. Much of this discussion is based on the author's previous analysis of adoption and
artificial insemination, in Michael J. Broyde, Note, The Establishment of Maternity and
Paternity in Jewish and American Law, 3 NAT'L JEWISH L. REv. 117 (1988).
8. F.P. WALTON, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ROMAN LAW 72 (1920).
Although it is commonly thought that adoption is a relatively recent phenomenon, it is not.
Adoption was recognized in the Babylonian Code of Hamurabi. THE CODE OF
HAMURABI, KING OF BABYLON arts. 185-186 (R.F. Harper trans., 1904). It was also regu-
lated in ancient Greek, Egyptian, and Roman civilization. See John Francis Brosnan, The
Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 332 (1922); Leo A. Huard, The Law of Adoption:
Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743 (1956) (summarizing various ancient adoption
laws).
9. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 19b. This is viewed as a righteous deed.
See also ExoDus RABBAH ch. 4. Although the institution under Jewish law is different
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adoption law,' 0 in Jewish law, this act does not change the legal
status of the child's parentage." One who raises another's child is
an agent of the natural parent and, like any agency rule in Jewish
law,12 if the agent fails to accomplish the task delegated, the obliga-
tion reverts to the principal. Thus, the biblical obligations, duties,
and prohibitions of parenthood still apply between the natural par-
ents and the child whose custody they no longer have. 13
than commonly accepted notions of adoption, the author uses the terms "adopted child"
and "adoptive parents" for ease of communication.
10. Adoption in the United States is one of the few areas of law where common law
had no influence, in contrast with England, where the common law rejected in toto the
institution of adoption. See C.M.A. McLauliff, The First English Adoption Law and Its
American Precursors, 16 SEroN HALL L. REV. 656, 659-60 (1986). Thus, from its legal
inception, adoption law in America rejected Jewish law's analysis of adoption as a type of
agency, and instead accepted the Roman model of legally changing the parenthood of the
child. As with Roman law, such a change was apparently total and complete, virtually
stripping the child of his prior identity. See Sanford N. Katz, Re-writing the Adoption
Story, 5 FAM. ADvoc. 9, 9-13 (1982).
Adoption laws were intended to put children in an environment where society could
not determine that they had been adopted; even the children themselves many times did
not know. U.S. law reflected this, severing all parental rights and duties with an adopted
child's natural parents, and establishing those rights and duties with the adoptive parents,
again following the Roman model. Id. The "right to know" controversy has resulted in a
number of state statutes governing an adoptee's ability, upon attaining the age of majority,
to access adoption information, including information identifying the biological parents.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-236 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(4)(D) (1993);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 710.68 (1992); Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.121 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-141 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1993). Each of these statutes has different
standards for revealing "identifying" versus "non-identifying" information, with the former
standards predictably much harder to meet due to privacy concerns. Once children have a
right to know who their natural parents are, the adoption law must reflect the dichotomous
relationship between one's natural parents and one's adoptive parents. See generally Carol
Amadio & Stuart L. Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children To 'Stay in
Touch' with Blood Relatives, 22 J. FAM. L. 59 (1983); Marshall A. Levin, Adoption
Trilemma: The Adult Adoptee's Emerging Search for His Ancestral Identity, 8 U. BALT. L.
REv. 496 (1979). These tensions have not yet been resolved in American law. Most states
still ascribe to adoption law the ability to recreate maternal and paternal relationships,
notwithstanding the knowledge of one's biological parents. States also maintain the ability
to legally destroy any such relationships. It is well within the power of the state to not only
create new parental rights and duties, but also to remove the rights of a parent towards its
child; this is true not only for the rights towards the child, but also for the duties of a parent
to a child. Levin, supra, at 496-97.
11. Although it is true that there are four instances in the Bible in which adopted
parents are called actual parents, these are assumed to be in a non-legal context. See 1
Chronicles 4:18; Ruth 4:17; Psalms 77:16; 2 Samuel 21:8; cf. BAaYLON IAN TALMUD, Sanhe-
drin 9b.
12. I.H. LEVINTHAL, THE JEWiSH LAw OF AGENCY 58-73 (1923).
13. SHULCHAN ARucH, Even Haezer 15:11.
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Conversely, one who raises another's child does not assume
the biblical prohibitions associated with one's own child. For ex-
ample, regardless of who is currently raising the child, it is never
permitted for a natural parent to marry his or her child. So too, the
assumption of custody cannot raise to a biblical level the prohibi-
tion of incest between a parent and the adopted child.14 Further,
the Talmud explicitly discusses whether or not adopted children
raised in the same home may marry each other, and concludes that
such marriages are permitted. 15
On the other hand, certain non-biblical family guidelines
promulgated by the rabbis have placed greater emphasis on cus-
tody than parenthood. For example, in talmudic times, it was de-
creed that the possessions, earnings, and findings of a minor child
belong to his father. 16 Although the wording of the Talmud refers
only to the father, it is clear from later discussions that this law
applies to anyone who supports the child, including adoptive par-
ents.1 7 The reasoning behind this rabbinic decree was equity; one
who supports a child should get the earnings of that child.' 8 Thus,
a financially independent minor does not transfer his income to his
parents because he is supporting himself.' 9 Similarly, the earnings
of a dependent adopted child go to his adoptive parents, as the
rationale for the decree applies equally to adopted and biological
children.20
Other examples of adoptive parents being treated as natural
parents can be found in the area of ritual law. For example, while
the rabbis prohibited two unrelated, unmarried people of the op-
posite sex from rooming together alone, 2' some argue that these
rules do not apply in the adoption scenario. Specifically, although
14. 1& ("It is permitted to marry one's adopted sister.").
15. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sotah 43b. One medieval authority, Rabbi Judah ben Sa-
muel, decreed that such marriages not be performed. JUDAH BEN SAMUEL OF REGEN-
SBERG (HA'CHAsID), SEFER HA'CHASIDIM sec. 829 (Rebeun Margolies ed., 1956)
[hereinafter SEFER HA'CHASIDIM]; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sotah 43b. This decree
has not been generally accepted. See RABBI M. SoFEA, RESPONSA, 2 Yoreh Deah 125.
Although legally permitted, few such marriages are actually performed. Id.
16. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Metzia 12b.
17. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 370:2.
18. Rabbi J. Falk, Meirat Einaim, in SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 370:2.
19. SHULcHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 370:2.
20. Id; see also Rabbi Z. Mendal, Be'er Haytaiv § 4, in SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen
Mishpat 370:2.
21. In Hebrew, these are the laws of yichud. See Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 22:2.
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some commentators disagree, 2 many maintain that it is permissi-
ble for an adopted child to live with his adopted family,23 notwith-
standing the prima facie violations of the above prohibition.24 As
one of these commentators noted, without this lenient rule, the in-
stitution of raising another's child would disappear.25
Another example of the different treatment of adopted chil-
dren under ritual law is the adopted children's lack of obligation to
recite the mourner's prayer (kaddish) upon the death of their natu-
ral parents, and the incumbent obligation for them to mourn upon
the death of their adoptive parents.26 This is so because the institu-
tion of mourning is rabbinic in nature.27 There exist numerous
other examples of rabbinic institutions not strictly applied in the
context of raising another's child, as Jewish law encourages this
activity.28
Notwithstanding the high praise given by Jewish law to a per-
son who raises another's child,29 it is critical to realize that the insti-
tution of adoption in Jewish law is radically different from U.S.
adoption law. The natural parents are always the "parents"; the
adopted parents never are. While a number of incidental areas of
parental rights are associated with custody rather than natural
parenthood, they are the exception, not the rule. Jewish law fo-
cuses entirely on natural relationships to establish parental rights
and duties.
22. 4 RABBI M.M. SHNEERSON, ZicHRoN AKEDAT YrrzcHAK 33-37. For a complete
list of authorities agreeing with this position, see Azarya Berzon, Contemporary Issues in
the Laws of Yichud, 13 J. HALACIA & CoNrrEMP. Soc'y 77, 108 (1986).
23. For example, this occurs when a couple adopts a boy and the boy's adoptive father
later dies, leaving the adopted child living alone with a woman not his natural mother.
24. See 6 RABBI ELIEZER WALDENBERG, Tzrrz ELIEZER 40:21; RABBI C. DAVID
HAL~vi, AsEaH L cHA RAy 194-201. Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik has also been quoted
as permitting this. See Melech Schacter, Various Aspects of Adoption, 4 J. HALACHA &
CoNTEM. Soc'y 93, 96 (1982); see also RABBI MosHm FEINSrEIN, IOROT MosHE, 4 Even
Haezer 64"2.
25. 6 WALDENBERG, supra note 24, at 40:21.
26. RABBI M. SOFER, RESPONSA 1 ORACH CHAIM 164. Rabbi Sofer also notes the
praise Jewish law gives to one who raises another's child.
27. This issue is in dispute. Compare SHuLCHAN ARUCH, Yoreh Deah 398:1 with
Rabbi Moshe Isserless, in id. 399:13.
28. See generally SHuLCHAN ARUCH, Orach Chaim 139:3; see also Rabbi Abraham
Gumbiner, Magen Avraham, in SauLc1A ARucH, Orach Chaim 156; 1 RABBI Mosr
FEINSTEIN, IGRoTr MosHm, Yoreh Deah 161.
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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Thus, if one chooses to adopt, it would be a laudable action.
Yet, the adoptive parent must realize that the natural parents will
always remain the true "parents" of the adopted child.
2. The Alternative of Artificial Insemination
Along with the traditional options of adoption and childless
marriages, a woman whose husband is sterile could have children
through artificial insemination. The permissibility of artificially in-
seminating a married woman with sperm other than her husband's
is the subject of a multi-sided dispute in Jewish law, and touches on
issues of adultery, legitimacy, and modesty.30
There are four basic positions that discuss this issue. The first
position, held by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, permits artificial insemi-
nation3' and establishes the paternity of the child by the genetic
relationship between the child and the father.32 Thus, he who do-
nates the sperm is the father. Further, Rabbi Feinstein believes
that the act of artificial insemination does not violate Jewish law,33
and does not constitute an act of adultery by the woman. 34
The second position, held by Rabbi Teitelbaum, is identical to
the first in that it acknowledges the legal significance of the genetic
relationship and recognizes that paternity is established solely
through the genetic relationship. 35 Yet, this position also maintains
30. According to Jewish law, non-biological relationships such as those created by
adoption are not recognized as creating a prohibition against marriage. BABYLONIAN TAI-
MUD, Yevamot 21a. Indeed, as noted in the Shulchan Aruch, it is permissible to marry
one's adopted sibling, even if he or she was raised in the same house. SHULCHAN ARUCH,
Even Haezer 15:11. Thus, it is safe to say that, according to Jewish law, parental relation-
ships are granted to the natural parent and cannot later be changed to be in harmony with
custodial relationships. Unlike American law, Jewish law typically presents no problems
for establishing parental status because, in almost all situations, the identity of the parent is
legally clear. Id.
31. See Feinstein, supra note 24, at 1:10, :71, 2:11, 3:11. For another vigorous defense
of his own position, see RABBI MOSHE FEINSTEIN, DIBROT MosHE, Ketubot 233-48.
32. As discussed in my previous response to the Prenuptial Agreement fact-pattern,
there are situations in Jewish law where, even in the course of a sexual relationship, no
paternity is established. According to Jewish law, the chilW of a relationship between a Jew
and a Gentile always assumes the legal status of its mother. The child bears no legal rela-
tionship to its father. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yevamot 22a-b; Jacob ben Asher, Tur, in
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 16. This is equally true in cases of artificial insemination.
Id.
33. Feinstein, supra note 24, at 2:11.
34. In normal circumstances, this would lead to the classification of the child as illegit-
imate. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 4:13. If done intentionally, it would mandate sep-
aration of the couple. Id.
35. 2 RABBI YOEL TEITELBAUM, DIvREI YOEL 110, 140.
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that the genetic relationship predominates in establishing illegiti-
macy and the legal propriety of these actions. Thus, Rabbi Teitel-
baum views heterologous artificial insemination as an act of
adultery.3 6 In sum, while Rabbis Feinstein and Teitelbaum agree
on how paternity is established, they differ as to how illegitimacy is
established.
The third position, held by Rabbi Waldenberg, posits that an
act of adultery occurs when the act of heterologous insemination
occurs, and not when the sperm mixes with the egg. Therefore,
because this act is physically analogous to adultery, it is not permit-
ted.37 This view is not based on the presence or absence of genetic
relationships between child and father, but rather upon the belief
that the injection of sperm is itself a prohibited form of adultery. 38
Further, Rabbi Waldenberg maintains that such conduct violates
the rules of modesty, which are of rabbinic origin.3 o Thus, he
would prohibit such conduct in all circumstances, regardless of
whether it technically violates the biblical prohibition against
adultery.4°
The fourth and final position, held by Rabbi Breish, believes
that heterologous insemination is neither an act of adultery nor a
biblical violation.41 Nonetheless, Rabbi Breish maintains that,
"from the point of view of our religion these ugly and disgusting
things should not be done, for they are similar to the deeds of the
land of Canaan and its abominations." 42
The essence of this dispute revolves around a single talmudic
source found in Tractate Hagigah,43 which discusses artificial in-
semination en passant. Tractate Hagigah states:
Ben-Zomah was asked: May a pregnant virgin marry a High
Priest? Do we assume that Samuel is correct, when he states
that one can have intercourse many times without removing the
physical characteristics of virginity, or perhaps this is unlikely?
36. Id.
37. See 9 Tzrrz ELIEZER, supra note 24, at 51:4.
38. Id.
39. Id. Rabbi Waldenberg maintains that this conduct violates the laws of marital
modesty (dat yehudit). See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubot 72a.
40. Rabbi Waldenberg would also prohibit surrogate motherhood on the same
grounds. See Rabbi E. Waldenberg, Test Tube Infertilization, 5 SEER ASYA 84-92 (1986).
41. 3 RABBI YAKOV BREIsH, CHELKAT YAKOV 45-48 [hereinafter CHELKAT YAKOV];
see also 3 RABBI YECHEIL YAKOV WEINBERG, SREDAI EIsH 5 [hereinafter SREDAI EIsH].
42. 3 CHELKAT YAKOV, supra note 41, at 45-51.
43. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Hagigah 14b-15a.
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He replied: Samuel's position is unlikely, and we assume that
the woman was artificially inseminated.44
The simple explanation of the talmudic text is that artificial insemi-
nation does not create legal prohibitions that are normally based
on prohibited sexual conduct. Through silence, the Talmud implies
that it establishes paternity, for the Talmud would have explicitly
stated that it did not establish paternity.45
Citing additional support for the first position, Rabbi Feinstein
quotes a ruling by Rabbi David Halevi (Taz) of the seventeenth
century, which is itself based on a Responsa of Rabbi Peretz, an
eleventh century Jewish scholar.4 Rabbi Peretz stated that, "in the
absence of sexual intercourse, the child resulting from the mixing
of sperm and egg is always legitimate.
'47
Based on this source, Rabbi Feinstein reaches a critically im-
portant conclusion: If there is no forbidden sexual act, the child is
legitimate under Jewish law.48 Additionally, this child is not even
stigmatized to the extent that he is forbidden to marry someone of
priestly descent,49 because all of the stigmas associated with the
child of an illicit relationship are dependent upon the presence of
prohibited intercourse, not upon the genetic combination of two
44. According to Jewish law, the High Priest may only marry a woman who has never
had intercourse before her marriage to him. See Leviticus 21:13; see also MAIMoNmEs,
MISHNAH TORAH, Sefer Kedusha, Hilchot Issurai Biah 17:13.
45. This is the near unanimous opinion of the decisors. See 2 RABBI OBADIA YOSEF,
YABIAH OMER, Even Haezer 1:6; 3 SREDAI EISH, supra note 41, at 5; Rabbi Samuel ben
Uri, Chelkat Mechoket, in SHULCHAN ARUcH, Even Haezer 1:6; IOROT MOsHE, supra note
24, at 1:10, :71; RABBI MENASHE KLEIN, 4 MISHNAH HALACHOT 160; 3 Tzrrz EIJEZER,
supra note 24, at 27:3; 2 DIvRni YOEL, supra note 35, at 110, 140; RABBI S. DulRA
(TAsHnn-Z), 3 RESPONSA 263; Rabbi Samuel Pardu, Belt Shmuel, in Su.cHAN ARUCH,
Even Haezer 1:10; RABBI J. ETrLINGER, ARUCH LENEIR, Yevamot 10; 2 RABBI JACOB
EMDEN, SHELAT YAvEI-z 96. It is sometimes claimed that the Turai Zahav (Taz) disagrees
with this. See Rabbi David Halevi, Turai Zahav, in SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 1:8
[hereinafter Turai Zahav]. It is not necessarily true that the Taz is only referring to the
question of the fulfillment of the commandment to have children, and not also the estab-
lishment of paternity. See generally Fred Rosner, Artificial Insemination in Jewish Law, in
JEWISH BIOETHIcs 105, 111 (Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979).
46. IGROT MosHE, supra note 24, at 1:10. See Turai Zahav, supra note 45, Yoreh
Deah 195 n.7. The original work by Rabbi Peretz has been lost. The authenticity, how-
ever, is not in doubt, as this position has been frequently cited in his name. See Rabbi Joel
Sirkes, Bayit Chadash (Bach), in JACOB BEN ASHER, TUR, Yoreh Deah 195; Rabbi Samuel
Pardu, Beit Shmuel, in SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 1:10; Rabbi I. Rozanz, Mishnah
Le'Melech, in MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, Sefer Nashim, Hilchot Ishut 15:4.
47. IGROT MosHm, supra note 24, at 1:10, 2:11, 3:11.
48. Id. 1:10.
49. DIBROT MosHE, supra note 31, Ketubot 239-43.
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people prohibited to each other.50 Furthermore, Rabbi Feinstein
accepts the literal interpretation of the talmudic text in Tractate
Hagigah and states that the genetic father is also the legal one.
In support of the second position, Rabbi Teitelbaum relies on
radically different sources than that of Rabbi Feinstein. Specifi-
cally, Rabbi Teitelbaum relies on a position articulated by Rabbi
Moses ben Nachman (Nachmanides), a twelfth century commenta-
tor on both the Talmud and the Bible. In Nachnamides' explana-
tion on the verse, "One may not have intercourse with one's
neighbor's wife for seed [or sperm],' '51 Nachmanides focuses on the
final two words of the verse "for seed." He claims that these two
words seem to be unnecessary, but raises the possibility that they
were placed in the text to emphasize one reason for the prohibition
of adultery-that society will not know from whom the child is de-
scended.5 2 Accepting this as one of the intellectual bases for the
prohibition of adultery, Rabbi Teitelbaum claims that heterologous
insemination, even without any physical act of intercourse, is bibli-
cally prohibited because, had there been intercourse, it would have
been categorized as an act of adultery.5 3 Therefore, he concludes
that the genetic combination of two people who are prohibited to
marry leads to illegitimacy, even when there is no sexual
intercourse.5
In support of the third position, Rabbi Waldenberg relies to a
great extent upon the same material as Rabbi Teitelbaum. Yet,
Rabbi Waldenberg does not emphasize the genetic relationship in
the mixing of sperm and egg; rather, he notes that, according to
Nachmanides, the injection of sperm is itself an act of adultery
analogous to intercourse.55 Thus, he maintains that the act of in-
semination is prohibited because it is the legal equivalent of actual
50. IGRoT MosliE, supra note 24, at 1:10. In this Responsum, Rabbi Feinstein ad-
vances an alternative explanation of why the child is permitted to marry a priest.
51. Leviticus 18:20.
52. Rabbi Moses ben Nachman (Nachmanides), commenting on Leviticus 18:20.
53. 2 DivREi YOEL, supra note 35, at 110, 140.
54. Id. Rabbi Teitelbaum also devoted considerable time and effort to defending his
reliance upon a biblical commentary to derive principles of Jewish law. He noted that,
while some authorities believe that the reliance upon commentaries on the Bible is not
acceptable because such commentaries were not intended to be used as sources for estab-
lishing Jewish law, these sources ought to serve as a guide and furnish us with a better
understanding of the scope of the law. This is particularly true when these sources indicate
that our conduct should become stricter rather than more lenient. For Rabbi Feinstein's
reply, see DMROrT MosHm, supra note 31, at 238-39.
55. 9 Tzrrz ELMZER, supra note 24, at 51:4; 3 id at 27:1.
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intercourse, just as anal intercourse is legally identical to normal
intercourse.5 6 Rabbi Waldenberg also vigorously disputes Rabbi
Peretz's conclusions, quoting a number of early decisors who disa-
gree with Rabbi Peretz. 57 It is worth noting that, according to
Rabbi Waldenberg, one may conclude that the one who injects the
sperm is culpable of committing the act of adultery.58 Another
commentator has gone so far as to assert that the person who in-
jects the sperm is the legal father, because he is the one committing
adultery.59 This position has been widely attacked as based on an
illogical premise that neither the genetic father nor the husband of
the wife would be considered the father of the child.60
As to the fourth and final position, Rabbi Breish represents
the intellectual hybrid of the positions of Rabbis Feinstein and
Waldenberg. Rabbi Breish concedes that the child resulting from
artificial insemination is legitimate (a major concession according
to Rabbi Feinstein).61 Rabbi Breish hesitates, however, in permit-
ting this conduct in contravention of the legal rules of adultery, in
contrast to Rabbi Waldenberg's position. Rabbi Breish maintains
that permitting conduct that people widely assume to be prohibited
will result in the general decline of moral values.62 Thus, he pro-
hibits this conduct because it is the top of a slippery slope that he is
not willing to slide down.63
56. See Isserless, supra note 3, at 20:1.
57. See 3 Tzrrz ELIEZER, supra note 24, at 27:1.
58. Id.
59. Shapiro, Artificial Insemination, 1 NOAM 138-42 (1957).
60. See Menachem Kasher, Artificial Insemination, 1 NOAM 125-28; 3 CHELKAT
YAKOV, supra note 41, at 47.
61. 3 CHELKAT YAxov, supra note 41, at 45-46.
62. Id. at 48-51. For an earlier articulation of this concept, see SEFER HA'CHASiDrM,
supra note 15, ch. 829. Rabbis Feinstein and Breish engaged in vigorous written correspon-
dence on these various topics. See DIBROT MOSHE, supra note 31, at 232-48.
63. The jurisprudential analysis used by normative U.S. law is completely contrary to
the principles used in Jewish law. U.S. law, unlike its Jewish counterpart, does not view the
identity of the natural parent as the critical question in establishing legal paternity; rather,
it views that question only as the starting point of the analysis. In the United States, the
power is reserved to the legal system to harmonize parental rights with other values such as
custodial parenthood or the best interest of the child. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 2 (1962);
2 J. MCCAHEY ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION LAW AND PRAcncE §§ 10.01-03,
11.0(1) (1987); H. GAMBLE, THE LAW RELATING TO PARENTS AND CHILDREN 169 (1981).
Heterologous insemination presents two issues in U.S. law. The first issue regards the
rights and responsibilities of a husband to a child who is not genetically his own. The
second regards the rights and duties of a sperm donor to his genetic child. The leading case
on the duties of a husband towards a child not genetically his own is People v. Sorensen,
437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968). See also S. v. S., 440 A.2d 64 (NJ. 1981); In Re Adoption of
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3. The Alternative of a Childless Marriage
As explained above, there is no Jewish obligation for a woman
to have children.64 If a woman is comfortable without children,
Jewish law recognizes that personal decision as completely proper
and within the individual's discretion. Yet, there are a number of
related concerns. Most significantly, if a woman's husband recov-
ered from an illness-imposed sterility later in life, he, like his wife,
would be within his rights under Jewish law to seek a divorce if, at
that time, the woman could not provide him with children.65 This
choice must be made on an individual basis.
4. The Possibility of Divorce
Like all Jewish marriages, should either party wish to end the
marriage, the couple is required to execute a get, or Jewish divorce.
Indeed, a marriage formed in accordance with Jewish law cannot
Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973); Noggle v. Arnold, 338 S.E.2d 763 (Ga. 1985); R.S. v.
R.S., 670 P.2d 923 (Kan. 1983); Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647 (Utah 1980); In re Custody of
D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d 530 (Wis. 1987); L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 312 N.W.2d 853 (Wis. 1981); In re
Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1987).
Only one case has found that children who are the product of consensual heterologous
artificial inseminations are illegitimate. See Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963)
(yet holding that the husband's consent estopped him from litigating the issue of his finan-
cial duty to support the children). Thus, U.S. law is nearly settled that children resulting
from heterologous insemination are legitimate. Further, all of the states that have com-
mented on the issue have accepted that, once a man consents to the artificial insemination
of his wife, he is legally obligated to support the resulting children. This obligation is based
on one of two theories: the theory of equitable estoppel, which prohibits the husband from
litigating the paternity of a child resulting from heterologous insemination to which he
consented; or the theory of adoption, which states that the husband, by his consent, has
formally or informally adopted the children.
Most states strip the sperm donor (the father) of his rights when he donates through
artificial insemination and a sperm bank. See Note, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artifi-
cial Insemination by Donors, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1062 n.79 (1985). Few American cases
discuss the rights of a sperm donor. See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (NJ. 1977) (ruling that
the donor was the natural father of the child and entitled to visitation rights); see also
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986) (involving the
informal donation of sperm to a woman without the presence of a physician).
64. As a side issue, if a woman dies childless and without a will, her husband will
inherit her estate. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer, 90:1. If her husband predeceases her,
her estate goes to her immediate relatives. Id., Choshen Mishpat 246:1-3 (noting the order
or priorities of heirs). For an overview of the issues involved regarding wills, see Judah
Dick, Jewish Law and the Conventional Last Will and Testament, 2 J. HALACHA & CON-
TEMP. Soc'y 5 (1982); see also IGROT Mosum, supra note 24, 1 Yoreh Deah 109.
65. SHuLcHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 1:5-6, 154:10; see also Isserless, supra note 3, at
1:5-6, 154:10 (explaining the terminology used in that section).
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be ended, in the eyes of Jewish law, through a civil divorce. 66 Thus,
one who is married religiously and divorced only civilly remains
married according to Jewish law. This is no trivial matter, as all
sexual relationships by a person still religiously married to another
(other than with the spouse) are classified as adulterous. Children
fathered by a man other than the husband are illegitimate.67 Upon
divorce, an individual is free to search for another to marry.68
Should it prove impossible to execute a religious divorce, 69 it is
possible that the marraige is void due to sufficient fraud in its en-
actment. The essential issue then becomes whether the inability to
father children, without impotence, is sufficient fraud in any given
case. 70 Particularly because the facts of this case state only that
Phyllis would probably not marry Alex if she knew he could not
father children, the resolution of this issue is uncertain. Unques-
tionably, the preferred option is that a get be issued.71
5. Conclusion
The choice of remaining in the marriage belongs to Phyllis. If
she wishes, she may continue in a marriage with a husband who is
sterile. If she chooses to remain, she may choose not to have chil-
dren, to adopt children, or, according to many authorities, to be
artificially inseminated. On the other hand, if she wishes to end
this marriage, that option is also valid. The choice is ultimately
hers to make.
66. For a complete discussion of this issue, see IRvIno BRnrrowrrz, BETWEEN CrvIL
AND RELIGIOUS LAw: THE PLIGHT OF THE AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SoCmTY chs. 1-3
(forthcoming 1994).
67. SHuLcSAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 15:16-18.
68. One cannot, however, marry a Cohen after being divorced. SHuLcHAN ARUCH,
Even Haezer 6:1.
69. This is called an agunah, or "a chained woman." For various reasons, an agunah
cannot have a Jewish divorce executed. For a discussion of this issue and various alterna-
tive solutions to this problem, see generally BRErrowrrz, supra note 66.
70. It is crucial to distinguish between impotence and sterility in this issue, as they are
treated differently under Jewish law. See OQZAR HApOsKIM SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even
Haezer 39:5(32), 44:4(16); see also SHuLcHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 44:4.
71. Thus, for example, Rabbi Feinstein states that a man who is impotent and enters
into a marriage, but does not inform his prospective spouse of his impotency, has used
fraud in the enactment of the marriage. If no get can be issued, the woman may remarry
without a get. IGROT MOSHE, supra note 24, at 1:79; see also id at 1:80,4:113 (adopting the
same posture concerning uninformed lunacy and closet homosexuality); see also RABBI
SHMUEL STERN, 7 REsPONSA EVEN A7EZER 6 (applying to venereal disease). Again, it is
important to distinguish between impotence and sterility, as they are treated differently
under Jewish Law. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 154:6-7 (regarding the husband's
ability to fulfill the obligation of an ongoing sexual relationship).
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